Talking bollocks thread #2

kvs wrote:

Russian automated (as in workers do not have to manually handle pipes and other tasks) oil drilling platform.    
It is designed for easier relocation as well.

Yep, Russia doesn't make anything.   More like clowns in the west are either sore losers or don't have brains.  

Well, go talk to Kilogolf over at nuclear weapons section of forums, he thinks Russians are fucking stupid cause of their submarines and ballistic missiles. So we got those dolts even here on the forums.

miketheterrible wrote:Well, go talk to Kilogolf over at nuclear weapons section of forums, he thinks Russians are fucking stupid cause of their submarines and ballistic missiles. So we got those dolts even here on the forums.

I think Russians are stupid.

KiloGolf wrote:

miketheterrible wrote:Well, go talk to Kilogolf over at nuclear weapons section of forums, he thinks Russians are fucking stupid cause of their submarines and ballistic missiles. So we got those dolts even here on the forums.

I think Russians are stupid.

Then why you are posting in RUSSIAN defence forum?


I have to say that this kind of stuff is the reason why I visit this forum.

Russia si the only success story of the collapse of the eastern block.

Every other country ( including the current nato/eu members) had a catastrophic collapse, and they never recovered from the shock.

The only positive example Russia, and they did it on they own.

Means the help to eastern Europe wasn't help really, but rather a devastating blow.

Singular_Transform wrote:

KiloGolf wrote:

miketheterrible wrote:Well, go talk to Kilogolf over at nuclear weapons section of forums, he thinks Russians are fucking stupid cause of their submarines and ballistic missiles. So we got those dolts even here on the forums.

I think Russians are stupid.

Then why you are posting in RUSSIAN defence forum?


I have to say that this kind of stuff is the  reason why I visit this forum.

Russia si the only success story of the collapse of the eastern block.

Every other country ( including the current nato/eu members) had a catastrophic collapse, and they never recovered from the shock.

The only positive example Russia, and they did it on they own.

Means the help to eastern Europe wasn't help really, but rather a devastating blow.

Em... he was sarcastic...

Then why you are posting in RUSSIAN defence forum?

Because he likes to talk to people more intelligent than he is...

Can't find that on any pro western websites sadly...

GarryB wrote:

Then why you are posting in RUSSIAN defence forum?

Because he likes to talk to people more intelligent than he is...

Can't find that on any pro western websites sadly...

Strong high school vibes in this one. Take it easy friend.

Singular_Transform wrote:
Then why you are posting in RUSSIAN defence forum?

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/irony

2a

GunshipDemocracy wrote:

Singular_Transform wrote:
Then why you are posting in RUSSIAN defence forum?

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/irony

2a

the guy posting here due to irony, or the post was irony?

Singular_Transform wrote:

GunshipDemocracy wrote:

Singular_Transform wrote:
Then why you are posting in RUSSIAN defence forum?

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/irony

2a

the guy  posting here due to irony, or the post was irony?

the funniest thing in jokes it to explain meaning. Please just let it go.

the guy  posting here due to irony, or the post was irony?

No, he is being an ass by posting flame bait, but is pretending he is being Ironic to get away with any negative comments.

You know what it is like.... you post something you truly believe, and then later pretend it was a joke when it is not well received...

See slow clapping guy humour to understand... when it doesn't work he becomes the joke...

GarryB wrote:The strategic arms reduction treaty, which is currently in force limits strategic weapons... that includes ICBMs on trains or trucks or in silos or even on launch platforms.

What would the speed of a MIRV be in outer space ? I'm not talking about the speed of descent at which it travels towards its target once it enters the Earth's atmosphere. But the speed at which it travels in outer space.

Can MIRVs (Russian, US) manoeuvre in outer space ? If yes how will an exo atmospheric intercept missile, intercept them ?

It is hard to say what the actual speed would be... though as long as it is less than orbital speed then it will fall back to earth.

Think of MIRV as being a bomber armed with laser guided bombs... the bomber is the bus, while the warheads when released on a path to the target will correct their fall to land as close to the target as they can all the way to impact.

MARV is more like cruise missiles... a bit like small pilotless aircraft that fly to the target area on their own so the bus never gets anywhere near the enemy airspace.

The MARVS can be programmed to fly planned manouvers but are unlikely to have onboard sensors that detect incoming threats... remember if the MARV is moving at 6-7km/s and the interceptor is moving at even half that then the closing speed will be over 10km/s... even a small fragment hitting at that speed will do serious damage...

