Arab states in 1973 Yom Kippur War

ahmedfire wrote:
Air power was a main factor + when Egyptian forces advanced they left their effective tactics to engage with enemy tanks , before they put ATGM teams first under SAMs protection then tanks behind them , that did very well at the begining but when they advanced out of SAM coverage after the Syrian president pushed Egypt president to advance, so the ATGM teams can't work as the begining because IAF would target them so the tanks advanced and did a battle with enemy's tanks which were superior in detection range and firepower and supported by IAF in the absence of Egyptian SAM coverage ,Egyptians lost a lot of tanks that day and they destroyed less Israeli tanks .  

From what I've read the IAF was a significant factor only in the wadi Mabouk. Btw on the 14th the Egyptians did bring some ATGM teams into action but these were much less effective in a mobile action.

Actually Kabil did lead one Division (4th) but this one division face the three IDF armored divisions but IDF failed to destroy it 

They certainly mauled it badly. By war's end the 4rth's brigades were badly depleted. Btw I don't think the 4rth fought Sharon's division just those of Adan and Magen.

so three divisions vs one and they failed also to occupy the high hills in the area

But the Israelis took the jebel Geneifa, the jebel Shabrawat and about half of the jebel Ataka. They seized missile base 5122 (or some such) and held it against the 4rth's counterattacks. The position afforded a good view of the whole area.

so IDF forces were stuck in the area , can't occupy any city as planned before (from october to december ) and can't advance more to deep , his supply's road was long 300 km and can't secure it , Egyptian forces was about to cut (at Shamel plan) the only 7:10 km width gap where the IDF get supplies from it and Egyptians prepared double the force of IDF and were ready for that . Israelis in our land , we have double of their forces ,Israelis forces were under Egyptian artillery range and being shelled , SAM coverage became active so this was perfect for the Egyptians to do the final attack to completely finish the IDF forces.

Shamel might've wiped out the Israeli bridgehead west off the canal, but that wouldn't have finished off Israeli forces since many had been withdrawn to the east bank to confront the 3rd army more directly.

No it was a big dangerous decision to treat your ally like that .

It was risky but Russian arms deliveries resumed in '73 i.e. even before the war. Btw maybe you think Egypt woud've done better in '73 had Sabry and Fawzi taken over in '71 and got rid of Sadat.

Lol one photo    ok did they showed all photos of the downed Egyptian aircrafts ? no because as i said before neither Israel nor Egypt had all photos for the downed aircrafts from the other side ,simply many incidents were not filmed or recorded.

Nobody expects them to provide pics for all of their claims just some of them. You say the EAF downed 17 Israeli jets over the delta on October 14 '73. There should be at least one pic of wreckage. There was a pic of a Phantom downed during "Cracker Barrel" why not mansourah?

From what I've read the IAF was a significant factor only in the wadi Mabouk. Btw on the 14th the Egyptians did bring some ATGM teams into action but these were much less effective in a mobile action.

No it was 24 hour support by IAF because Egyptian forces already went out of the SAM coverage and i said they can't use ATGM team effectively this time because of absence of SAM coverage ,also the IDF used the ATGMs SS II .

They certainly mauled it badly. By war's end the 4rth's brigades were badly depleted. Btw I don't think the 4rth fought Sharon's division just those of Adan and Magen.

The 4th did lost but not to the limit to be damaged completely , of course it will lose more beacuse it was facing tanks with more in numbers , firepower and detection range ,nothing smart from Israeli side . Sharon did support to the battle against 4th division but he faced more the 21 division ,in the chinese farm where his forces suffered a huge losses (his commander Amnon lost 2/3 of his brigade ).
Also Sharon tried to occupy Ismailia but exposed to huge losses .At the same day (21-22 Oct) The IDF made a sudden attack at east bank trying to take the area that Egyptians took at the start of the war but IDF lost 20 tanks and 12 IDF soldiers were captured ,after that Balriev cancelled the operation to occupy that area .

But the Israelis took the jebel Geneifa, the jebel Shabrawat and about half of the jebel Ataka. They seized missile base 5122 (or some such) and held it against the 4rth's counterattacks. The position afforded a good view of the whole area.

There are many hills in the area ,i can count about 12 by my memory ,Qabil said IDF tried to occupy Geneifa but failed to completely occupy it ,in Ataka Israel lost 450 soldier and at the end they withdraw from that half  , for Shabrawat yes they captured it for some time.

Shamel might've wiped out the Israeli bridgehead west off the canal, but that wouldn't have finished off Israeli forces since many had been withdrawn to the east bank to confront the 3rd army more directly.

The IDF forces in the west were big enough to make the war end for Egyptians if the Shamel was applied , that's why Egypt received a big warning from US .

While IDF bypassed the main Egyptian army divisions on the Eastern Canal, they failed against infantry forces to fullfill a major achievement west of the Canal. Sharon Division that was attacking to the north in the Ismaeilya direction to isolate the 2nd army was stopped by the 182nd paratroopers brigade, 129th commandos brigade & 139th commandos brigade. IDF crossing yard was being shelled on a minutely basis by the 2nd army & the 3rd army artillary & rockets. The Missory fortification east of the canal was strangling IDF logistic supplies passage to the west. Together with the chineese Farm battles, the Missory 16th armoured division troops destroyed IDF operation time schedule & wasted IDF prime goals of Canal crossing.

IDF propganda which is presenting the 3Rd army seige as the only outcome of the war ,while ignoring the forced existence of more than 200,000 Egyptian troops in IDF pre-war positions, is pathetic.

It was risky but Russian arms deliveries resumed in '73 i.e. even before the war. Btw maybe you think Egypt woud've done better in '73 had Sabry and Fawzi taken over in '71 and got rid of Sadat.

Supplies to Egypt would be never compared to US supplies to Israel .As i told before US was giving original copies of arms to IDF but USSR was selling export models of arms to Egypt . US used reconnaissance aircraft SR-71 to provide IDF with the whole battle scene update including the positions of Egyptian army ,so Israel didn't fight  by her own and at the end they failed to keep the lands, their political unconditioned withdrawal on the 18th of January to 35 kms east of the Canal, while the Egyptian army continue guarding its positions east of the Canal is an unquestioned evidence of the Egyptian army victory in that war.

Nobody expects them to provide pics for all of their claims just some of them. You say the EAF downed 17 Israeli jets over the delta on October 14 '73. There should be at least one pic of wreckage. There was a pic of a Phantom downed during "Cracker Barrel" why not mansourah? Smile

Do you have official figures for IDF reserves losses due to the Egyptian commandos operations in Sinai routes to the Canal? Israel information concealment policies are well known. A fixed IDF policy since it's establishment is to block any information regarding the Arab commando operations against it.The irony is some Israeli sources denying that Mansourah air battle ever existed

What Israel should learn from this war (I guess they took the lesson already ) is two things :

1-Never underestimate your enemy based on only your superior weapons .

2-How to early plan and SURPRISE your enemy .

The surprise from Egyptian side was huge enough to destroy the invincible army myth that Israel sprayed it everywhere before the war .

As example the Egyptian navy planned from 1971 to close the Bab-el-Mandeb strait which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

By may-1973 the complete plan was ready ,  at the begining of October the Navy declared that some of it's pieces (missile boats ,submarines and destroyers) were going to Pakistan to make some repairs but the real reason these pieces were heading to Bab-el-Mandeb strait and it was in a completely silent mode by closing all radars and not doing any communications with any Navy bases so that it would not be tracked or noticed by Israel's Navy ,for many days there were no any communications with the bases and no one from Egyptian navy knows exactly the status of that force till 6-Oct.

By 6-Oct the navy force near Bab-el-Mandeb received a signal over a separated device with a code which was agreed before as a signal to start closing the strait .

Suddenly the Israel's navy found that the Egyptian navy were completely controling the strait and doing the inspection and stopping any ship that putting the Israeli's flag,cutting 100% of the supplies to Israel from that south area .That strait connects Israel with Asia and Africa .

The Israel's minister of defence (Moshe Dayan) gave orders not to publish any news regarding that sudden move from Egyptian navy .

The Egy Navy also cut 80% of supplies to Israel in the mediterranean sea.

Other navy groups gave a huge firing support against the Israeli's positions and spreaded sea mines to close the Suez gulf to prevent the enemy from transferring the oil from there to Israeli's ports .

ahmedfire wrote:
No it was 24 hour support by IAF because Egyptian forces already went out of the SAM coverage and i said they can't use ATGM team effectively this time because of absence of SAM coverage .

Absence of SAM coverage wasn't the main problem for sagger teams. According to accounts in The Yom Kippur Warby the London Insight Team, it was IDF tanks firing machine-guns and high explosive shells.

Sharon did support to the battle against 4th division

Exactly when and where?

At the same day (21-22 Oct) The IDF made a sudden attack at east bank trying to take the area that Egyptians took at the start of the war but IDF lost 20 tanks and 12 IDF soldiers were captured ,after that Balriev cancelled the operation to occupy that area .

Yeah Missouri, Hamutal too.

There are many hills in the area ,i can count about 12 by my memory ,Qabil said IDF tried to occupy Geneifa but failed to completely occupy it

What part did Egypt still hold when fighting shifted south to the Cairo-Suez road and farther south?

