Russian Economy General News: #7

miketheterrible wrote:Doesn't look like Russian banks are hurting at all:

http://tass.com/economy/952459

Profit of Russian banks surged 2.8 times to 653 bln rubles ($11 bln) in January - May 2017

....
These made the lowest rates in the country’s history. In stressing the sanctions-resistant nature of the sovereign offer, Andrei Solovyov of VTB Capital said foreign investors, “most of whom” were American, bought a “large part” of the issue.....

Hopes that China would quickly fill the vacuum created by US and EU sanctions were initially disappointed. But over the past year the situation has changed and China investment into Russia is steadily rising and, more importantly, broadening away from the previous exclusive interest in hydrocarbon and extractive industries. More importantly, having recovered from the economic crisis, Russia is now in a better position to get improved commercial terms for China investment than it was in 2014 or 2015, and to broaden its investor relationships.

The main danger to that improving position is that tougher US sanctions, which could also restrict some major EU companies from investing in Russian projects, would again shift the advantage to China and force Moscow to sell more of its prized assets on Beijing’s terms. The actions of US Congress will undoubtedly damage Russia’s longer-term recovery prospects as well as some major US and EU corporations. The only winner here will be China.

In 2014, as the EU, Europe and several other developed nations imposed sectoral sanctions and financial restrictions on Russia, the chant from nationalist politicians in the Duma was “Asia-pivot”. The idea being to replace what they saw as a failed experiment to develop a mutually beneficial and respectful relationship with the West by making a sharp turn to Asia, to China in particular. It was assumed that China would be eager to fill the role vacated by the US and EU as, after all, Russia is the world’s biggest energy exporter and a significant exporter of industrial materials while China is the world’s biggest importer of most of these products.

It wasn’t just the politicians calling for the switch to a China focus. Ministers and state officials, looking for a financial lifeline against the uncertainty of sanctions and collapsing oil revenues, also tried to tap China. But, with the exception of interest in modern weaponry and access to energy projects, it seemed that China simply was not interested in bailing out its neighbour or in any sort of strategic relationship. Sberbank CEO, German Gref, famously said after returning from a China trip “we were in a long line of people looking for money and nobody called us to the front of the queue”.

So, has the hope for a stronger trade and investment relationship with China failed? Despite government optimism, is the country facing an uncertain future as US senators pass a bill aimed at making it more difficult for US companies to work in Russia, and the EU is expected to keep existing sanctions at least until 2H18 or later?

It is very difficult to get exact figures for China investment into Russia but the fact that the volume has picked up strongly is clear enough. Russia’s Central Bank reports that direct investment from China in 2015 and 2016 was only $645mn and $350mn respectively. But reports from China say the total was $3bn in 2015 and rose to $14bn in 2016.

The reason for the difference is that the Central Bank only accounts for direct transfers from a China-located bank while the China-sourced figures take into account the reports of China investors from all sources. Anecdotally, given the announcements of individual deals, the higher figures also make more sense. What is not unclear is that the value of cross-border trade between the two countries has risen from $16bn in 2013 to almost $70bn last year and, with the completion of new projects under construction, is realistically set to reach $200bn early in the next decade.

Value-added processing

The focus of investment is still overwhelmingly in hydrocarbon and extractive industries but we are seeing a shift away from direct investment into production and pipelines and into processing plants. The key hydrocarbon projects are still the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, which will pump 38bn cm of natural gas to China starting sometime in 2019, the Yamal LNG plant, in which Chinese investors own a 29.9% stake, will start to send LNG to China later this year, and the 2nd leg of the Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline which will double direct crude oil exports into China’s heartland to 600,000 barrels per day when completed in 2018.

In addition, Chinese investors have proposed investing 6bn yuan ($880mn) into building a petrochemical complex on the Russian side of the border and sending the products to China. This is the latest phase of investment from China and reflects Moscow’s stronger negotiating position as the economy returned to growth, and investment from other countries is picking up; it no longer has to sell raw materials cheaply for processing in China but is able to insist on value-added processing in Russian territory before exporting the products.