GarryB wrote:The MARVS can be programmed to fly planned manouvers but are unlikely to have onboard sensors that detect incoming threats...

So in that case, on what basis will the MARVs manoeuvre if they can't detect incoming threats ? In other words when do they manoeuvre ? Obviously not when an interceptor missile is approaching them because as you said, they don't have any sensors to detect the incoming missile.

jhelb wrote:

GarryB wrote:The MARVS can be programmed to fly planned manouvers but are unlikely to have onboard sensors that detect incoming threats...

So in that case, on what basis will the MARVs manoeuvre if they can't detect incoming threats ? In other words when do they manoeuvre ? Obviously not when an interceptor missile is approaching them because as you said, they don't have any sensors to detect the incoming missile.

A MARV will fly a pre planned evasive course to the target erea.

Same as a cruise missile... it will fly a pre programmed path that avoids known SAM sites and enemy positions so it can sneak up on the target and get surprise.

Obviously for a falling warhead that is not exactly the same but a few preprogrammed and timed course changes with an ultimate turn to hit the target or get to its most effective detonation point would make it a difficult target for a hit to kill munition.

GarryB wrote:Obviously for a falling warhead that is not exactly the same but a few preprogrammed and timed course changes with an ultimate turn to hit the target or get to its most effective detonation point would make it a difficult target for a hit to kill munition.

Why don't MARVs get some sensors then ? Cruise missile have them.

Adding radar based sensors would be rather complicated and expensive and to have the range and resolution needed to be effective would take of space and be very expensive... not to mention not really improving accuracy or performance except increasing the chance of dodging a threat that might or might not hit the missile anyway.

Adding IR sensors has similar problems and having an IR sensor that can look ahead of the warhead looking for climbing interceptors that can detect and track them at a useful range... including during reentry with an enormous IR plume as it enters the atmosphere... and of course the obvious problem... it detects an IR signature... how far away is the intercepting missile? What sort of manouver would the warhead need to perform to evade that interceptor missile and does it have enough fuel to both perform that manouver and still steer back to hit the intended target...

In comparison a cruise missile can be fitted with simple flare and chaff launchers and a simple IR sensor that can detect an incoming missile from 2-3km... easily enough time to fire off some flares and chaff...

GarryB wrote:Adding radar based sensors would be rather complicated and expensive and to have the range and resolution needed to be effective would take of space and be very expensive... not to mention not really improving accuracy or performance except increasing the chance of dodging a threat that might or might not hit the missile anyway.

Adding IR sensors has similar problems and having an IR sensor that can look ahead of the warhead looking for climbing interceptors that can detect and track them at a useful range... including during reentry with an enormous IR plume as it enters the atmosphere... and of course the obvious problem... it detects an IR signature... how far away is the intercepting missile?  What sort of manouver would the warhead need to perform to evade that interceptor missile and does it have enough fuel to both perform that manouver and still steer back to hit the intended target...

Hmmm..... so a boost phase intercept is not all that difficult. Because the interceptor system generally fires 2-3 exo atmospheric missiles agiant one incoming MARV. Despite pre programmed flight plans the inability to detect in coming interceptor missiles means that MARVs can be effectively targeted. Of course counter measures like baloons etc can help the MARV but even then it's not all that difficult to destroy a MARV in outer space.

No, pretty much a boost phase is during launch when the booster rockets are operating and you have a nice strong IR signal at the base of each rocket carrying 6 or more warheads.

Midcourse intercept is when the rockets have all fired to get the warheads moving towards the target and the warheads are coasting towards the target area.

Boost phase intercept means hitting 100 missiles, mid course intercept means intercepting 600 actual warheads and perhaps 5,000 decoys in space.

Most MARVs reenter the atmosphere and start manouvering quite early in their flight profile, which is likely to be based on where known fixed ABM sites are... once they start to manouver interception becomes very very problematic because they are no longer flying on a predictable ballistic path but are still travelling at enormous speeds so getting to where they are going before they get there is still tricky.

Against ICBMs, it doesn't work that way.

An ICBM reach its apogee midcourse, that meaning thousands of kms away from intended targets, and at apogee it is practically in outer space, having reached an altitude ranging between some hundreds kms to several hundreds altitude, depending on how far away the launcher was from the targets and the type of flight path chosen.

At such altitudes, air attrition is almost not existent, meaning the ICBM can reach, or maintain, any possible speed.

An old ICBM, in order to maximize practical range, used an almost perfect parabolic course, meaning at its apogee the ICBM had little speed (still several Mach, anyway) and it would regain its energy during descending part of the course, reaching several tens Mach speed.

