Poseidon carrier Submarines

magnumcromagnon wrote:

max steel wrote:I've some doubts & questions but you're busy laughing.

magnumcromagnon wrote:

Morpheus Eberhardt wrote:It seems that Skif and Status-6 are different. Status-6 is more in line with T-5 and T-15. It should be noted that Status-6 seems to have a diameter of 1.6 m (nominal?), and T-15 had a diameter of 1.55 m (again, nominal?).

Here is an image apparently of T-5 (21'').

max steel wrote:

Do you think it can really travel 10,000 km with up to 1000m depth that too with 105km/h speed because it will take 40 hours to reach and something travelling that fast will make noise which can be detected on their sonars etc. Lacking stealth and how exactly Russia will guide it to such a large distance? Using sats or intertial navigation for underwater icbm torpedo ?

.I'd like to hear what GarryB, and others have in response towards the think tanks' article:

That’s a long time; do Russian military planners really want a system that takes nearly two days to strike its objectives?

Second, at a speed of 100 knots, the Status-6 would be much faster than conventional torpedoes. When it comes to underwater travel, more speed usually means more noise, increasing the risk of detection. This would not appear to be a particularly stealthy system. NATO navies might not have an ability to stop it, but they might well know where it was and where it was headed.

Third, the Russians as a rule exercise caution about how they manage and control nuclear arms. Would Russian navy commanders be comfortable with an unmanned nuclear weapon roaming the ocean on its own for up to two days traveling to its target—or perhaps even longer if it traveled to near the target and simply lurked?

This is not to say that the Status-6 is not a real weapon design. The Russians, and the Soviets before them, have built some bizarre and nasty devices.

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Steven Pifer | November 18, 2015 8:00am
Russia’s perhaps-not-real super torpedo

Russia
Nuclear Weapons
Weapons of Mass Destruction
kremlin

Russia's President Vladimir Putin (L) is seen through the glass of C-Explorer 5 submersible after a dive to see the remains of the naval frigate "Oleg", which sank in the 19th century, in the Gulf of Finland in the Baltic Sea July 15, 2013. REUTERS/Aleksey Nikolskyi/RIA Novosti/Kremlin

On November 10, a Russian television broadcast of a meeting between President Vladimir Putin and some of his senior military officers revealed a “secret” plan for a long-range, nuclear-armed torpedo called Status-6. The broadcast on state-run Channel One showed a diagram of the torpedo, filmed over the shoulder of a Russian officer.

According to BBC, the diagram described the purpose of the Status-6 as to “destroy important economic installations of the enemy in coastal areas and cause guaranteed devastating damage to the country's territory by creating wide areas of radioactive contamination, rendering them unusable for military, economic or other activity for a long time.”

The Status-6 revelation raises some interesting questions.

Status-6, Full name and size comparison (Russian)
Status-6, full name and size comparison (Russian). Credit: Madnessgenius. Licensed under the Creative Commons. Attribution: Share Alike 4.0 International license.
Not an accidental leak

To begin with, this was no accidental leak. Televised events involving the Russian president are carefully scripted by the Kremlin. Even were a Russian cameraman daring enough to film the diagram surreptitiously, his producer would have made a phone call to check with higher authority before broadcasting a secret weapon to the world.

The picture was aired because the Kremlin wanted it aired and wanted the world to believe that Russia has plans for a large nuclear torpedo. That fits with Moscow’s pattern of nuclear saber-rattling over the past two years. Along with a generally more belligerent stance toward the West, flights by Bear bombers near NATO air space, and submarine incursions in Swedish and Finnish waters, Putin and other Russian officials take every possible occasion to remind the world of something the world already knows well: Russia has an awful lot of nuclear weapons.
Is it real?

Is the Status-6 intended to be real? As Jeffrey Lewis has pointed out, it would appear to be a particularly nasty weapon that would generate massive amounts of radioactivity if detonated in shallow waters. It also would appear to have some drawbacks.

First of all, the diagram indicated that the torpedo, which would be launched from a submarine mothership, will have a range of 10,000 kilometers (more than 6,000 miles). The long range would allow the torpedo to be fired from waters close to Russia, reducing the exposure of the Russian mothership to U.S. and NATO anti-submarine capabilities. At its alleged speed of 100 knots (about 115 miles per hour), if launched from north of Russia’s Kola Peninsula, the torpedo would take some 40 hours to reach targets on the U.S. East Coast. That’s a long time; do Russian military planners really want a system that takes nearly two days to strike its objectives?

Second, at a speed of 100 knots, the Status-6 would be much faster than conventional torpedoes. When it comes to underwater travel, more speed usually means more noise, increasing the risk of detection. This would not appear to be a particularly stealthy system. NATO navies might not have an ability to stop it, but they might well know where it was and where it was headed.