The Missory fortification east of the canal was strangling IDF logistic supplies passage to the west. Together with the chineese Farm battles, the Missory 16th armoured division troops destroyed IDF operation time schedule & wasted IDF prime goals of Canal crossing.

The 16th was an infantry division. Unfortunately none of the Egyptian achievements in the crossing area--shelling, repulse of the attack on Missouri etc--sufficed to prevent expansion of the IDF bridgehead and isolation of 3rd army.

Do you have official figures for IDF reserves losses due to the Egyptian commandos operations in Sinai routes to the Canal?

No but even Adan mentioned high losses to Egyptian ambushes early in the war.

The irony is some Israeli sources denying that Mansourah air battle ever existed

They deny the Egyptian version and have their own.

Absence of SAM coverage wasn't the main problem for sagger teams. According to accounts in The Yom Kippur Warby the London Insight Team, it was IDF tanks firing machine-guns and high explosive shells.

This happened when the Egyptian forces became in close combat with IDF forces but from the begining of the Egyptian advance the main issue was the IAF that worked freely in the absence of Egyptian SAMs coverage  ,according to many Egyptian books .

Exactly when and where?

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According to Qabli ( leader of the 4th division )this was at the begining of the crossing on the west canal .

What part did Egypt still hold when fighting shifted south to the Cairo-Suez road and farther south?
The 16th was an infantry division. Smile Unfortunately none of the Egyptian achievements in the crossing area--shelling, repulse of the attack on Missouri etc--sufficed to prevent expansion of the IDF bridgehead and isolation of 3rd army.

War must never be seen as a purpose to itself, but as a means of physically forcing one's will on an opponent ("war is the continuation of politics through other means").

In addtion to the the above Clausewitz has classified the War objectives into two main categories:-
A- war to achieve limited aims
B- war to "disarm the enemy and make him politically helpless or militarily impotent."

Knowing the Superiority of IDF (especially) in Air & armoured forces) which was planned & executed by the unlimited support of US to israel, Egypt selected "A" war class.

The Basic Egyptian army war mission was :-
1-Storming Suez Canal east Bank & demolishing IDF fortifications line ( Bar-leve Line]
2- Peneteration of 5 to 6 miles deep in Sinai under the cover of the Egyptian anti Air missiles umbrella.
3- Sparking off an international crisis into which both USSR & US would be drawn. The Egyptian leadership hoped that the two superpowers would then force Israel into concessions acceptable to the Arabs.
4-If superpowers failed to intervene or were unable to force Israel to make the demanded concessions, The arabs were to revert to "meat grinder" tactics against the stretched IDF forces & continue fighting for weeks or months against the exhausted IDF troops & force Israel to accept the Arab terms.

Next map illustrates the Main Egyptian attack from the West to The East Canal bank in one of the most complicated & successful military crossing operations 'through history' as described by US army historians:




The following map shows the situation on the 18th of Jan i.e after 12 weeks from the official cease fire. Here it is shown how IDF has withdrew its forces to 30 Kms east of the water line without maintaining any political price for this retreat. This was done as a result of 1st disengagement agreement where the egyptian side agreed on having a buffer zone between both armies.
This map clearly expresses the Egyptian army victory in fullfilling his War targets. Israel lost its 5th of October lines & Suez canal East bank forever. The failure of IDF to restore its 5th of october positions is a clear mark of its defeat.



The depth that IDF occupy at the west wasn't completely controlled from IDF , this area includes scattered Egyptian army positions that were bypassed during the actions & remained active during the ceasefire period whch means IDF purpose was just to advance to gain an advantage on the political table but on ground Egyptian forces were also in that area which threatened the IDF supplies line .

The IDF at the west of the Canal was bounded with the Egyptian army troops while having long threatened routes to its logistic bases east in Sinai. IDF positions on the 24th of Oct were vulnerable. This led to the 1st disengagement treaty.

By the Military operations end it was proved that IDF had the followig drawbacks:-
- Failed to push the 2nd army from its new positions in the east of the canal to the west.
- Failed to push the 3rd army from its new positions in the east of the canal to the west.
- Failed to encircle the 2nd army.
- Failed to invade Suez city or Ismaeilia city.
- Failed to occupy Missory position east of the canal. This failure prevented IDF from widening the passage between the troops in the west canal bank & its logistic bases in Sinai.

IDF losses starting from the 15th till the 24th in the fighting that took place in Canal west bank & East bank represents more than 65% of its total war losses. The resulting forces positions on the 24th showed 3 IDF divisions in a severly threatened positions west of the canal.

The first disengaement treaty together with the Resignation of Golda Maeir, Moshe Dayan, David aliaazer, Gonin & Mossad leaders in response to Agranat Commision decisions is a proof of the disasterous war results.

The funny thing that some Israelis sources claimed they gonna occupy Cairo ,If IDF failed to occupy a small town like Suez on the 24th with losses of more than 100 killed troops & 40 damaged tanks & armoured carriers then, how on earth, this exhausted forces may form a threat to Cairo or any other Egyptian town. Big claims but too far from reality. The Fact is the opposite. IDF divisions west of the canal were in threatened positions. Only politics withdrawal commitment saved then from a disasterous fate.

British historian Edgar Oballance said :

'The Israelis now give the impression that they were merely caught by surprise & that once they had recovered their balance, all was well. They insist that their quality was still superior to arab quantity & that their young, energetic, capable generals were superior to those of the arabs as was the Israeli soldier to his Arab counter-part. The Israelis like to say they drove back the Arabs on both fronts, crossed the suez canal, penetrated into Africa & surrounded the Egyptian Third Army with ease. They further claim that only intervention by the superpowers saved the Third Army from surrendering & the Israelis from advancing further into Arab territory, as the road to Cairo lay open before them. This was by no means the correct picture & by perpetuating it, the Israelis are in danger of falling into the same errors of Self-deception & overconfidence that they did after the 1967 War.

Israel lost the war. They lost it in the battlefield and more significantly in politics. Golda Meir and the whole Israeli leadership couldn't wake up from the surprise until too late. They were still drunk with the victory of 1967. Kissinger's book "Crisis" describes how Meir used to weep  in the phone during the war asking Kissinger for help, and how the US airplanes were launched directly from US aircraft carriers to Israel after painting it with the Israeli colors!!

GarryB wrote:Early model Sagger missiles were not that easy to operate and literally had to be flown into the target by the operator at distances of up to 3km. Later models used more capable and effective guidance options like command to line of sight where you simply put the crosshair on the target and moved it to keep it on a moving target, but with older model Sagger missiles you had to fly the missile to the target like a remote control plane.

There's a book on the development of the sagger and M-60 tank and how they did against each other in '73.

GarryB wrote:Early model Sagger missiles were not that easy to operate and literally had to be flown into the target by the operator at distances of up to 3km. Later models used more capable and effective guidance options like command to line of sight where you simply put the crosshair on the target and moved it to keep it on a moving target, but with older model Sagger missiles you had to fly the missile to the target like a remote control plane.

Yes the soldiers said the same , it was hard to operate but was effective and one of the reasons that Israeli's counter attack was completely failed by 8 October-1973 , they lost 200 tanks in the first 4 hours .

ahmedfire wrote:
This happened when the Egyptian forces became in close combat with IDF forces but from the begining of the Egyptian advance the main issue was the IAF that worked freely in the absence of Egyptian SAMs coverage  ,according to many Egyptian books .

From what I've read, the IAF wasn't an actual, major factor except in the wadi Mabouk. The other battles that day such as near Hamadia seemed to have involved just IDF tanks firing ion Egyptian ones.

According to Qabli ( leader of the 4th division )this was at the begining of the crossing on the west canal .

Not at the very start but soon afterwards and it fought only Adan at first, not Sharon.

This map clearly expresses the Egyptian army victory in fullfilling his War targets. Israel lost its 5th of October lines & Suez canal East bank forever. The failure of IDF to restore its 5th of october positions is a clear mark of its defeat.

Egypt ultimately succeed in attaining its political objectives but that owed much to a ceasefire on October 24, before it was too late. By then the 3rd was isolated and vulnerable to air attack and Egypt didn't have the means to save it by itself.

Failed to occupy Missory position east of the canal. This failure prevented IDF from widening the passage between the troops in the west canal bank & its logistic bases in Sinai.

But Egypt's situation was worse because the 3rd's supply lines were cut whereas Israel's just seemed threatened. The Egyptian 21st division had already failed to cut that supply route, and the 25th brigade was demolished too.


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IDF losses starting from the 15th till the 24th in the fighting that took place in Canal west bank & East bank represents more than 65% of its total war losses. The resulting forces positions on the 24th showed 3 IDF divisions in a severly threatened positions west of the canal.

True, Israel suffered its highest losses after October 14. But Israeli units west of the canal weren't in serious danger until Shamel preparations were ready by about December.