Now, that kind of flight path would make, at least theoretically possible to intercept an ICBM at its apogee, provided someone could have a launching platform almost perfectly placed midway from launching spot and targets.

It is for that reason the US are developing ship based interceptors, because in the end the only practical launching platform for an interceptor would be a prepositioned ship, or better to say a chain of prepositioned ships.

The russians have developed their last generation of ICBMs, and SLBMs, adopting a shallow orbit right to counter such approach: with a shallow flying path, an ICBM loose some useful range, but even at its apogee maintain a far greater speed, making interception really harder.

The struggle between an ICBM (or a SLBM) and an interceptor is not on equal terms, and it cannot be: launching spots are either deep in others' own territory or unknown (if the missiles are SLBMs), so interception could start only when the ICBM is already flying outside the Atmosphere.

It could travel almost as fast as its designers chose to make it, while the interceptor will struggle against aerodynamic attrition trying to reach an estimated interception point ahead of present ICBM's position, and ahead means really far ahead.

So the interceptor, if trying to perform an apogee's interception, will have to travel hundreds of kms upwards, having only a very little opportunity's window to actually intercept the ICBM: any little error in speed estimation, better to say on speed's change along the trajectory estimation, would guide the interceptor either too ahead or too past the ICBM.

In the final course, interception would be even harder: reentry vehicles, once released, will reach in few seconds speeds beyond any conceivable feasibility for an interceptor. In the last part, the will fly at speeds several tens Mach, and even the slightest change in course will make impossible for an interceptor to successfully compute the new target's speed and course, an interception trajectory, and then actually implement it.

Decoys, then, are not balloons: they are inert devices acting just like reentry vehicles: their goal is to aim at plausible targets, forcing the opponent to intercept all of the existing tracks.

They exists because present treaties put a cap on the available number of actual warheads deployable in an ICBM.

The ICBM being able to carry far more payload, decoys are the obvious solution to reduce dramatically chances of terminal path's interception.

If no cap would exist, any ICBM would likely bring far more reentry vehicles and no, or only a few decoys.

At such altitudes, air attrition is almost not existent, meaning the ICBM can reach, or maintain, any possible speed.

No they can't.

Once the final third stage has burned out that is their top speed. They might gain a little speed as they fall through the latter phase of flight but they don't gain more than they lost on the climb up to their highest point unpowered.

An old ICBM, in order to maximize practical range, used an almost perfect parabolic course, meaning at its apogee the ICBM had little speed (still several Mach, anyway) and it would regain its energy during descending part of the course, reaching several tens Mach speed.

You are clearly confused between a vertical zoom climb and a ballistic projectile... even through the drag of the atmosphere a projectile starts to lose speed once it has left the muzzle of the artillery piece that fired it, and it loses velocity all the way to the target while it is unpowered.

For an ICBM however it is generally powered all the time it is in the atmosphere so once the last stage fires it wont accelerate very much at all for the rest of the flight and when it enters the atmosphere it will slow down... but in any event it will never exceed escape velocity... otherwise it wont be coming back.

Mid course interceptors like the ones the US is building in eastern europe can intercept targets thousands of kms up moving at very high speeds... that is why they had to withdraw from the ABM treaty to build and test them.

It is harder to intercept them there because there is no bright rocket plume showing you where the missile is and you can destroy lots of warheads and decoys together inside one rocket with one shot like you could with a boost phase interceptor.

Of course the new Russian rockets have high energy short burn rockets that get their warheads up into space rapidly so the warheads and decoys can be deployed rapidly too so it is harder to intercept them.

Now, that kind of flight path would make, at least theoretically possible to intercept an ICBM at its apogee, provided someone could have a launching platform almost perfectly placed midway from launching spot and targets.

By the apogee the warheads and decoys are already deployed, meaning hundreds or thousands of targets instead of one.

It is for that reason the US are developing ship based interceptors, because in the end the only practical launching platform for an interceptor would be a prepositioned ship, or better to say a chain of prepositioned ships.

Sounds like an excellent target for a 100 megaton armed torpedo that is fired to a particular location and detonated... or for that matter a depressed trajectory missile that air bursts in the upper atmosphere above these ships and ionises the airspace above them for the next hour or two making radar tracking impossible.

The russians have developed their last generation of ICBMs, and SLBMs, adopting a shallow orbit right to counter such approach: with a shallow flying path, an ICBM loose some useful range, but even at its apogee maintain a far greater speed, making interception really harder.