Recently the Minister for Regional Development reported that Chinese investors have proposed plans for 13 separate projects in the Far East with a value of $11bn. These cover extraction and processing of minerals, agriculture and transport projects.

Moscow is certainly keen to attract Chinese investors into the Far East and is offering tax breaks and “administrative preference” for China-backed projects in the region, especially outside of extractive industries. The $3bn invested by Chinese investors into the Primorye 1 & 2 Transport Corridors, which helps Chinese exports use Russian port facilities on the Pacific Coast, is a tangible example.

The opening up of the Belt and Road network, which in February saw a 100-container train transit Russia from China to London in 18 days, is also a potential game-changer in terms of China investment. Officials in Beijing have stated that they expect, and will encourage, a lot more investment along the network routes to take advantage of more efficient transport links and local resources.

In 2016 China investors created tens of thousands of jobs in such sectors as auto-manufacturing, food and tobacco and other consumer focused sectors. The number of individual projects was more than 30, up from 21 in 2015 and 12 in 2014.

But, as mentioned, Moscow’s perceived need for Chinese investment has changed since 2014. Partly this is because the economy is in relatively better shape and the widely predicted doomsday scenarios failed to materialise. A major reason for that is that Russia, faced with no easy way out, had to make the tough choices, such as letting the ruble freely float, and saved itself. That is a lesson that the Kremlin has learned and it has shaped trade and investment and political relations since. Russia is no longer interested in the sort of close and vulnerable relationship it once had with the US and EU, and which it nearly fell into with China in 2014. Been there, done that, didn’t work out.

Today the policy is one of diversification. India’s Prime Minister was prominent at the recent St Petersburg Forum and Japan’s Prime Minister has become a frequent visitor to Russia. According to FDi Monitor, Russia was the third most attractive investment location for EU investors in 2016, attracting $12.0 billion in deals, most from German companies. The November deal with Opec has greatly improved relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states and investment from that region is also picking up.

One example is the project to develop the former Tushino military airbase, in north-west Moscow, into one of the largest technology parks in Europe. The investors in the project are the Russia-China Investment Fund (a 50-50 $2bn venture between the Russia Direct Investment Fund and the China Investment Corporation) and some Arab sovereign fund investors.

This project does also show how, on the one hand, Moscow has diversified its investor base and has a more confident position when it comes to deal structures, but of course it also shows how China has adapted its approach. The Tushino Park will be home to Rostec, the state company at the core of the military industrial complex and owner of many of the advanced weaponry that Beijing would still like to buy from Russia. Now they will be neighbours in a Moscow suburb. Somebody should tell US Congress that they should be careful what they wish for.

The main danger to that improving position is that tougher US sanctions, which could also restrict some major EU companies from investing in Russian projects, would again shift the advantage to China and force Moscow to sell more of its prized assets on Beijing’s terms. The actions of US Congress will undoubtedly damage Russia’s longer-term recovery prospects as well as some major US and EU corporations. The only winner here will be China.

.......Getting back to Russia and Ms. Nabiullina’s conservative Central Bank, so far this year the following monthly increases were made to Russia’s official gold holdings:

JAN = +1,000,000 oz
FEB = +300,000 oz
MAR = +800,000 oz
APR = +200,000 0z and
MAY = +700,000 oz.

This comes to 93.3 tons (3,000,000 troy ounces) in the first five months of 2017. It may be of interest to note that of the estimated 106 metric tons of gold produced by Russia between January and May 2017, the CB added 93 mt to their official gold reserves. Contrast that with the U.S., which produced 96 mt in the same period, adding nothing to official reserves. In sum, the addition to reserves between January and May 2017 represents 88% of Russia’s domestic mine supply. At the same time, the United States is continuing as before to export all of its gold supply......