'The Israelis now give the impression that they were merely caught by surprise & that once they had recovered their balance, all was well. They insist that their quality was still superior to arab quantity & that their young, energetic, capable generals were superior to those of the arabs as was the Israeli soldier to his Arab counter-part. The Israelis like to say they drove back the Arabs on both fronts, crossed the suez canal, penetrated into Africa & surrounded the Egyptian Third Army with ease. They further claim that only intervention by the superpowers saved the Third Army from surrendering & the Israelis from advancing further into Arab territory, as the road to Cairo lay open before them. This was by no means the correct picture & by perpetuating it, the Israelis are in danger of falling into the same errors of Self-deception & overconfidence that they did after the 1967 War.

I disagree with the Israeli view to some extent e.g. the road to Cairo wasn't open. But there's still considerable truth to it e.g. the third army was in an untenable situation had the war continued.

From what I've read, the IAF wasn't an actual, major factor except in the wadi Mabouk. The other battles that day such as near Hamadia seemed to have involved just IDF tanks firing ion Egyptian ones.

There was a point when the IDF land forces targeted the Egyptian SAMs when they passed to the west , the purpose is to give the chance to IAF to fly freely and give support to ground forces , as example the 16 Armored brigade faced heavy IAF bombing after advancing 5 km which make it to stop .  IAF along with ground forces gave a big firing support against 21,4 armored divisions ,it doesn't mean that IAF destroyed all the tanks that day but it played a major role to disperse the Egyptian advance and damage some of the advanced forces .

Not at the very start but soon afterwards and it fought only Adan at first, not Sharon.

I didn't say it fought Sharon first but it faced some of his units ,but he faced more the 21th division .

Egypt ultimately succeed in attaining its political objectives but that owed much to a ceasefire on October 24, before it was too late. By then the 3rd was isolated and vulnerable to air attack and Egypt didn't have the means to save it by itself.
But Egypt's situation was worse because the 3rd's supply lines were cut whereas Israel's just seemed threatened. The Egyptian 21st division had already failed to cut that supply route, and the 25th brigade was demolished too.

 The Egyptian Air missile basis were pulled backward on the 16th & 17th of Oct. That means the 3rd army faught for one week till the 24th without Canal west Air missile umbrella against IAF & IDF formations without being destroyed or impaired. It was protected by its potable anti air missiles & by the EAF.

IDF forces threatened the Suez ruler to give up orelse the IAF gonna hit the city ,the ruler refused and IDF tried to occupy the city but his tanks damaged and his soldiers killed and completely failed to control the city . To destroy the 3rd army you need to attack by your ground forces heavily.The 3rd army had huge reserves plus reserves from Suez which means it can fight for a long time ,also IDF forces were not free ,they were already fighting and losing some of their power hardware . They failed against infantry forces to fullfill a major achievement west of the Canal. Sharon Division that was attacking to the north in the Ismaeilya direction to isolate the 2nd army was stopped by the 182nd paratroopers brigade, 129th commandos brigade & 139th commandos brigade. IDF crossing yard was being shelled on a minutely basis by the 2nd army & the 3rd army artillary & rockets. The Missory fortification east of the canal was strangling IDF logistic supplies passage to the west. Together with the chineese Farm battles, the Missory 16th infantry division troops destroyed IDF operation time schedule & wasted IDF prime goals of Canal crossing.

The Egyptian GC was preparing to cut the passage from the reinforced 2nd army positions in the north with a simultanous local attacks on IDF divisions west of the Canal. You should not limit the new operations to the 3rd army front. By trying to demolish the 3rd army, IDF should prove that it can hold long defensive positions against a determined well organized multi node Egyptian attack on Canal west front. Only, the opposite was proved on the 6th of October.

On the 24th, 25th & 26th, General Adan failed to conquer Suez city. His troops corps were scattered in the city streets marking his miserable defeat . In the north, General Sharon troops were defeated south Of Ismaelya city by the Egyptian commando brigade 150 & 182. From the 19th till the 24th Sharon armoured division & paratroopers chalenged the Egyptian Commando brigades south of Ismaelya but was defeated & prevented from conquering the city or penetrating behind the second Army. On the East of Canal, IDF attacked Div 16 in Missori & the nothern sector of the chimnese farm & failed to conquer any. IDF forces confronting the 2nd army & the 3rd army in the east of the Canal failed to push them one inch backward.

The ceasefire was perfect for IDF bad situation .

True, Israel suffered its highest losses after October 14. But Israeli units west of the canal weren't in serious danger until Shamel preparations were ready by about December.

How they suffered high losses if there is no serious danger

As example the infantry division 16 remained a very effective fighting formation till the ceasefire declaration. Its power as a defensive force was as efficient as it was through the whole War period. To execute another immediate offensive to cut the passage after the failed 17th of Oct offensive was not planned or ordered.The priority was now to sustain its positions in missory, Hamital & Televizia. the failure of IDF to occupy these till the cease fire , left its passage to the Canal west threatened of being Cut in the future upon resumption of fighting. The stubbornness of Division 16 together with the high courage & spirit of its troops damaged all IDF attacks on Missori & Hamital till the ceasefire. During this period, some of the IDF troops refused orders of attack due to the huge losses which they suffered by Division16 strong fire & solid defence.




The 18th of Jan  disengagement agreement reflects the Egyptian army victory. Here IDF withdraw from his threatened positions west of Canal to 35 kms east without any political return.


Admiral Thomas Moorer from JCS says his opinion about That gap (I think the canal crossing of those Israeli tanks is nothing more than a raid on the Egyptian air defenses. I don't think they can survive long.)

I disagree with the Israeli view to some extent e.g. the road to Cairo wasn't open. But there's still considerable truth to it e.g. the third army was in an untenable situation had the war continued.

If Israel found a single chance to completely win the war by military action ,it would do that and US would support it .

After the Ceasefire and by withdrawing the 2nd army armored tanks brigades, a total power of 700-850 no tanks were surrounding IDF west of the canal. In addition to these, Artillery batteries & Infantry troops formed a strong barrier around IDF divisions. In addition, excessive supplier were pouring to Egypt to replace its damaged weapons.

IDF 500 tanks losses by the Egyptian army only in the war first 3 days according to the Israeli sources. Here is the minutes of meeting between Israel embassador & Henry Kissinger on the 9th of Oct 1973.

So it seems the declaration of the Mossad chief is true that Israel lost about third of her tanks at the first week , but US supplied IDF with the necessary original hardware to replace the destroyed one , it was huge advantage for Israel but at the end it didn't work to keep Sinai occupied .

ahmedfire wrote:IDF 500 tanks losses by the Egyptian army only in the war first 3 days according to the Israeli sources.

The figure of 500 refers to total tank losses on both fronts not just the Suez front.

ahmedfire wrote:
as example the 16 Armored brigade faced heavy IAF bombing after advancing 5 km which make it to stop .

Where was that, what sector?

 IAF along with ground forces gave a big firing support against 21,4 armored divisions ,it doesn't mean that IAF destroyed all the tanks that day but it played a major role to disperse the Egyptian advance and damage some of the advanced forces .

With the exception of one brigade of the 4rth, Egyptian units didn't really advance very far on the 14th, so with the exception of that one brigade, they probably still had some SAM protection.

I didn't say it fought Sharon first but it faced some of his units ,but he faced more the 21th division .

Where and when did thew 4rth face some of Sharon's units?

 The Egyptian Air missile basis were pulled backward on the 16th & 17th of Oct. That means the 3rd army faught for one week till the 24th without Canal west Air missile umbrella against IAF & IDF formations without being destroyed or impaired. It was protected by its potable anti air missiles & by the EAF.

Na the 3rd still had SAM cover down to the 22nd, when the IAF struck at SAM positions in the south of the jebel Geneifa. What portable SAMs? SAM-7s? Not very effective warheads…And the EAF suffered unsustainable losses trying to provide cover for the 3rd on the 24rth. "We lost a lot that day" an Egyptian said later.

To destroy the 3rd army you need to attack by your ground forces heavily.

Right, that's why the Israelis sent their armor back east in November.

The 3rd army had huge reserves

What besides the depleted 4rth and 6th?

Sharon Division that was attacking to the north in the Ismaeilya direction to isolate the 2nd army was stopped by the 182nd paratroopers brigade, 129th commandos brigade & 139th commandos brigade.

Yeah but that was because the Israelis prioritized their drive south where the terrain was more favorable to armored warfare.

IDF crossing yard was being shelled on a minutely basis by the 2nd army & the 3rd army artillary & rockets. The Missory fortification east of the canal was strangling IDF logistic supplies passage to the west.

The 16th infantry division and artillery units inflicted some losses but was hardly strangling IDF logistics. The IDF had adequate supplies to go as far south as Adabiya.

On the 24th, 25th & 26th, General Adan failed to conquer Suez city. His troops corps were scattered in the city streets marking his miserable defeat . In the north, General Sharon troops were defeated south Of Ismaelya city by the Egyptian commando brigade 150 & 182. From the 19th till the 24th Sharon armoured division & paratroopers chalenged the Egyptian Commando brigades south of Ismaelya but was defeated & prevented from conquering the city or penetrating behind the second Army. On the East of Canal, IDF attacked Div 16 in Missori & the nothern sector of the chimnese farm & failed to conquer any. IDF forces confronting the 2nd army & the 3rd army in the east of the Canal failed to push them one inch backward.

The ceasefire was perfect for IDF bad situation .