What are you talking about?

You need the latest generation of ICBM or SLBM to fly a depressed trajectory?

Really?

Then how do 12,000km range TOPOLs get aimed at targets in Europe?

The INF treaty bans intermediate range missiles so they could not use them...

The interception missiles the US is basing in eastern europe have been tested on satellites which move fast enough to remain in orbit and are therefore rather faster than any ICBM or SLBM warhead... otherwise those satellites would fall back to earth like anything else that fails to reach orbital speed.

It could travel almost as fast as its designers chose to make it, while the interceptor will struggle against aerodynamic attrition trying to reach an estimated interception point ahead of present ICBM's position, and ahead means really far ahead.

Actually they can travel as fast as the designers choose to make them but making them fast enough to stay in orbit means you need an extra rocket motor to deorbit them. Fractional orbit bombardment system, or FOBS... look it up.

The speed is not important as I mentioned as long as the targets are detected early enough and their flight path calculated...

So the interceptor, if trying to perform an apogee's interception, will have to travel hundreds of kms upwards, having only a very little opportunity's window to actually intercept the ICBM: any little error in speed estimation, better to say on speed's change along the trajectory estimation, would guide the interceptor either too ahead or too past the ICBM.

The flight path of the interceptor could be engineered to be a head on interception so that the interceptor flys along the flight path of the target, and then it is just a case of releasing small fragments in the path of the target... impact with which would destroy any object at such closing speeds.

In the final course, interception would be even harder: reentry vehicles, once released, will reach in few seconds speeds beyond any conceivable feasibility for an interceptor. In the last part, the will fly at speeds several tens Mach, and even the slightest change in course will make impossible for an interceptor to successfully compute the new target's speed and course, an interception trajectory, and then actually implement it.

Actually the last phase interception is much easier... reentry vehicles accelerate due to gravity and accelerate at 9.8m/s/s, which is not inconceivable and when they start to hit the atmosphere they will actually start to slow down.

Decoys, then, are not balloons: they are inert devices acting just like reentry vehicles: their goal is to aim at plausible targets, forcing the opponent to intercept all of the existing tracks.

Decoys that act like warheads would need to have the same size and shape and weight as a warhead... so basically they would weigh as much as a warhead and take up the same space as a warhead.... you might as well just carry an extra warhead.

metalised balloons on the other had can be carried in enormous numbers and when released in space will be hard to differentiate from real warheads...

In fact you can put metalised balloon material around your real warheads so the difference is even less obvious...

They exists because present treaties put a cap on the available number of actual warheads deployable in an ICBM.

No they don't. there is no limit on the number of warheads an ICBM or SLBM can carry. One of the later START agreements banned heavy ICBMs with multiple MIRVs but that was not ratified by the US so it never went into effect.

That is why the first TOPOLs had one warhead each but now they put three warheads in them.

If no cap would exist, any ICBM would likely bring far more reentry vehicles and no, or only a few decoys.

The cap on the total number of warheads allowed means the total number of warheads they can threaten the US with is limited, but the ability to carry an unlimited number of decoys means determining which is a warhead and which is a decoy much much harder.

ICBM are not pure ballistic weapons.

They steer during boost phase, steer on the exo-atmospheric path, and still maintain a steering capability during MIRVs release.

Soviet/Russian ICBM, at least those employing some liquid fuel stage, add the ability to actually change and regulate their acceleration and exo-atmospheric speed.

So it's nearly impossible to predict in advance a possible point of interception, limiting greatly useful range of interception from ground based interceptors.

The Topol-M, and Bulava as well, have exploited the liquid fueled third stage to push things further: they could be launched along a shallow trajectory, can perform not only the usual minor course adjustments, but actual course changes, and can at least theoretically even change speed, making any intercept a gamble.

By the way, most interceptor rely on hit-to-kill warhead, because it seems to be deemed too likely that any proximity fused warhead won't succeed in destroying the ICBM during mid-course trajectory.

Only terminal phase interceptors, as the old soviet Gazelle and the US Sprint, relied on proximity fuzing, but that using nuclear warheads.

The problem stays always the same: an interceptor could start engaging an ICBM only when the ICBM is already in the exo-atmospheric part of its trajectory. So there is a little window of opportunity left, and even minor course adjustments by the ICBM would be hard to counter on the interceptor side, real course change would easily bring the interceptor out of chances.

So, it's not true that ICBM are easily targeted as satellites: satellites as well are not that easy to target, old school ICBMs were/are way harder, new evasively maneuvering ones could turn out to be a real challenge.

