Planes will still take to air if it all comes to that. In that scenario they need to a) Shoot down the F22 or b) Negate its ability to shoot down the opposing bird.
victor7 i know that it is wasted time ,but i will attempt another time to shake you from your slumbering state. (....even if i must admit that your interventions in the
Strategic Rocket and Space Forces section are so funny and comical that would be a pity to lose suddenly them
)
1) F-22 has not...
NOT ....clear ?....
N...O....T.....an
average RCS of 0,0001 square meters (or other similar fairytale-like figures ); similar sensationalistic figure are in reality linked merely to hypercritical ,very very narrow ,co-altitude head-on angle of illumination ,
the average ,profitable ,area of diffraction of an aircraft like F-22 in a typical "many vs many " air engagement between data sharing aircraft (the typical engagement against an
advanced enemy )
is instead in the area 0,2 - 0,4 square meters and here we talk of X band airborne radar.
When you ear of the capability of a very low observanble aircraft to ,eventually, engage its opponent without that it was aware and realized the original position from where a simialr attack came from ,you must remember that those situations
DON'T refere to the capability of a simialr aircraft to come directly within effective engagement range of its missiles without that its opponent has any chance to track it,but to
the exploitation of a positional advantage offered by stealth .
Effectively similar aircraft,
when the tactical scenario allow it, capitalize the tracking advantage enjoyed for effectively get around the footprint area of coverage of the enemy radar ,attacking its opponent from a vector included in one of its blind angles.
Even you can realize as this tactic ,very easy to apply in staged exercices ,become harder and harder (up to its complete inapplicability) at the grow of the number of the data sharing enemy aircraft and at the increase of theirs sophistacation .
2) Aircraft of a nation so advanced to be equipped with S-400 ,naturally, wouldn't take the air
after that aircraft like F-22 would start to attack but would take-off and follow an inteception route even before that a similar aircraft would be even only be at some hundreds of km outside the border of the country , a nation so advanced to have S-400 as a part of its IAD,in fact, would surely own very advanced, modern, very long range early warning radars .
Those radars would provide to the Air Force's interception squadrons an approximate positional update of the ,potential, enemy attacking units (in a way totally unrelacted to any type of RCS reduction feature present in theirs design) and ,eventually, erase from the track selection of the interception aircraft any target already indentified as drone/decoys.
The task of the interception units wouldbe merely to follow the update up to the area indentified employing alternate multi-angle radar pulses and in-built IRTS/OLS to track the enemy and engage it.
Obviously if instead you talk of Lebanon or Lybia or Ethiopia or any other immensely inferior enemy attacked by the whole NATO ,all what said would lose any importance.
In this situation squadrons after squadrons of USAF's F-22s could come in the airfields near the borders of those enemy nations without any fear to be disintegrated in few minutes even before the first take-off, could confidently rely on the guidance of few available E-3 AWACS ,the support of EA/18 and in fly refueling thanks to KC-135s, without any fear that them was selectively and easily attacked and destroyed ,moreover could engage ,like in the past,at maximum 15-20 enemy fighter aircraft (likely of '80 years ) ,enjoying the usual numerical advantage of 14-15 to one.
If you want to talk of possible conventional conflict scenarios against advanced enemies you must multiply for some thousands of times the capabilities owned by NATO enemies in pasted wars.