Adan succeeded in isolating 3rd army--a more important goal than taking Suez. The 16th did retreat at Missouri, as Shazly authorized a limited pullback from the south part of the ridge. By then the IDF had taken the Chinese farm.

How they suffered high losses if there is no serious danger

Many times victors have suffered high losses.

If Israel found a single chance to completely win the war by military action ,it would do that and US would support it .

No, the US had to restrain Israel around the 24rth because of the risk of a serious Soviet reaction if the 3rd was in the process of being destroyed.

The figure of 500 refers to total tank losses on both fronts not just the Suez front.

This what the MOM was talking about but according to Egyptian sources the IDF lost 90 tanks on the 6th & 7th and lost  more than 400 Tanks during its first counterattack on the 8th .

So if we even believed the IDF numbers ,so that means IDF lost 500 tanks at the first 3 days which proved the Mossad chief declaration (which you rejected before  ) that IDF lost about third of the whole tanks at the first week of the war .

Where was that, what sector?
With the exception of one brigade of the 4rth, Egyptian units didn't really advance very far on the 14th, so with the exception of that one brigade, they probably still had some SAM protection.

The Egypt's army chief of staff refused the president decision to advance the troops to the east and his reason was the forces would go out of SAM coverage.

The brigade that you mentioned  reached to 25km to the east and on 14-Oct it was bombed heavily from IAF and that was a main reason to limit the brigade ability to destroy the IDF anti tank teams which targeted the brigade heavily.

The infantry mechanized brigade (from the 6 division ) faced ATGMs and bombing from IAF

on 13-Oct the 11th mechanized brigade (from division no.7 ) also faced ATGMs and bombing (specially the B.M.P vehicles)  from IAF after advancing only 2 km.

The 21 division , 14 infantry battalion and 18 infantry mechanized also were bombed by IAF on 14-Oct , so claiminng that the IAF didn't support the IDF is far away from truth .

Where and when did thew 4rth face some of Sharon's units?

According to 4th division commander inreview , Sahron send some units to support against the division on the west , this was after the cossing .

Na the 3rd still had SAM cover down to the 22nd, when the IAF struck at SAM positions in the south of the jebel Geneifa. What portable SAMs? SAM-7s? Not very effective warheads…And the EAF suffered unsustainable losses trying to provide cover for the 3rd on the 24rth. "We lost a lot that day" an Egyptian said later.

The SAM-7 was not very effective to destroy the aircraft but was damaging it , 2 destroyed  +26 damaged aircrafts was recoreded during the war as a result from using SAM-7 which means it's still a weapon , losing some aircrafts didn't mean it will not face the IAF ,it's a war and must be losses there .

At the end did IAF destroyed the 3rd army before 24th ? no , so they couldn't do that .

Right, that's why the Israelis sent their armor back east in November.

And by the end of December , Egypt prepared forces that was double the IDF forces on the west which means IDF has no single chance to survive if the Shamel plan was applied .

What besides the depleted 4rth and 6th?

I'm talking about ammunitions ,IDF reached the Gulf of Suez on the night of the 24th. That means the supplies ti the Third army were never affected during the War. You must realize that till the 22nd the logistic supplies to the Third army was far safer & secured than the supplies to IDF west of the Canal

Yeah but that was because the Israelis prioritized their drive south where the terrain was more favorable to armored warfare.

General Sharon troops were defeated south Of Ismaelya city by the Egyptian commando brigade 150 & 182. From the 19th till the 24th Sharon armoured division & paratroopers chalenged the Egyptian Commando brigades south of Ismaelya but was defeated & prevented from conquering the city or penetrating behind the second Army.

The 16th infantry division and artillery units inflicted some losses but was hardly strangling IDF logistics. The IDF had adequate supplies to go as far south as Adabiya.

The Egyptian Artillary shells on IDF bridges & area of collection ( the Yard) did not stop since the 16th till the 2nd cease fire on the 24th. During this period , Rockets, Artillary shells, Katyousha, Napalm & air bombardments were dropped on IDF receiving area west of the canal. Hundreds of IDF personal were killed or injured due to this day/night continuous shelling to mark the trap which IDF put 3 of his armored divisions inside it.

Adan succeeded in isolating 3rd army--a more important goal than taking Suez. The 16th did retreat at Missouri, as Shazly authorized a limited pullback from the south part of the ridge. By then the IDF had taken the Chinese farm.

IDF failure to conquer Missouri  left their logistics supplies to their forces west of the canal subjected to artillery bombardment. In addition this site together with the other 16th Div positions offer excellent axis for cutting IDF thin access to its 3 divisions west of the canal upon hostilities works resumption.

Regarding the Air Cover, you must remember that beside the anti-Air missile umbrella, the Egyptian air force was still there. If IDF got air superiority over canal , it would not spare any chance to damage the Egyptian forces. This did not happen throughout the War. Not over Missouri or over the 3rd Army.

Many times victors have suffered high losses.

Right in general but it doen't mean by any way that IDF forces in the west were secured .

No, the US had to restrain Israel around the 24rth because of the risk of a serious Soviet reaction if the 3rd was in the process of being destroyed.

Wrong .

IDF failed to maintain its Counter attack War objects till the 22nd of Oct. Egypt & Israel agreed to Ceasefire & UN decision 338 on that day. IDF violated the ceasefire & maintained a ground surround of the third army on the 24th of Oct. Yet, this try for reversing the War outcome was blocked by Egypt threat that unless IDF retreat to th 22nd lines, the Egyptian Army will resume its operations & open an access to the 3rd army. Fearing from the erupt further military actions, Israel agreed to hold military discussions with the Egyptians to discuss the issue of the 22nd lines. An agreement was reached on the 11/Nov/ 1973( 6 point agreement) where the 3rd army was re-supplied & IDF should not alter its re-supply operations.

This agreement reflects IDF real status at the War end. They failed to declare a real challenge to the enemy. They raised a claimed surround & permitted re-supply without maintaining any Political return.

The Egyptian Army has fulfilled his limited War targets. IDF never returned to its 5th of Oct positions which were conquered by the Egyptian Army. The War started with the 50% of Canal shores under direct occupation by IDF. After 18 days of fighting, 75% of Suez Canal shores became under the Egyptian Army direct control. The trapped third army divisions are far counterbalanced by the threatened positions of IDF 3 armored divisions west of the Canal. An attrition war was started from the 30th of Nov till the 18th of Jan 1974. IDF retreat was obligatory & took place on the 18th of Jan till the passes lines.




You are deceiving yourself when you repeat IDF propaganda regarding the real reasons of their retreat. From the 15th of Oct through the bloodiest war battles IDF armored divisions advanced till the map shown 22nd Oct lines. At these positions ceasefire was declared which was approved by all the confronting sides. IDF used the precious hours following the ceasfire to push more than 40000 troops through the passage to Canal west shore & push quickly towards Suez to occupy it & cut the 3rd Army supply lines. While failed to occupy Suez, it succeeded in reaching the Gulf of Suez on the 24th & cut partially the third army supply lines ( The army was being supplied through the Suez gulf a shown in the map).

Israel trials to maintain an exchange of armies positions were rejected by the Egyptians & were rated unrealistic by Israel allies. Israel proposed to withdraw from the West of the Canal on a condition that the Egyptian army will withdraw from the East of the Canal to pre-war positions. This Israeli proposal was torn away by the Egyptians as it did not reflect the actual War results or the Forces respective locations on the ground.
During the post war negotiations, IDF planners found themselves stuck with three desperate choices. choosing any would either point to their lost War or would worsen their position. These choices were:
1- Rejecting all withdrawal proposals & continue occupying its existing positions risking the commencement of the war actions. In addition to the uncertanity of the resumed fighting results, Israel would have faced a stronger International isolation due to the violation of its agreed upon Ceasefire decision. The truma of this choice is that IDF can not launch a decisive attack against the Third army as its main armored divisions were pinned in Canal west bank. In addition, the decision to apply a complete sealed siege against the third army would result in a direct legitimate offensive from the Egyptian army on IDF foces to secure supply routes to its surrounded forces. This mess resulted in non-military supplies transport to the Third army through IDF lines (This was the case till IDF withdrawal from Canal west Bank) . This choice proved to be unacceptable & could n't be permitted to last for longer periods as the IDF status would be worsening with time . As the time passes, the Egyptian army would have completed its weapons & losses replacement in both east & west Canal positions while IDF remained parallelized for unknown reasons west of the Canal.
2- Returning to 22nd Oct lines to comply with UN 338 & 339 decisions. This would reverse the situation in the West Canal bank. According to Golda & Yarif, IDF would be trapped by the same Third Army in the next erupted hostilities. The UN ceasefire decision that was approved by Israel found IDF 30 Kms north of the Suez gulf Adabia port. IDF withdrawal to these lines from its 24th Oct positions means resupply of the Third army with Anti-Air missile bases & facilitating its ability to launch an offensive to cut IDF divisions supply lines from the east of the Canal when restoring Hostilities. This choice was completely rejected by IDF planners.
3- Withdrawing from the west of the Canal to secured posts away from the Canal shores was the third choice. This choice with reducing the Egyptian forces east of the Canal & maintain a buffer Zone between the Two confronting armies was acepted by the Israel decision makers. Although, It proved the success of the Egyptian Army , it was the less painful for the Israelies.

