Features of the Donbass crisis
Rostislav Ishchenko
In the DPR/LPR declared mobilization and evacuation. It is planned to evacuate women, children and the elderly, but the situation with mobilization is different
By decreePushilin as part of the mobilization, a "call for citizens who are in reserve" should be carried out, Pasechnik announced a total mobilization of " male citizens who are on the military register or not, but are required to be on the military register and citizens who are in reserve. Between the ages of 18 and 55." Also, male citizens between the ages of 18 and 55 are prohibited from leaving the LPR.
A comparison of the wording of the two decrees indicates a higher level of professionalism of the DPR authorities. The measures taken in the LPR are almost identical to the Ukrainian ones of 2014, when, under the influence of panic, the Kiev authorities were going to mobilize all men under the age of 60, until they found out that such an action would not strengthen the army, the economy would collapse, and the panic would increase.
Pushilin calls for reservists who have served in the DPR Armed Forces, have relevant experience and are assigned to a specific unit. Quartermasters should know how much additional weapons, ammunition, uniforms and food is needed for the increased contingent and have the appropriate supplies available, and commanders who receive additional troops should know exactly how to use them. In other words, the planned deployment of parts and connections is underway.
The points of the Luhansk decree on mobilization suggest that as much as we catch, we will send so much to the army, and then let the commanders and quartermasters get out of it as they want. In the spring of 2014 (before the beginning of active military operations in the Donbas) Ukrainian TV showed dozens of cases when those mobilized to the Armed Forces of Ukraine lived in the forest in tents in civilian clothes and on foot fodder, without any support, because the Armed Forces of Ukraine were not able to immediately digest the number of people that the military enlistment offices sent them and simply did not know what to do with them until it was necessary to
In general, it seems that the mobilization measures in Donetsk were really worked out in advance, and in Lugansk they were carried out formally. It is clear that the military enlistment office, calling on citizens, must supply specific units with a contingent of specific specialists of a pre-known number within a certain time frame. How this problem can be solved by invoking "composed and non-composed" is not clear.
This is reminiscent of the" people's militia divisions " of the 1941 model, which were formed, armed and dressed according to the residual principle (which they found). But then it was a measure forced by the destruction of a large number of Red Army personnel units already in the border battle, as well as in subsequent major disasters near Uman, Kiev, Bryansk and Vyazma. In the Donbass, a military catastrophe did not happen and cannot happen, since the corps of the republics are propped up from the rear of the Russian Armed Forces. Perhaps the Luhansk shortcomings are precisely related to the confidence that Russia will not let the abyss disappear anyway, so they did not work out the mobilization measures in advance, and when it was hot, they worked from scratch.
However, this is a significant problem (in the defense system of Donbass, the Luhansk direction has always been a weak link), but not the most important one. The main thing is that after eight years of shelling and provocations, the Donbass suddenly reacted so harshly. Evacuation and mobilization are an unequivocal signal of readiness for a full-scale war.
It is clear that the republics could not have taken such actions without coordination with Russia. At least because the evacuation is taking place on Russian territory. Moreover, in the Rostov region, 700 thousand evacuees were ready to receive from the wheels.
Even if we assume that half of the available population of the DPR/LPR will be taken out (currently estimated at 3-3. 5 million people), the number of evacuees will not exceed 1.5-1.7 million. That is, with the most massive evacuation of places prepared in advance only in the Rostov region-about half of those leaving. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that over the past years, many citizens of the DPR have acquired relatives, acquaintances, rented or even their own housing in Russia. In other words, refugee reception centers will not be needed by all those who leave.
We can state that the evacuation plan was clearly worked out in advance and began to be implemented directly at the moment when Ukraine sharply increased the shelling of the republics and sabotage activities on their territories. It was meant to be. The Kremlin could not help but understand that if the United States failed to deceive the "Russian invasion" with a hysterical campaign in the press and diplomatic demarches, then the old proven method of provocation in the Donbass would definitely be used.
Terrorist attacks provide an almost unlimited opportunity to escalate tensions. Shot 10 times, if Russia did not react-shot 100 times, and then 1000. And so on until it becomes impossible not to react. At the same time, any response from the DPR/LPR can be called "Russian aggression" and begin to iron the residential buildings of the republics with artillery without restrictions, encouraging Russia and the republics not only to suppress the firing batteries, but to occupy their places of deployment in order to exclude the repetition of attacks. This, in turn, will require an attack on the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and will give the United States the necessary picture for accusations.
As practice and experience show, residents of the DPR/LPR are also under constant terrorist threat. The Ukrainian DRGs constantly seek to organize terrorist acts, both against the leaders of the republics and against random civilians, but the most dangerous thing is their regular attempts to organize sabotage in hazardous industries that can cause man-made and environmental disasters on a national scale. This danger is an even greater incentive to evacuate civilians than terrorist artillery attacks.
Considering the general political aspect of the current aggravation of the Donbass crisis, it should be noted that if we lived in the XIX or in the first half of the XX century, the announcement of mobilization would mean an inevitable war. The fact is that at that time armies increased many times during mobilization, the advance of troops to the border was carried out gradually, groups were formed for weeks, or even months. The state sought to declare war at the most convenient moment of the mobilization process — when the concentration of its troops in the border areas significantly exceeds the concentration of enemy troops.
Even in the era of the German blitzkriegs, mobilization always preceded war. Czechoslovakia mobilized as early as 1938 (during the first stage of the Sudetenland crisis). By September 1939, the Polish troops had almost completed their mobilization (at least they put those who had enough weapons under the gun). By the May 1940 German offensive, France, Holland, and Belgium had already deployed troops to the borders for several months, and the British Expeditionary Force had been deployed to France for 9 months.
Even the Soviet Union conducted a covert mobilization, more than doubled the size of the Red Army from 1939 to June 1941, bringing it to 5.5 million people. The success of the blitzkrieg was achieved not so much by tactical surprise (which lasted for days, or even hours), as by the power and mobility of the shock fists, the well-developed interaction of tank groups and front-line aviation, as well as the highly efficient work of headquarters. The USSR was able to achieve the same level of effective command and interaction by mid-1943. The Allies never could.
But since the second half of the twentieth century, due to the rapid increase in the effectiveness of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, the headquarters of superpowers have been forced to plan a war virtually without mobilization (in cash). What would survive after the exchange of massive nuclear strikes (12-15 thousand warheads on each side) was unclear, but it was assumed that very little and the management of this small can be extremely difficult. So the war was supposed to start and end in a few minutes, or at least (with a gradual increase in the power of strikes) in a couple of days.
Under these conditions, demonstrative mobilization became a means of psychological pressure on the enemy. Not the first military argument, but the last diplomatic one, forcing him to make concessions. In fact, the mobilization is a demonstration of readiness for a military solution, in order to rid the opponent of the illusion that a further increase in rates can give him an advantage in negotiations. The stakes are immediately raised in such a way that the opponent understands that the next step is war, and it is he who will have to start.
All of this does not change the fact that evacuation and mobilization are really the last argument. With their declaration of war, it is still possible to avoid it, but it is closer than ever. The party announcing mobilization deliberately restricts its own space for maneuver. To cancel the mobilization without achieving anything from the enemy will mean a serious loss of face. The opponent understands that now not just the ball is in their own half of the field — they have the final choice. An attempt to throw the ball back will trigger an almost automatic start of combat operations.
https://ukraina.ru/exclusive/20220219/1033316179.html