"The conflict [between Russia and the United States] contributes to the marginalization of Russia in international institutions and projects, is fraught with serious loss of economic benefit", - the expert of the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) Alekseya Kudrina. Their report on foreign policy and on the positioning of Russia in the world 2017-2024 gg. quotes "Interfax". Due to this conflict, "Russian forces have to be sprayed on the excess military-political competition, apart from the modernization and development objectives of the country", analysts warn.

In its relations with the West, Russia should pursue such goals, the authors of the report believe: to minimize the risk of armed conflict, the gradual settlement of the conflicts in the former Soviet Union, particularly in the Donbass, the gradual removal of sanctions and mutual discriminatory regimes, the return to full economic cooperation. In the CSR believe that the Minsk agreement can hardly be carried out and over time they can be reviewed. Holding elections recognized by all in the conflict region, the report is considered an achievable goal.

Russia's actions towards Ukraine made it to Kiev's strategic enemy, the experts wrote. "Hostility entrenched at the level of political ideology and social consciousness. Ukraine lost to Russia as a business partner for a long time "- they warn. "Ukrainian issue strained relations with the West, causing damage to trade, creating an arms race, covering many areas of cooperation in which Russia itself is interested", - the report says. All this carries risks for Russia, it is necessary to resolve the conflict in the Donbass, and establishing a dialogue with Kiev, and concluding an agreement with the West, the process, according to experts, it will be a long, gradual and uneven.

CSR also believe that Russia and the United States need to start developing a new treaty to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, and try to keep the treaty on intermediate-and shorter-range missiles. According to experts, with the United States need to engage in dialogue on strategic stability, removing contradictions on missile defense in Europe, the alternative would be mutually dangerous race in strategic offensive arms.
As the report says, it is necessary to continue cooperation on cybersecurity, to cooperate in space exploration, to continue the dialogue on conventional arms control in Europe, given the new technological realities.

Austin wrote:Looks like russian government will only be happy once the Budget deficit is positive by that time they would kill the domestic industry !

Medvedev: Russia Budget Deficit to Stand at $25.4Bln in 2018

https://sputniknews.com/russia/201706291055081181-russia-budget-deficit/

franco wrote:http://russia-insider.com/en/politics/russia-insider-special-report-awara-accounting-russias-economy-emerges-stronger-ever-after

Russia’s GDP growth amounted to 3.1% in May as the economic growth rates are rising, Economic Development Minister Maksim Oreshkin said Friday.

"Russia’s economic growth rates are rising. In May, GDP growth amounted to 3.1%, while industrial growth was even higher at 5.6%," he said.

Investments in capital stock in Russia increased by 3.2% in May, Russian Finance said.

"Investments were growing by 3.2% in May," he said in an interview with the Rossiya-1 television channel.

It is very good, since investments will entail new production lines and it will be a basis for future economic growth," he added.

Earlier, Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Oreshkin said that investment growth in the first quarter of 2017 was 2.3% He said his ministry could revise upwards the forecast for the 2018-2020 budget in terms of investment dynamics. The ministry’s forecasted investment growth is two percent.

In one relatively recent case, data from these foreign accounts offered U.S. authorities a sense of the mood in Moscow in March 2014, after Russia's invasion of Crimea prompted the United States to respond with economic sanctions.

When foreign holdings at the New York Fed plunged about $115 billion, U.S. officials confirmed what others could only suspect, according to two former Fed officials: Russia's central bank had pulled its funds.

While the Kremlin's public response was defiant, Fed and Treasury officials concluded Moscow feared the United States would freeze Russia's assets even though the account was not included in the narrow scope of the sanctions, according to one former official.

After about two weeks, Russia's central bank returned most of the money to its Fed account, but the incident made officials monitor the account more closely for signs the sanctions had forced Moscow to draw down its reserves, the same source said. It was unclear what effect the sanctions had.

The Bank of Russia said it would not comment on "details of its operations and interaction with partners." The Russian Embassy in Washington did not respond to an emailed query.