The failure of IDF to destroy part or important portions of the Egyptian Army prevented it from altering the Egyptian War goals. While the Egyptian army succeded in maintiaing all of its War goals, the counter goal of IDF ( Destruction of the attacking forces) was not maintained.

ahmedfire wrote:This what the MOM was talking about but according to Egyptian sources the IDF lost 90 tanks on the 6th & 7th and lost  more than 400 Tanks during its first counterattack on the 8th .

I believe the IDF lost more on the 6th and 7th but 400 for just the 8th appears greatly exaggerated. Maybe it's a misunderstanding--400 total up to the 8th.

So if we even believed the IDF numbers ,so that means IDF lost 500 tanks at the first 3 days which proved the Mossad chief declaration (which you rejected before  ) that IDF lost about third of the whole tanks at the first week of the war .

I don't doubt the IDF lost about a third of its tanks in the first week, but many of these were recoverable just like some Egyptian losses.

The brigade that you mentioned  reached to 25km to the east and on 14-Oct it was bombed heavily from IAF and that was a main reason to limit the brigade ability to destroy the IDF anti tank teams which targeted the brigade heavily.

The infantry mechanized brigade (from the 6 division ) faced ATGMs and bombing from IAF

on 13-Oct the 11th mechanized brigade (from division no.7 ) also faced ATGMs and bombing (specially the B.M.P vehicles)  from IAF after advancing only 2 km.

The 21 division , 14 infantry battalion and 18 infantry mechanized also were bombed by IAF on 14-Oct , so claiminng that the IAF didn't support the IDF is far away from truth .

I was aware of bombing of units besides the brigade in the wadi Mabouk but I don't think either bombing or ATGMs were important factors in halting the offensive. Tanks were.

According to 4th division commander inreview , Sahron send some units to support against the division on the west , this was after the cossing .

I knew part of Sharon's force took over the central sector west of the canal after Magen moved southward. But I don't think there was actual combat pitting Sharon's troops against the 4rth.

The SAM-7 was not very effective to destroy the aircraft but was damaging it , 2 destroyed  +26 damaged aircrafts was recoreded during the war as a result from using SAM-7 which means it's still a weapon , losing some aircrafts didn't mean it will not face the IAF ,it's a war and must be losses there .

Late in the war, after the third army lost SAM cover from the west it was getting a "fearful pounding" from the IAF. The Egyptians even had to appeal for blood for the third army's wounded. SA-7s couldn't provide adequate air cover and nor could the EAF--that's why the Egyptians built such a big SAM network. Of course the EAF tried but high losses indicate the effort wasn't sustainable.

At the end did IAF destroyed the 3rd army before 24th ? no , so they couldn't do that .

No but as Dupuy wrote, in (Elusive Victory), had the war continued another week, the IAF and logistical strangulation would've "overcome Badawy's command" i.e. the third army.

I'm talking about ammunitions ,IDF reached the Gulf of Suez on the night of the 24th. That means the supplies ti the Third army were never affected during the War. You must realize that till the 22nd the logistic supplies to the Third army was far safer & secured than the supplies to IDF west of the Canal

No, already by the 21st at the latest, Israeli tank fire was hindering Egyptian traffic along the Cairo-Suez road.

General Sharon troops were defeated south Of Ismaelya city by the Egyptian commando brigade 150 & 182. From the 19th till the 24th Sharon armoured division & paratroopers chalenged the Egyptian Commando brigades south of Ismaelya but was defeated & prevented from conquering the city or penetrating behind the second Army.

Yes I know that. But Sharon's sector did not have priority hence he got less armor troops etc to advance than Adan did. He probably would've gotten farther with more but the IDF preferred to head south where terrain was better for tanks.

The Egyptian Artillary shells on IDF bridges & area of collection ( the Yard) did not stop since the 16th till the 2nd cease fire on the 24th. During this period , Rockets, Artillary shells, Katyousha, Napalm & air bombardments were dropped on IDF receiving area west of the canal. Hundreds of IDF personal were killed or injured due to this day/night continuous shelling to mark the trap which IDF put 3 of his armored divisions inside it.

It was costly for the Israelis but the bottom line is that their logistics was not disrupted to the degree necessary to stop their offensive southward.

IDF failure to conquer Missouri  left their logistics supplies to their forces west of the canal subjected to artillery bombardment. In addition this site together with the other 16th Div positions offer excellent axis for cutting IDF thin access to its 3 divisions west of the canal upon hostilities works resumption.

Maybe when Shamel preparations were ready but not during the war, especially not after the 17th when Egypt's attempt to cut the corridor was shattered. The 21st division and 25th brigade not only failed but were badly mauled.

Regarding the Air Cover, you must remember that beside the anti-Air missile umbrella, the Egyptian air force was still there. If IDF got air superiority over canal , it would not spare any chance to damage the Egyptian forces. This did not happen throughout the War. Not over Missouri or over the 3rd Army.

In fact it happened in both places. Israeli Skyhawks pounded Missouri before Raviv attacked and then 3rd was also pounded heavily. The EAF had far inferior jets and air to air missiles--exactly why Egypt had to rely on so many SAMs.

IDF failed to maintain its Counter attack War objects till the 22nd of Oct. Egypt & Israel agreed to Ceasefire & UN decision 338 on that day. IDF violated the ceasefire & maintained a ground surround of the third army on the 24th of Oct. Yet, this try for reversing the War outcome was blocked by Egypt threat that unless IDF retreat to th 22nd lines, the Egyptian Army will resume its operations & open an access to the 3rd army.

How could the Egyptians open an access to the third army in late October? As I wrote, Kabil was very reluctant to try with the 4rth--badly depleted by then.

You are deceiving yourself when you repeat IDF propaganda regarding the real reasons of their retreat. From the 15th of Oct through the bloodiest war battles IDF armored divisions advanced till the map shown 22nd Oct lines. At these positions ceasefire was declared which was approved by all the confronting sides. IDF used the precious hours following the ceasfire to push more than 40000 troops through the passage to Canal west shore & push quickly towards Suez to occupy it & cut the 3rd Army supply lines. While failed to occupy Suez, it succeeded in reaching the Gulf of Suez on the 24th & cut partially the third army supply lines ( The army was being supplied through the Suez gulf a shown in the map).

The Egyptian generals realized they were in serious danger when the IDF forces broke through their blocking units on the 18th of October. Fearing Egypt wouldn't be able to stop the enemy, Ismail finally persuaded Sadat to seek a cease fire. Egypt needed a cease fire to prevent a defeat and loss of even more territory. If it had the capability to stop the enemy it would've done so.

I believe the IDF lost more on the 6th and 7th but 400 for just the 8th appears greatly exaggerated. Maybe it's a misunderstanding--400 total up to the 8th.
I don't doubt the IDF lost about a third of its tanks in the first week, but many of these were recoverable just like some Egyptian losses.

So it’s a misunderstanding when mentioned by Egyptian sources but it’s damn fact if it was mentioned from IDF generals ?
Israel on 9-Oct requested the U.S help to supply the necessary hardware to replace the damaged one .
Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz have threatened Kissinger with the use of nuclear weapons in order to underline the urgency of Israel's situation and push the U.S. into initiating an airlift to replace Israel's losses,  Later that day Kissinger relayed U.S. President Richard Nixon's decision to initiate Operation Nickel Grass—which aimed to replace all of Israel's material losses.

Underestimating the IDF losses is far away from reality

I was aware of bombing of units besides the brigade in the wadi Mabouk but I don't think either bombing or ATGMs were important factors in halting the offensive. Tanks were.

War is about using a combination of platforms to deliver different types of ammunitions  from multiple sources . Think about street fight as example ,the using of arm & leg & head and knee make a combination to attack the opponent from different angles ,may the arm attacks more than the leg but removing all of this and keeping the arm to fight alone will never give the same result against the opponent .IDF used ATGM and IAF and artillery and tanks to counter the Egyptian advance on14-Oct .ATGMs and IAF made a main role to disperse the united forces & damaging some of them and gave more chances to Israeli’s tanks to shoot on her targets .

Late in the war, after the third army lost SAM cover from the west it was getting a "fearful pounding" from the IAF. The Egyptians even had to appeal for blood for the third army's wounded. SA-7s couldn't provide adequate air cover and nor could the EAF--that's why the Egyptians built such a big SAM network. Smile Of course the EAF tried but high losses indicate the effort wasn't sustainable.

No but as Dupuy wrote, in (Elusive Victory), had the war continued another week, the IAF and logistical strangulation would've "overcome Badawy's command" i.e. the third army.

First , wasn’t the period before 24th-Oct  enough for IAF to “destroy” the 3rd army if IAF can ? I mean IAF could do thousands of hits during that period  to completely destroy the 3rd army IF they could fly freely without threats .
IAF tried hardly and violated the ceasefire to try again but the couldn’t do what they said they can do .Actually they tried to fly high altitutes to avoid threats from SAMs but this heavily decreased the accuracy , also the Egyptian airforces faced them at high altitutes .

Below is the analysis from U.S intelligence report about the war.

No, already by the 21st at the latest, Israeli tank fire was hindering Egyptian traffic along the Cairo-Suez road.