And by the point of view of the interceptor, the real problem is given by the translational speed of the ICBM, not its absolute speed. A shallower trajectory means a greater part of the absolute speed is made of translational speed, and proportionally less of vertical speed.

About the MIRVs, they are not released mid-course, or better to say there is no proof they are actually, or have to be released mid course. The final stage could actually bring them for most of the path before releasing them, and again Topol-M and Bulava, with their liquid fueled third stages allegedly able to even shut-off and restart, will restrain from releasing the payload until reached a point were evasive maneuver is no longer feasible or less effective than releasing multiple potential targets (either MIRVs or single warhead plus decoys).

By the way, MIRVs accelerate typically during their first trajectory correction phase and in the initial dive, start to decelerate as soon as they re-enter atmosphere.

But starting their dive at speed typically in excess of 20000 km/s, they are almost impossible to intercept at least with hit-to-kill warheads. Nuclear tipped one should of course still be effective, even if they could turn out to be politically unpalatable.

Just a last note: Arrow 3, promising a engagement range in excess of 1500 kms, is actually a rocket putting more or less in orbit a smaller rocket able to independently recognize, aim and engage the target, the warhead being actually propelled by a real and independent rocket engine.

I believe (just my own two cents, of course) that this shows what even for the ICBM the future would be: a comparatively highly maneuvering rocket carrying maneuvering payloads.

Topol-M and Bulava have already started the path, and future versions or new missiles will try to extend further those evading capabilities.

And the decoys should actually emulate real RVs: Arrow-3 warhead is allegedly already able to discriminate real payload from decoys, any radar reflective decoy will have to emulate actual behavior of an RV, not just to fall from the sky giving a large enough radar echo.

ICBM are not pure ballistic weapons.

They don't have wings like a cruise missile... the B in ICBMs says that they are ballistic weapons.

The fact that they can use thrusters to correct their flight path does not mean they are not ballistic weapons.

They steer during boost phase, steer on the exo-atmospheric path, and still maintain a steering capability during MIRVs release.

They can steer during those phases... they don't continuously steer during those phases...

They can adjust their course but they don't continuously steer because steering costs fuel and they have only a limited amount of onboard fuel available.

Soviet/Russian ICBM, at least those employing some liquid fuel stage, add the ability to actually change and regulate their acceleration and exo-atmospheric speed.

The pre MARV warheads make occasional corrections in trajectory... they simply don't have enough fuel to do more.

MIRV buses carry all their warheads together and the whole bus manouvers to release warheads at targets on the way... but even they will fly a fairly simple path to a release point and then burn fuel to change trajectory to the next release point.

So it's nearly impossible to predict in advance a possible point of interception, limiting greatly useful range of interception from ground based interceptors.

Oh, please... If you take a globe and draw a line from the known launch pads in Iran and North Korea to the top of the USA and to the bottom of the USA and then add a twist to counter for the earths rotation during their flight and you get an area through which all ICBMs fired at the US from either of those two countries must pass... anywhere along that triangle you can put ground based interceptors... the further away from the launch position it is the more time it will have for the interception because those launch pads are watched 24/7.

Satellites have fuel to maintain altitude for long period operational times and can be moved to avoid impacts with debris in orbit, yet there are missiles that have been tested that can shoot down those satellites... and to remain in orbit those satellites must move faster than any object launched from earth that lands back down on earth.

The Topol-M, and Bulava as well, have exploited the liquid fueled third stage to push things further: they could be launched along a shallow trajectory, can perform not only the usual minor course adjustments, but actual course changes, and can at least theoretically even change speed, making any intercept a gamble.

All MIRVed missiles have a liquid bus stage that releases each warhead to a different target... they don't waste fuel speeding up or slowing down it is just side to side for the trajectory needed for each MIRV to hit its target.

By the way, most interceptor rely on hit-to-kill warhead, because it seems to be deemed too likely that any proximity fused warhead won't succeed in destroying the ICBM during mid-course trajectory.

Proximity fused warheads would be interesting... with the target moving at about 7km/s and the interceptor moving at almost any possible angle depending on the interception parameters, being half a second early means missing by 3.5km and no conventional warhead would help there...

Only terminal phase interceptors, as the old soviet Gazelle and the US Sprint, relied on proximity fuzing, but that using nuclear warheads.

Technology has move on from then.

I have seen folding mesh warheads that simply expand and increase the chance of contact... I suspect the directed fragment warhead of the S-300 did not come from nowhere either...