Strong figures for May point to a faster than expected recovery

Russia’s Economic Development Minister Maksim Oreshkin has reported that Russia’s GDP growth in May was 3.1% whilst its industrial growth was even higher at 5.6%.

It is not clear what Oreshkin’s base of comparison is, though it is likely he is comparing May’s GDP and industrial output figures with those of May 2016.

Regardless, it is now clear that the Russian economy is surging as it recovers strongly from the recession.

The Central Bank, published a rather more modest report on Russia’s economic performance yesterday, putting the rise in industrial output in May at a still very impressive 4.8%, which the Central Bank however clearly reported as an increase in output over the figure for May last year.

The Central Bank has also predicted that industrial growth in annual terms will rise between 3.4% and 4% in June.

These differences in figures for the economy published by the Economics Ministry and the Central Bank are traditional in Russia.  Russia’s three major economic policy making institutions – the Economics Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank – traditionally publish different figures for the economy, and make different forecasts, with the Economics Ministry consistently the most optimistic of the three, the Central Bank consistently the most pessimistic, and the Finance Ministry always coming in somewhere between the other two. For definitive figures one has to wait for those published by Rosstat, Russia’s state statistical agency.

For the record, in my experience the most accurate forecaster has been the Economics Ministry, though the latest figures – even if one takes those published by the Central Bank as the most accurate – surpass even its most optimistic forecasts.

Meanwhile inflation remains stable at 4.2% in annual terms, prior to its anticipated further fall over the course of the late summer, when prices for food products normally fall in Russia.

As for the budget deficit – a subject about which ridiculous things have been written – it is now forecast by the Finance Ministry to be no more than 1.6% of GDP in 2017, an amount the Russian government can finance without effort, whilst the international reserves held by the Central Bank – a subject about which ridiculous things have also been written – stood at $408 billion as of 23rd June 2017, up from roughly $350 billion during the worst period of the recession in 2015, despite denials from the Central Bank that it has been buying foreign currency on the currency markets.

From the Russian government’s point of view possibly the single most encouraging figure is the growth in capital investment, which the Central Bank has put at between 3% and 5% in the second quarter.

That shows that Russia’s recovery is investment rather than demand led – exactly as the government wanted and intended.

Overall the Central Bank is now predicting that annualised GDP growth in the third quarter this year may be between 1.3% to 1.8% – significantly above its earlier forecast, which had anticipated growth of around 0.9% to 1.3%.

Some people are now becoming even more optimistic, predicting GDP growth for the whole year to be as high as 2% (my note: possibly too pessimistic? ), this despite real interest rates still being around 5%.

If so then forecasts of Russia’s economic growth rate equalling or surpassing the growth rate of the world economy as a whole may be realised sooner than anyone expected.

"The course we have a floating, so our task is, the federal government, is to make it predictable and relatively stable. There are fluctuations, but they are insignificant. Less and less observed rate dependent on oil prices. And in many ways it is the action of the Ministry of .. of Finance in terms of withdrawal of surplus oil and gas revenues, which come not to spend these revenues, and the formation of reserves, respectively On the one hand, the provisions on the budget and on the other hand, reduces the volatility of the exchange rate ", - said Siluanov.

According to him, the Ministry of Finance has placed in the budget estimates of parameters in the 2018-2020 year the ruble, which is taken into account in the forecast of Ministry of Economic Development. In accordance with the Basic Economic Development Ministry forecast average dollar exchange rate at the end of 2017 is expected to reach 64.4 rubles to the dollar in 2018 - 69.8 rubles to the dollar in 2019 and 2020 - 71.2 and 72.7 rubles per dollar .

"We are now focus on those forecasts, on which we are building a budget our adjustment. There are design parameters of the course. It laid a model of economic development model of the movement of capital in the country, and out of the country. And in many respects is determined by our export commodity prices. The course is determined by many factors, but in the calculation of the parameters, we are laying a course that takes into account ", - said Siluanov.