IDF succeeded in cutting Cairo Suez road on the dawn of the 24th. It reached the Gulf of Suez on the night of the 24th .
By the way Magen had only 50 tanks , he lost  about 130 tanks to reach that area although he bypassed many Egyptian forces on the way an choosed not to fight it , advancing to get a hand on the political table which IDF couldn’t do .  This reflects the price that was being paid by IDF for advancing 20 Kms/7 days ( 3 kms/ day ) against the Heroic resistance of the Egyptian commando & general command reserve forces. While IDF bypassed the main Egyptian army divisions on the Eastern Canal, they failed against infantry forces to fullfill a major achievement west of the Canal. Sharon Division that was attacking to the north in the Ismaeilya direction to isolate the 2Nd army was stopped by the 182nd paratroopers brigade, 129th commandos brigade & 139th commandos brigade. IDF crossing yard was being shelled on a minutely basis by the 2nd army & the 3rd army artillary & rockets.

Yes I know that. But Sharon's sector did not have priority hence he got less armor troops etc to advance than Adan did. He probably would've gotten farther with more but the IDF preferred to head south where terrain was better for tanks.

The attack to the south was executed by Adan division. Actually, Sharon role according to the original plan was securing the passage & crossing to the west bank to either attack north to occupy Ismaeilia/surround 2nd army or to attack south to occupy Suez/surround 3rd army. After the exchange of roles with Adan, his primary role was to occupy the chinese farm & Missori then he was given the permission to attack Ismaeilya city in the west bank. He failed miserably in both.

Military analysts believe that Sharon has subjected his forces & IDF to unnecessary losses due to his wrong attitudes & decisions on the 8th & through the Valiant operation.

Here is one of his soldiers statement:-

A veteran of the October 1973 "Yom Kippur" war ("Harb Ramadan"), Henry Lowi writes:

"Sharon wantonly sacrificed his young soldiers and officers in crossing the Suez Canal, for the glory of Arik Sharon and to preserve the conquests of Zionism... I will always remember Arik Sharon as the son-of-a-bitch general for whom his own soldiers were truly only cannon fodder." He observes that Sharon "successfully used propaganda to serve the goals of his tactical manoeuvres", and concludeswith: "Down with Sharon-style brutality, lies and oppression!"

http://www.canpalnet-ottawa.org/Lowi_Sharon.html

It was costly for the Israelis but the bottom line is that their logistics was not disrupted to the degree necessary to stop their offensive southward.

Wrong .
Bybassing the Egyptian forces and the failure  to conquer Missouri left their logistics supplies to their forces west of the canal subjected to artillery bombardment. In addition this site together with the other 16th Div positions offer excellent axis for cutting IDF thin access to its 3 divisions west of the canal upon hostilities works resumption.

Below is a qoute of the analysis from U.S intelligence report about the war.

Maybe when Shamel preparations were ready but not during the war, especially not after the 17th when Egypt's attempt to cut the corridor was shattered. The 21st division and 25th brigade not only failed but were badly mauled.

IDF losses starting from the 15th till the 24th in the fighting that took place in Canal west bank & East bank represents more than 65% of its total war losses. The resulting forces positions on the 24th showed 3 IDF divisions in a severly threatened positions west of the canal.

In fact it happened in both places. Israeli Skyhawks pounded Missouri before Raviv attacked and then 3rd was also pounded heavily. The EAF had far inferior jets and air to air missiles--exactly why Egypt had to rely on so many SAMs.

In Mansourah air battle IAF had more aircrafts but failed to destroy the EAF and the airports .

How could the Egyptians open an access to the third army in late October? As I wrote, Kabil was very reluctant to try with the 4rth--badly depleted by then.

5 armored brigades (600 No tanks) were pulled back from the 2nd army infantry divisions east of the Canal & pushed to the south to support Kabil division & continue surrounding IDF west of the canal. Republican Gaurds armored divisions joined the front. Since ceasefire, enormous Tanks supplies were pouring to Egypt from USSR, Jougoslavia & Algeria.

The Egyptian generals realized they were in serious danger when the IDF forces broke through their blocking units on the 18th of October. Fearing Egypt wouldn't be able to stop the enemy, Ismail finally persuaded Sadat to seek a cease fire. Egypt needed a cease fire to prevent a defeat and loss of even more territory. If it had the capability to stop the enemy it would've done so.

Yeah just like the myth of “invincible army “  or describing the Barliev line as “the Safest natural defence line in history”

On the 24th, 25th & 26th, General Adan failed to conquer Suez city. His troops corps were scattered in the city streets marking his miserable defeat by DIV 19th troops. In the north, General Sharon troops were defeated south Of Ismaelya city by the Egyptian commando brigade 150 & 182. From the 19th till the 24th Sharon armoured division & paratroopers chalenged the Egyptian Commando brigades south of Ismaelya but was defeated & prevented from conquering the city or penetrating behind the second Army. On the East of Canal, IDF attacked Div 16 in Missori & the nothern sector of the chimnese farm & failed to conquer any. IDF forces confronting the 2nd army & the 3rd army in the east of the Canal failed to push them one inch backward.

The Egyptian Artillary shells on IDF bridges & area of collection ( the Yard) did not stop since the 16th till the 2nd cease fire on the 24th. During this period , Rockets, Artillary shells, Katyousha, Napalm & air bombardments were dropped on IDF receiving area west of the canal. Hundreds of IDF personal were killed or injured due to this day/night continuous shelling to mark the trap which IDF put 3 of his armored divisions inside it.

The war Ended on the 18th of Jan by signing the first disengagement treaty where IDF withdrew from the west of the Canal to 30 Kms inside Sinai with a 10 kms buffer area with the Egyptian army. This treaty was signed without any political commitments from the Egyptian side.
the Egyptian army has changed the forces positions on the ground in his favor in YK war. This change was rejected by Israel during all peace negotiations that took place after 1967 war. Due to the War outcome , Israel was forced to accept it.

ahmedfire wrote:
IDF used ATGM and IAF and artillery and tanks to counter the Egyptian advance on14-Oct .ATGMs and IAF made a main role to dispersed forces & damaging some of them and gave more chances to Israeli’s tanks to shoot on her targets .

The Israelis denied having TOWs as early as the 14th. They had SS-11s. In any event I'm sure almost all Egyptian tank/APC losses that day were due to tank fire.

First , wasn’t the period before 24th-Oct  enough for IAF to “destroy” the 3rd army if IAF can ?

No, because the 3rd didn't lose SAM cover until the 22nd and the IDF was mainly concerned with Egyptian forces and objectives west of the canal until the 24rth when it finally pounded the 3rd heavily.

Actually they tried to fly high altitutes to avoid threats from SAMs but this heavily decreased the accuracy , also the Egyptian airforces faced them at high altitutes .

There was no longer any significant SAM  cover by the 24rth, so the IAF could be much more effective. Egypt did buy some time by squandering MIG-21s--around 14 that day--but that just wasn't sustainable.

IDF succeeded in cutting Cairo Suez road on the dawn of the 24th.

No, a few days earlier. Adan had already overrun the jebel Geneifa on the night of the 19th-20th, and was in a position to hit vehicles on the Cairo-Suez road by the 21st at the latest.

By the way Magen had only 50 tanks , he lost  about 130 tanks to reach that area

He certainly suffered high losses--one of the best kept Israeli secrets of the war (did you see the starvisions post "Obscure Battle 1973"?). I don't know where the figure of 130 comes from though.

Bybassing the Egyptian forces and the failure  to conquer Missouri left their logistics supplies to their forces west of the canal subjected to artillery bombardment. In addition this site together with the other 16th Div positions offer excellent axis for cutting IDF thin access to its 3 divisions west of the canal upon hostilities works resumption.

But enough supplies must've gotten through to enable the Israelis to advance south to isolate 3rd army.

IDF losses starting from the 15th till the 24th in the fighting that took place in Canal west bank & East bank represents more than 65% of its total war losses. The resulting forces positions on the 24th showed 3 IDF divisions in a severly threatened positions west of the canal.

Severely threatened by what--the severely depleted 4rth and 21st, and the demolished 25th brigade?

In Mansourah air battle IAF had more aircrafts but failed to destroy the EAF and the airports .

OK so they didn't destroy it. But the IAF had a tremendous advantage in quality of aircraft and air to air missiles. The EAF was in no shape to provide air cover for long without SAMs.

5 armored brigades (600 No tanks) were pulled back from the 2nd army infantry divisions east of the Canal & pushed to the south to support Kabil division & continue surrounding IDF west of the canal. Republican Gaurds armored divisions joined the front. Since ceasefire, enormous Tanks supplies were pouring to Egypt from USSR, Jougoslavia & Algeria.

It was proposed that the 15th be pulled back but I don't think it was. The 21st's brigades had been wrecked.

On the 24th, 25th & 26th, General Adan failed to conquer Suez city. His troops corps were scattered in the city streets marking his miserable defeat by DIV 19th troops. In the north, General Sharon troops were defeated south Of Ismaelya city by the Egyptian commando brigade 150 & 182. From the 19th till the 24th Sharon armoured division & paratroopers chalenged the Egyptian Commando brigades south of Ismaelya but was defeated & prevented from conquering the city or penetrating behind the second Army. On the East of Canal, IDF attacked Div 16 in Missori & the nothern sector of the chimnese farm & failed to conquer any. IDF forces confronting the 2nd army & the 3rd army in the east of the Canal failed to push them one inch backward.