This would not appear to be a particularly stealthy system.

Third, the Russians as a rule exercise caution about how they manage and control nuclear arms. Would Russian navy commanders be comfortable with an unmanned nuclear weapon roaming the ocean on its own for up to two days traveling to its target—or perhaps even longer if it traveled to near the target and simply lurked?

This is not to say that the Status-6 is not a real weapon design. The Russians, and the Soviets before them, have built some bizarre and nasty devices. But it’s not obvious that the Status-6 would be the weapon of choice for many operations—that is, unless the Russian leadership was prepared to have its cities nuked in response.

For all the oddities of the Status-6 torpedo, there would appear to be one bit of good news. Military strategists since the dawn of the nuclear ballistic missile age have obsessed over the possibility of surprise attack. Given its long travel time to target, possibly noisily announcing its course along the way, the Status-6 would not appear to make a good first-strike weapon.

At about the time that it showed the Status-6 diagram, the broadcast aired Putin expressing concern about U.S. missile defenses and saying: “We’ll work on our missile defense systems, but primarily, as we’ve said repeatedly, I repeat, we’ll work on development of strike weapons capable of overcoming any anti-missile defense systems.”

The Status-6, operating underwater, presumably would not be troubled by an American missile interceptor. But does the Russian military really believe it needs such a system to overcome U.S. missile defenses? It would hardly seem so. By 2018, the United States will have 44 missile interceptors with a velocity capable of engaging a strategic ballistic missile warhead. At that time, Russia will have some 1,500 deployed warheads on its intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The Russian military understands this. The Russian public may not. The Status-6 revelation thus may have been aimed at domestic viewers, to assure them that, despite all of the anxiety that Moscow voices about U.S. missile defenses, the Russian military will still be able to strike back.

This episode illustrates the very different attitudes of the American and Russian presidents toward nuclear arms. While noting that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent, Obama stresses the need to reduce nuclear risks and seeks to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy.

Putin, on the other hand, has refused to engage in any nuclear arms reduction negotiations since the New START Treaty.

max steel wrote:Got this thread from somewhere on status-6 PROGRAM : http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,26054.0.html

Your Thoughts?

"
They can't possibly be worried about missile shields. If GBI achieved 100% success rate it wouldn't make a dent. For example, load up an Oscar with 24 nuclear armed land-attack P-700s, park it off Virgina, and what could stop those missiles from launching a decapitating strike. Certainly not GBI. On the other hand these Russian "torpedoes" would be the perfect terror weapon. If say, Russia decided to go into Poland, a NATO country, and the US decided to attack Russian units with conventional forces, Russia could send these torpedoes on their way to NY, DC, Seattle, Sand Diego, etc. They'd be loud enough we'd certainly detect them. But they'd be recallable. Unlike ICBMs Russia could say, "back off and we'll stop them". Imagine the pressure on a US administration to sit on it's hands and do nothing. 10 hours of bedlam.
"

I had an idea a while back and thought I'd share it. I think we're overthinking this. The weapon doesn't actually have to make sense.

There are two obvious possibilities:

The first is that the hierarchical non-democratic Russian government has even more opportunities for sycophants than the U.S. government, and as a result may make even worse decisions regarding military procurement.

The second is that the Russians are using the 'Madman theory' of psychological warfare (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madman_theory). The goal isn't to message to the public, it is to give the impression to world governments and analysts that the Russian regime is unpredictable and irrational in its decisions.
Logged

victor1985 wrote:question: as far as i know the fastest military objects are those on railguns......can russia make a railgun mounted on a sub .......with a nuclear warhead on it? ....i suppose is useless to make a defence sistem when a projectile travel at 7 mach.......
also maibe would be a way of launch railguns underwater.....i think at a chamber with no water ...and the walls be destroyed at railgun launch..... supposing russia could make such a wall that resist to pressure but is destroyed at launch ....or maibe a 0,1 second rectractile wall.... problem being here sincronisation with the projectile launch

max steel wrote:The Status-6 ocean-going multipurpose system is a separate representative of future Russian submarine force.A self-propelled submersible operating within 10,000-km radius and diving down to 1,000 meters would be a striking force of the system as it is designed to destroy an opponent’s coastal infrastructure. It is supposed to be mounted on nuclear submarines Belgorod (Project 09852) and Khabarovsk (Project 09851). The first one, formerly a cruise missile carrier, is being rebuilt into a special-purpose submarine, and the second one is being built from scratch. Both subs are at the Sevmash shipyard.

TheArmenian wrote:

The Belgorod will be completed in 2018.
Rumors that it is 11m longer than the others.

http://www.i-mash.ru/news/nov_predpr/90432-sevmash-peredast-apl-belgorod-vmf-rossii-na.html

http://izvestia.ru/news/688769