So we had a powerful UA counterattack at the flanks in Bakhmut. They hoped of course that it would lead to the encirclement of Bakhmut, but in the worse case, UA command hoped it would release the RU pressure on the main supply roads. In this, it was relatively successful, though more so in the south than in the north, and the southern road is already occupied by Wagner forces once it enters the urban city area itself.
The 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade held the flank south of Ivanivske. This brigade is part of the newly formed 3rd Army Corps (based in Orenburg Oblast) & itself newly formed. The brigade and corps are part of the regional volunteer regiments raised before the RU partial mobilization. Similarly to the DNR and LNR battalions which were organized under the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, these were placed under a newly formed 3rd.
While its volunteer membership may be a positive, the new formations can hardly be touted among Russia's best nor best equipped. It also likely is quite mixed in terms of ethnicity and spoken languages. It reeled under the pressure of attack, and gave way some territory, but the front was finally stabilized by the intervention of the 4th separate motor rifle brigade. Its commander (Colonel Vyacheslav Makarov (same name as a Duma member) and another high ranking officer, fell in these battles, but the front held. At this time I am not sure which brigade this may be part of. It is possible that this is the new name for the old LNR 4th Territorial Defense Brigade, the Prizrak Brigade, now that it is incorporated into the Russian army.
Against these two brigades, the UA had launched formidable forces. First, the 3rd Assault Brigade Azov, which grew out of Azov SSO special forces and includes many Azov Regiment veterans.
Second the 80th Air Assault Brigade. A brigade with a long history into the Soviet past, it more recently was an important part of the Kharkhov oblast offensive. Along with the 25th Airborne Brigade and the 92nd Mechanized Brigade, it took part of the successful battles around Kupyansk when the Russian forces attempted to stabilize the collapsing LNR front.
It is one of Ukraine's best and most veteran units.
Finally the assault waves included elements of the 5th Assault Brigade. Like the 3rd, it was formed in 2022, but it grew out of the 5th Assault Regiment founded by Pavlo Palisa, who now commands the 93rd Mechanized Brigade which held much of the Bakhmut Urban area and has been gradually pushed back (now perhaps in southern Domino). Some elements of the 5th, along with Special Forces elements appeared to have attacked in the SW corner if the city to open the Chajkovskogo st.
Three top Ukrainian brigades, of the few that have offensive combat powers were thrown against two middling Russian ones. From reports, the UA losses were heavy.
In the north, we had the 67th Brigade, which emerges from the all volunteer corps right sector. One of the largest volunteer formation, it was reported that it all joined the SSO, but apparently not all battalions did. Some joined the 67th brigade which includes the Da Vinci Wolves battalion.
This is undoubtedly one of Ukraine's most motivated and experienced brigades. The 92nd mechanized brigade, or at least its 3rd mechanized battalion, joined in as well. This unit has a long Soviet history as well, is also among UA's better formation and as noted above, took part in the successful Kharkhov offensive.
These two top UA brigades squared off against the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (one of a few Arctic Warfare Brigades in the RU forces) of the 1th Army Corps, and apparently only its 3rd battalion. The brigade had interestingly faced off against the 92nd brigade before during the Kupyansk battles last year.
Further north on the salient, the 56th and 57th Mechanized Brigades attacked towards the 106th Air Assault Division (with support of the 6th Motorized Division), and made no territorial gains.
So what does this tell us? In the south, 3 of Ukraine's best brigades, supported by a myriad of other units and artillery (munitions built up for weeks for the occasion) carried out an all-out attack against what was first one relatively average Russian brigade and subsequently another that came in to support it.
Why the flanks were so poorly manned after all the warnings we can leave aside for now, but we can note that the UA achievement was not impressive, especially given the losses. The brigades' offensive power is sapped for now, especially in terms of armored vehicles.
In the north, arguably UA's 2 best brigades until now, made some more impressive gains against one decent Russian brigade, but also were ultimately halted along better defensive positions and suffered heavy losses.
Further north, two lesser UA brigades made no gains whatsoever against a higher quality Airborne (VDV) division. This is all very telling (note Prigozhin was telling us he hadn't seen the VDV because indeed, they were further north, and not where the breakthrough occurred).