Arthur C Clarke said the easiest way to destroy a satellite is to put a bucket of nails on an opposing orbit... even if you miss, then 45 minutes later you get another chance with the expanding cloud of nails... a better chance... and even a nail with a closing speed of 14km/s would be devastating.

The problem stays always the same: an interceptor could start engaging an ICBM only when the ICBM is already in the exo-atmospheric part of its trajectory. So there is a little window of opportunity left, and even minor course adjustments by the ICBM would be hard to counter on the interceptor side, real course change would easily bring the interceptor out of chances.

Quite true, but how would the ICBM know when to change course at exactly the right time... and the best time to move would be 2-3 seconds before impact because starting to move wont be detected by ground control and the degree of the movement would be able to be calculated for a few seconds, so the command to compensate would not be possible either...

The point is that for Iranian or North Korean missiles they will just be dumb MRVs or at best MIRVs and not MARVs like the Russians have.

So, it's not true that ICBM are easily targeted as satellites: satellites as well are not that easy to target, old school ICBMs were/are way harder, new evasively maneuvering ones could turn out to be a real challenge.

Only new MARVs are hard... older model ICBMs and SLBMs are quite straight forward... though of course hardly easy.

About the MIRVs, they are not released mid-course, or better to say there is no proof they are actually, or have to be released mid course. The final stage could actually bring them for most of the path before releasing them, and again Topol-M and Bulava, with their liquid fueled third stages allegedly able to even shut-off and restart, will restrain from releasing the payload until reached a point were evasive maneuver is no longer feasible or less effective than releasing multiple potential targets (either MIRVs or single warhead plus decoys).

MIRVs are not used against one target... the I means independently targeted... In other words on the flight path towards the most distant target warheads are released from the warhead bus to hit targets on the way... a missile launched from Russia might pass right through the middle of europe releasing warheads for London and Paris and brussels and Poland and germany and belgium... the warhead bus in this case wont contain all the warheads when it gets to London... it will have released them on the way, with however many left when it gets to london... london is a big place but each ICBM or SLBM will likely only have one warhead allocated to the target london. Their might be 5 or 6 different missiles with one warhead aimed at london, so london will get hit with 5 or 6 warheads from 5 or 6 different missiles because london is a big target.

The US is a much further away target so to hit from one side to the other the warheads will have to be released much earlier so the range of targets can be hit.

Of course they might split the country and have missiles hitting targets on one coast or the other and other missiles going right down the middle...

By the way, MIRVs accelerate typically during their first trajectory correction phase and in the initial dive, start to decelerate as soon as they re-enter atmosphere.

By gravity, not by rocket booster.

But starting their dive at speed typically in excess of 20000 km/s, they are almost impossible to intercept at least with hit-to-kill warheads. Nuclear tipped one should of course still be effective, even if they could turn out to be politically unpalatable.

Check your numbers my friend... twenty thousand kilometres per second is faster than anything man has ever achieved by an enormous margin... eleven kilometres a second will escape earth orbit and take you out into deep space..., so even if you just meant 20,000 m/s you are still way off because that is still almost double escape velocity...

I'll give you a hint... the S-500 is designed for shooting down ICBMs and it is optimised for target speeds of 7km/s, though it can hit faster targets in some circumstances...

The international space station is moving at 7.67 km/s which is about 27,600 km/h or 17,200 mph, so objects moving at that speed at 400km altitude above the earth don't fall down... they stay in orbit...

And the decoys should actually emulate real RVs: Arrow-3 warhead is allegedly already able to discriminate real payload from decoys, any radar reflective decoy will have to emulate actual behavior of an RV, not just to fall from the sky giving a large enough radar echo.

They don't have to make decoys look like warheads... it is much easier to make warheads look like decoys...

GarryB wrote:Most MARVs reenter the atmosphere and start manouvering quite early in their flight profile, which is likely to be based on where known fixed ABM sites are... once they start to manouver interception becomes very very problematic because they are no longer flying on a predictable ballistic path but are still travelling at enormous speeds so getting to where they are going before they get there is still tricky.

Why do they start maneuvering so early in the flight profile ? They are loosing a lot of energy in the process.

GarryB wrote:once they start to manouver interception becomes very very problematic because they are no longer flying on a predictable ballistic path

Interception won't be a problem. At least 2 - 3 interceptor missiles will be fired. MARVs can manoeuvre slightly (unlike fighter jets) because MARVs don't have sensors. So if one missile misses the other 2 will surely strike the MARV.