Unfortunately this overlooks the deep penetration of the west bank by IDF armor which raced from the crossing area to Adabiya in just a week….and the trapping of 3rd army.

The Egyptian Artillary shells on IDF bridges & area of collection ( the Yard) did not stop since the 16th till the 2nd cease fire on the 24th. During this period , Rockets, Artillary shells, Katyousha, Napalm & air bombardments were dropped on IDF receiving area west of the canal. Hundreds of IDF personal were killed or injured due to this day/night continuous shelling to mark the trap which IDF put 3 of his armored divisions inside it.

Unfortunately certain tactical successes did not stop the IDF advance. The IDF was not in danger in being trapped or cutoff in late October because Egyptian offensive power had been severely degraded. Shamel might've succeeded later but the situation in late October was very grim.

The Israelis denied having TOWs as early as the 14th. They had SS-11s. In any event I'm sure almost all Egyptian tank/APC losses that day were due to tank fire.

I didn’t say IDF tanks were not fighting but IAF ,ATGMs teams and artillery were there too , you said IAF wasn’t effective  ,here is a western source which said IAF was very effective that day :

On the 14th,

the Israeli Air Force was once again a potent battlefield killer

. The Egyptians had left most of their new SA-6 SAM's on the west bank to reduce their vulnerability to ground attack. This distant positioning, however, also reduced their effectiveness

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/ORL.htm

So your claims about the IAF that day is not correct , keep in mind that till now I’m sharing a western sources and I didn’t depend on Egyptian one which also mentioned the same IAF role that day + more IDF losses .

And regarding the TOW missiles , George W. Gawrych said that IDF used it on 14-OCT
Below is a quote by Dr. George W. Gawrych in his book , by the way he is supporting the Israeli’s views :

As anticipated by many senior Egyptian officers, the attack on the morning of 14 October proved an unmitigated disaster-a drive attempted too late and with insufficient forces . Using four axes of advance, Egyptian forces composed of one mechanized infantry and four armored brigades attacked the Israelis over open terrain with the sun in their eyes. IDF forces waited in defensive positions, armed with an undisclosed number of recently arrived sophisticated antitank TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) missiles from the United States.

On 11 October, the IDF had established a special course for rapidly training instructors on the use of the TOWs. 105 This gave them ample time to train units for action by 14 October.

No, because the 3rd didn't lose SAM cover until the 22nd and the IDF was mainly concerned with Egyptian forces and objectives west of the canal until the 24rth when it finally pounded the 3rd heavily.
There was no longer any significant SAM cover by the 24rth, so the IAF could be much more effective. Egypt did buy some time by squandering MIG-21s--around 14 that day--but that just wasn't sustainable.

Again you are wrong , Your claims are not only against Egyptian views but also against U.S intelligence views which mentioned that IAF tried to bomb more the last four days , one aircraft was lost and 6 damaged by AD forces .Actually Egyptian sources mentioned more IAF losses that period .
the Egyptian Air missile basis were pulled backward on the 16th & 17th of Oct  That means the 3rd army fought for one week till the 24th without Canal west complete SAM umbrella against IAF & IDF formations without being destroyed or impaired. It was protected by its potable anti air missiles & by the EAF.
Already I shared the U.S intelligence report that Egyptian AD was effective throughout the war ,as below !!

No, a few days earlier. Adan had already overrun the jebel Geneifa on the night of the 19th-20th, and was in a position to hit vehicles on the Cairo-Suez road by the 21st at the latest.

No , as per Egyptian sources , IDF reached Cairo Suez road on the dawn of the 24th. It reached the Gulf of Suez on the night of the 24th .

Has certainly suffered high losses--one of the best kept Israeli secrets of the war (did you see the starvisions post "Obscure Battle 1973"?). I don't know where the figure of 130 comes from though

.
Number were mentioned by many Egyptian books ,check the historian Gamal Hammad books .

But enough supplies must've gotten through to enable the Israelis to advance south to isolate 3rd army.
Severely threatened by what--the severely depleted 4rth and 21st, and the demolished 25th brigade?

Between 31-Oct to 18-Jan , Egyptian forces did 439 attacks on IDF forces  to prevent them for re-supplying or re-organizing, that’s why Israelis digged tunnels (width 7m and depth 5 m) to prevent the EGY forces from attacking them , they also put 750,000 anti armor mines to protect their forces .

439 attack during ceasefire caused the below IDF losses according to IDF official declarations (real losses more than those ):

187 Israeli soldiers get killed
11 aircrafts shoot down
41 tanks/armored vehicle get destroyed
36 bulldozer / engineering unit get destroyed .
Destroying sea landing boat .
Damaging Cerena oil tanker .

Bypassing many Egyptian forces and not securing the logistics ,IDF put his forces in a danger to be destroyed. Analysts believe that IDF can not sustain long wars. On the 24th of Oct, IDF failed to conquer Suez city or Mossiri position in the east or Ismaelya city or to achieve a further break through by sharon Division to surround the 2nd arm. The available IDF 3 armoured divisions were blocked on the Canal west bank & subjected to the Egyptian army pressure from the West, north & South. A plan of the 3rd army destruction can not be realized without risking IDF divisions safety on the Canal west bank

The infantry division 16 also remained a very effective fighting formation till the ceasefire declaration. Its power as a defensive force was as efficient as it was through the whole War period. To execute another immediate offensive to cut the passage after the failed 17th of Oct offensive was not planned or ordered.The priority was now to sustain its positions in missory, Hamital & Televizia. the failure of IDF to occupy these till the cease fire , left its passage to the Canal west threatened of being Cut in the future upon resumption of fighting. The stubbornness of Division 16 together with the all IDF attacks on Missori & Hamital till the ceasefire. During this period, some of the IDF troops refused orders of attack due to the huge losses which they suffered by Division16 strong fire & solid defence.
Till the last day , IDF faced high losses without any plan to secure his trapped forces , the area of IDF landing at the west Canal shore ( Yard) remained under continuous shelling from the 2nd & 3rd Army artillary & rocket launchers on a minutely basis starting from the 17th till the 24th of Oct. The high rank which IDF rate the Egyptian gunners is due to the perfect shelling of the Passage & the Yard area in the Oct War. It is absurd to state that the IDF supply went on a normal basis from Sinai to Canal west through the Passage & the Yard. Israelis confessed the high losses that they suffered due to the threatened passage & the Yard. In one night, the Egyptian artillery killed 100 IDF bridge engineering soldiers. No army could sustain such losses for a long time.
By the Military operations end on the 24th, it was proved that IDF had the following drawbacks:-
- Failed to push the 2nd army from its new positions in the east of the canal to the west.
- Failed to push the 3rd army from its new positions in the east of the canal to the west.
- Failed to encircle the 2nd army.
- Failed to invade Suez city or Ismaeilia city.
- Failed to occupy Missory position east of the canal. This failure prevented IDF from widening the passage between the troops in the west canal bank & its logistic bases in Sinai.
If there were forces there so may be the IDF soldiers were killing themselves .

OK so they didn't destroy it. But the IAF had a tremendous advantage in quality of aircraft and air to air missiles. The EAF was in no shape to provide air cover for long without SAMs.

They had it also in Mansourah air battle , in 53 minutes, 17 IAF aircrafts were downed and IAF tactics failed that day .

It was proposed that the 15th be pulled back but I don't think it was. The 21st's brigades had been wrecked.

The main plan from General Alshazli (which Sadat rejected ) was to pullback 3 brigades from 2nd army +one from the 3rd army , after that we can add Republican Gaurds armored divisions joined the front. Since ceasefire, enormous Tanks supplies were pouring to Egypt from USSR, Jougoslavia & Algeria.

Unfortunately this overlooks the deep penetration of the west bank by IDF armor which raced from the crossing area to Adabiya in just a week….and the trapping of 3rd army.

Bypassing main Egyptian forces is not a complete succeed , IDF put his forces in a trap .

Unfortunately certain tactical successes did not stop the IDF advance. The IDF was not in danger in being trapped or cutoff in late October because Egyptian offensive power had been severely degraded. Shamel might've succeeded later but the situation in late October was very grim.

To the last day IDF was losing a lot ,that’s why they put mines and dig tunnels to stop the Egyptian attacks , if Shamel plan was applied , all IDF forces would be destroyed ,that’s why U.S threatened Egypt .

IDF through the crossing failed to restore the 5th-Oct positions and put his forces in danger on the west with a very limited supply line with no plans to secure that forces .

CIA analysis :

After war , Israel was shocked from inside .

Agranat Commission was a National Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate

failings in the Israel Defense Forces

  in the prelude to the Yom Kippur War .

The commission's report was published in three parts. The interim report, released 1 April 1974, called for the

dismissal of a number of senior officers in the IDF and caused such controversy that Prime Minister Golda Meir was forced to resign

.