As we discussed previously, with enough concentration (and will) an attacker can always pierce through a defensive line (imagine 100 men vs 100, where a defender places 1 man per km guarding 100km front and the attacker leaves 1 man every 2 km along the same front and concentrates an attack of 50 men vs 1 defender on a 1 km stretch). The question is how deep, to what effect (can he exploit it effectively?), and at what cost?
Ukraine has famously prepared 12 new brigades for its counteroffensive, with western help. Nine of these were trained and equipped by western states (see my pentagon leak article). The other 3 are being raised in Ukraine (also with western help). The Western trained 9 are the:
47th
33rd
21st
32nd
37th
82nd Air Assault Brigade
118th
117th
116th
The 22nd, 23rd and 49th may be modified names for the 117th, 116th (and less likely 118th) or more likely be the 3 Brigades that UA is raising locally, not sure at this point.
We have reports on some of these brigades concentrating on either side of Dnipro (so that they can join either a Zaporizhizhia or (river crossing) Kherson one. But the location of these brigades would be very sensitive information and subject to UA misinformation.
So UA command launched about a 5-7 brigade strength full scale attack against lightly fortified newly occupied salients (arguably in the gray zone) manned by outnumbered average Russian units, to achieve no breakthrough, modest territorial gains, and at a heavy cost. And these were its best veteran brigades.
Unless the other 12, newly trained (and less veteran) are far superior, it does not bode well for what the UA may achieve with these. Again its best bet is to manage far greater concentration. But we have discussed why that is unlikely, due to concentration worries on the part of UA command which include giving up an element of surprise, presenting concentrated targets for RU strikes, and loss of the ability to gamble on more fronts.
So while it always remains up to the men on the ground, and it is far from predetermined, so far we have further evidence of our previous thesis, that the UA counteroffensive, even with its 12 new brigades is unlikely to be able to penetrate well manned and fortified Russian fronts. UA should attack in the sparsest fronts (perhaps even into RU), with the greatest
speed and concentration possible. The combat power it has wasted from 5 of its best brigades would have been much better used in coordination with the newly rooky brigades (for a total of 17 rather than 12).
Of course, then it would have had to withdraw its troops before from Bakhmut before they would be encircled. With the high cost of this counterattack, the UA command has opened the roads for UA retreat out of Bakhmut, but only partially and tentatively. I will follow up with a post with some details about this and the current road situation.
In short, the northern O-0506 road is not really open for business for the UA. It remains perilously under fire, and will quickly become useless as Wagner forces continue to near the western end of the city.
It is the southern routes which are now still somewhat useful, as UA forces can travel around (north of) the hangar area in the SW corner of the city, still doggedly held by UA special forces and elements of the 5th Assault Brigade. But unless the myriad of units still within Bakhmut withdraw now, many will face a casualty-heavy rout away from the city if not a complete encirclement.
Finally, a note about the intentional destruction of buildings. We saw earlier that UA forces were carrying out demolitions to deny high-rise buildings to RU forces and perhaps with some luck, to bring down the buildings on top of them, as they withdrew.
We discussed them here https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1646841072910254080 (later with new video & more politically in the quoted thread here:
https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1651957679655378947), and more recently here https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1653384078295457792 where I speculated that UA forces may not have any more explosives to carry this out.
With the roads being partially re-opened, it is possible that UA forces received additional explosives for this operations. Wagner forces should be weary of this. This is only a speculation since UA forces may no longer be in a position to do this (too crowded, too chaotic, too desperate), and even if so, the limited supply situation may prioritize other supplies. The right units that can carry this out may also already be evacuated. In any event, the possibility of seeing demolitions once again is here.
The fall of Bakhmut is here. Will UA troops get out, be encircled, and/or demolish buildings?
Where an when will the famed 12 new brigades strike? Will they fare any better than these half dozen veteran brigades?
https://twitter.com/ZimermanErik/status/1658641009662734336?cxt=HHwWgMC97bvN1oQuAAAA
NOTE:
- author is a veteran Israeli Army officer who has during the SMO provided some balanced insightful analyst of what is happening...
- as far as I have been able to ascertain the Russian 3rd Corps is comprised of those volunteer units raised and funded by the Regional governments. For sure the 6th Motor Rifle division (54th & 57th Motor Rifle regiments, 10th Tank regiment and 27th SP Artillery regiment) and the 72nd Motor Rifle brigade belong to it for a total of 12-15,000 troops.