The report refused to give an opinion on the responsibility of the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan ,this caused public uproar and unhappiness in the army. In Abba Eban's words "The conclusions ... did not seem to accord with the narrative" Yitzhak Rabin walked out of the cabinet with Elazar. Thousands of demonstrators took to the streets. Nine days after the publication of the Interim Report, Golda Meir announced the resignation of her government.


So IDF with all U.S unlimited support has failed to restore the 5th-Oct borders and was forced to pullback 30 km to the east and after war Israel was politically shocked from inside and the Prime Minister Golda Meir was forced to resign .Egypt took her lands back but Golan heights remianed occupied till today ,but one day will be liberated ,nothing lasts forever .


That's Egyptian vectory .

Israel's Intelligence Failures in YK war

.

The deception plan mounted by the Egyptians, which included their intelligence services, relied on producing a series of events and incidents, militarily and politically, internationally and nationally, aimed at convincing Israeli intelligence analysts that the Arab world was not preparing for war. Among the plan's requirements was that senior echelon commanders preserve superficial normality while working secretly on the final preparations for the offensive.

The core of the Egyptian deception plan was based on the prevalent Israeli mentality following their lightning-quick victory over Arab forces in the 1967 Six-Day War. This mentality is clearly illustrated in the following Israeli saying:

Damascus is only one hour's drive away, and Cairo perhaps two.

The Egyptians sought to exploit this Israeli belief to their advantage. Ever since assuming office, Sadat had continually threatened Israel with war, engaging in brinkmanship, until his threats became ignored by Israel and the world. In order to position their forces for the attack against Israel, the Egyptians announced an exercise by the canal. Exercises had been conducted numerous times before, and in May and August 1973 false alarms had caused the Israeli army to mobilise in response to these exercises, costing Israel some $10 million on each occasion. This time, when the Egyptians began exercises on October 1 to last until October 7, Aman disregarded the heightened military activity as training maneuvers. Troop movements on the Syrian front were detected as well, but Aman concluded that the Syrians would not go to war without the Egyptians.

The pretext of exercises allowed the Egyptians to conceal their preparations. These were further facilitated by the fact that the Egyptian Second and Third Field Armies were normally stationed along the Suez Canal for defence. Troops, armor, and crucially, the bridging equipment, were moved to their concentration areas over a period of fifteen nights up to the night of October 5/6, with a peak of activity during the final five nights .


Ever since it occupied the Sinai in 1967, Israel had openly declared it would remain in Sharm el-Sheikh to ensure the sea lanes to the port of Eilat through the Straits of Tiran remained opened (the closing of the Straits to Israeli shipping in 1967 was one of the causes of the Six-Day War). Egypt aimed to nullify Sharm el-Sheikh's importance to Israel by imposing a naval blockade at the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, almost 2,500 kilometers (1,600 mi) from Israel. To this end, arrangements were made with Pakistan to receive Egyptian vessels for repair early in 1973. Approval was sought, and obtained, from Sudan and Yemen to receive the submarines on their way to Pakistan in Port Sudan and Aden as a friendly visit. Pakistan's approval to receive Egyptian vessels for repairs were made public. On 1 October, a force containing several submarines, destroyers and missile boats set sail on a route planned to ensure their arrival at Bab-el-Mandeb on October 6. The fleet was fully equipped for combat, and the force was ordered to maintain complete

radio silence

; which meant there was no way of recalling the submarines. The commanding officers, unaware of their real mission, were issued sealed envelopes detailing their orders and mission, and were instructed to open the envelopes on 6 October, only a few hours before the war was to begin, whereupon they would break their radio silence. Once the fleet had set sail that day, 1 October, "the war had effectively begun" .

Throughout September 1973, Aman had received eleven warnings, including a warning from Jordan's King Hussein, that Egypt and Syria were bent on waging war, but they were all disregarded, as Aman maintained the belief that the Arabs would not launch an attack. Mossad director Zvi Zamir remained of the opinion that war was not an Arab option.

This western reporter filmed this two minutes video on 1-Nov-1973 ,showing the commander of 2nd infantry division commenting on the IDF forces that crossed the canal ,this showing how much it became a propaganda from IDF after their complete failure in battlefield and calling U.S for help .

Also this video showingn IDF journy to hell on the west and showing that Egyptian SAMs were working and fired on recon enemy planes

belongs to U.S army .

By the way this guy along with his division completely destroyed the Israeli 190th Armored Brigade ,around 100 tanks .

The fortifications of Israeli's Engineers on the east  canal failed to stop the Egyptian attack .

Bar Liev Line  was considered impregnable and was a symbol of Israeli military perfection

Israeli minister of defence, said "

It would take the American and Soviet engineer corps, together, to break through the Bar Lev line

."

 Soviet experts at the time said that what was needed was an atom bomb.

The line incorporated a massive, continuous sand wall lining the entire canal, and was supported by a concrete wall. The sand wall, which varied in height from 20–25 metres (66–82 ft), was inclined at an angle of 45–65 degrees. The sand wall and its concrete support prevented any armored or amphibious units from landing on the east bank of the Suez Canal without prior engineering preparations.


To take advantage of the water obstacle, the Israelis installed an underwater pipe system to pump

flammable crude oil

into the Suez Canal, thereby creating a sheet of flame. Some Israeli sources claim the system was unreliable and only a few of the taps were operational. Nevertheless, the Egyptians took this threat seriously and, on the eve of the war, during the late evening of 5 October, teams of Egyptian frogmen blocked the underwater openings with concrete.

Immediately behind this sand wall was the front line of Israeli fortifications. After the War of Attrition, there were 22 forts, which incorporated 35 strongpoints. The forts were designed to be manned by a platoon. The strongpoints, which were built several stories into the sand, were on average situated less than 5 km (3 mi) from each other, but at likely crossing points they were less than 900 metres (3,000 ft) apart. The strongpoints incorporated trenches, minefields, barbed wire and a sand embankment. Major strongpoints had up to 26 bunkers with medium and heavy machineguns, 24 troop shelters, six mortar positions, four bunkers housing anti-aircraft weapons, and three firing positions for tanks. The strongpoints were surrounded by nearly fifteen circles of barbed wire and minefields to a depth of 200 metres (660 ft). A strongpoint's perimeter averaged 200–350 metres (660–1,150 ft). The bunkers and shelters provided protection against anything less than a 500 kg bomb, and offered luxuries to the defenders such as air conditioning. Between 500–1,000 metres (1,600–3,300 ft) behind the canal, there were prepared firing positions designed to be occupied by tanks assigned to the support of the strongpoints. Some of the names of the strongpoints were Tasa, Maftzach, Milano, Mezach, Chizayon, Mifreket, Orcal, Budapest (the largest), Nisan, Lituf, Chashiva. In addition, there were eleven strongholds located 5–8 km (3–5 mi) behind the canal, which were built along sandy hills. Each stronghold was designed to hold a company of troops.

To support the Bar Lev Line, Israel built a well-planned and elaborate system of roads. Three main roads ran north–south. The first was the Lexicon Road (Infantry Road), running along the canal, which allowed the Israelis to move between the fortifications and conduct patrols. The second was the Artillery Road, around 10–12 km (6–7 mi) from the canal. Its name came from the twenty artillery and air defense positions located on it: it also linked armored concentration areas and logistical bases. The Lateral Road (Supply Road), 30 km (19 mi) from the canal, was meant to allow the concentration of Israeli operational reserves which, in case of an Egyptian offensive, would counterattack the main Egyptian assault. A number of other roads running east to west, Quantara Road, Hemingway Road, and Jerusalem Road, were designed to facilitate the movement of Israeli troops towards the canal.

The defense of the Sinai depended upon two plans, Dovecote (שׁוֹבָךְ יוֹנִים/Shovakh Yonim) and Rock (סֶלַע/Sela). In both plans, the Israeli General Staff expected the Bar-Lev Line to serve as a "stop line" or kav atzira—a defensive line that had to be held at all cost. As noted by an Israeli colonel shortly after the War of Attrition, "The line was created to provide military answers to two basic needs: first, to prevent the possibility of a major Egyptian assault on Sinai with the consequent creation of a bridgehead which could lead to all-out war; and, second, to reduce as much as possible the casualties among the defending troops."

Israeli planning was based on a 48-hour advance warning by intelligence services of an impending Egyptian attack. During these 48 hours, the Israeli Air Force would assault enemy air defense systems, while Israeli forces deployed as planned. The Israelis expected an Egyptian attack would be defeated by armored brigades supported by the superior Israeli Air Force.

Dovecote tasked a regular armored division to the defense of the Sinai. The division was supported by an additional tank battalion, twelve infantry companies and seventeen artillery batteries. This gave a total of over 300 tanks, 70 artillery guns, and 18,000 troops. These forces, which represented the Sinai garrison, were tasked with the mission of defeating an Egyptian crossing at or near the canal line. It called for around 800 soldiers to man the forward fortifications on the canal line. Meanwhile, along Artillery Road, a brigade of 110 tanks was stationed with the objective of advancing and occupying the firing positions and tanks ramparts along the canal in case of an Egyptian attack. There were two additional armored brigades, one to reinforce the forward brigade, and the other to counterattack the main Egyptian attack.

Israeli minister of defence, said "Egyptians can't destroy Bar Liev Line "

Egyptians replied : why are you so serious