2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war #2

ٍIs this photo for the Armenian S-300 ? the tubes are not even in the launch position !!

ahmedfire wrote:ٍIs this photo for the Armenian S-300 ? the tubes are not even in the launch position !!

https://i.servimg.com/u/f23/20/21/20/02/fb_img12.jpg

They keep this up they will soon lose those Iskanders as well that they seem to treat as collector items

Use 'em or lose 'em

https://korrespondent.net/world/4289624-v-armenyy-razreshyly-zabyrat-ymuschestvo-hrazhdan

https://strana.ua/news/296815-obstrely-azerbajdzhana-baku-obeshchaet-erevanu-zhestkij-otvet.html

https://gordonua.com/news/worldnews/kto-vladeet-shushi-tot-vladeet-arcahom-v-karabahe-zayavili-chto-armiya-azerbaydzhana-podhodit-k-strategicheskoy-tochke-1525192.html

https://korrespondent.net/world/4289652-azerbaidzhan-zaiavliaet-o-dvukh-sbytykh-su-25-v-karabakhe

https://korrespondent.net/world/4289277-yran-ozvuchyl-detaly-plana-po-urehulyrovanyui-v-karabakhe

Isos wrote:https://mobile.twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1320490120819187712

Nice thread on turkish drones and their stand off attacks on armenian AD.

Their drone use a lot GPS. Armenia can counter tgem by jamming GPS in the area totally. Then those drones will need constant control from operator and use laser guidance for their MAM munitiins which reduces their range making them go inside AD engagement zone.

Now they use GPS and can launch MAM L from 14km away. And the drone is just following a preplaned path with GPS instead of radio control.

MAM-L ,exactly like almost the totality of the light ammunitions employed by not-heavy UCAV , strictly require semi active terminal laser homing .

in facts with the very reduced potential of theirs warhead those ammunitions need CEP measured in centimeters in order to cause damage or destroy lightly or some medium armoured equipment or aim at weak spot of heavily armoured vehicles (usually above the engine compartement to hopefully cause its immobilization and possibly an uncontroled fire).

There is not escape from that : with GPS you have a CEP (50% of the hits within this radius) measured in several meters even in presence iun the theatre of the ground based stations for GPS signal processing lacking which ( at example cause theirs destruction or suppression in a war against a powerful enemy) even much more powerful ammunition would become almost not usable anymore like precision munitions; a MAM-L with exclusive GPS guidance also in presence of ground based correction of the signal probably wouldn't have even only damaged a single vehicles until now.

That said is easy to understand that those UAV's munitions attacks employing the old and very well known semi-active laser homing system to engage theirs targets (the most easy to detect and to suppress for advanced military forces ) find an useful niche of employment only against very outdated operators devoid of LWS and obscurant, aerosol or modulators capable to easily diffract the ray causing the missile to go totally out course.

Mindstorm wrote:

Isos wrote:https://mobile.twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1320490120819187712

Nice thread on turkish drones and their stand off attacks on armenian AD.

Their drone use a lot GPS. Armenia can counter tgem by jamming GPS in the area totally. Then those drones will need constant control from operator and use laser guidance for their MAM munitiins which reduces their range making them go inside AD engagement zone.

Now they use GPS and can launch MAM L from 14km away. And the drone is just following a preplaned path with GPS instead of radio control.

MAM-L ,exactly like almost the totality of the light ammunitions emloyed by not-heavy UCAV , strictly require semi active terminal laser homing .

in facts with the very reduced potential of theirs warhead those ammunitions need CEP measured in centimeters in order to cause damage or destroy lightly or some medium armoured equipment or aim at weak spot of heavily armoured vehicles (usually above the engine compartement to hopefully cause its immobilization and possibly an uncontroled fire).

There is not escape from that : with GPS you have a CEP (50% of the hits with this radius) measured in several meters even in presence iun the theatre of the ground based stations for GPS signal processing (lacking which, like theirs destruction or suppression in a war against a powerful ebnemy) even nuch more powerful ammunition would become almost not usable anymore like precision munitions; a MAM-L with exclusive GPS guidance also in presence of ground based correction of the signal probably wouldn't have even only damaged a single vehicles until now.

That said is easy to understand that those UAV's munitions attacks employing the old and very well known semi-active laser homing system to engage theirs targets (the most easy to detect and to suppress for advanced military forces ) find an useful niche of employment only against very outdated operators devoid of LWS and obscurant, aerosol or modulators capable to easily diffract the ray causing the missile to go totally out course.

   

The difference is that MAM is extremely visible and half the guys dead on the AZ videos could have been alive with simple NOD's.

KoTeMoRe wrote:

Mindstorm wrote:

Isos wrote:https://mobile.twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1320490120819187712

Nice thread on turkish drones and their stand off attacks on armenian AD.

Their drone use a lot GPS. Armenia can counter tgem by jamming GPS in the area totally. Then those drones will need constant control from operator and use laser guidance for their MAM munitiins which reduces their range making them go inside AD engagement zone.

Now they use GPS and can launch MAM L from 14km away. And the drone is just following a preplaned path with GPS instead of radio control.

MAM-L ,exactly like almost the totality of the light ammunitions emloyed by not-heavy UCAV , strictly require semi active terminal laser homing .

in facts with the very reduced potential of theirs warhead those ammunitions need CEP measured in centimeters in order to cause damage or destroy lightly or some medium armoured equipment or aim at weak spot of heavily armoured vehicles (usually above the engine compartement to hopefully cause its immobilization and possibly an uncontroled fire).

There is not escape from that : with GPS you have a CEP (50% of the hits with this radius) measured in several meters even in presence iun the theatre of the ground based stations for GPS signal processing (lacking which, like theirs destruction or suppression in a war against a powerful ebnemy) even nuch more powerful ammunition would become almost not usable anymore like precision munitions; a MAM-L with exclusive GPS guidance also in presence of ground based correction of the signal probably wouldn't have even only damaged a single vehicles until now.

That said is easy to understand that those UAV's munitions attacks employing the old and very well known semi-active laser homing system to engage theirs targets (the most easy to detect and to suppress for advanced military forces ) find an useful niche of employment only against very outdated operators devoid of LWS and obscurant, aerosol or modulators capable to easily diffract the ray causing the missile to go totally out course.

   

The difference is that MAM is extremely visible and half the guys dead on the AZ videos could have been alive with simple NOD's.

This is correct , but often those attacks happen successfully even in plain daytime, reason is that among those soldiers there not exist a protocol or training for those instances ; so not operatives cover the role of sky observers (usually placed in masked elevated positions and equipped with the most advanced surveillance and coomunication means to provide the precise command of cover or disperse........or better aerosol dispersing to destroy completely the attack ) and the number of those equiped with MANPADS can be literally counted on the fingers of two hands in the entire NK theatre.

Anyhow appear that in the latest days Artskh's air defense operators, also with theirs enormous limits, have begun to improve theirs performances against UAV with some tactical adaptations; at this point against a pair enemy (same economical resources) there would not be a single UAV anymore in the stock and the rest of the army would be horribly under-equiped cause the expense in those UAV.......

Mindstorm wrote:

KoTeMoRe wrote:

Mindstorm wrote:

Isos wrote:https://mobile.twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1320490120819187712

Nice thread on turkish drones and their stand off attacks on armenian AD.

Their drone use a lot GPS. Armenia can counter tgem by jamming GPS in the area totally. Then those drones will need constant control from operator and use laser guidance for their MAM munitiins which reduces their range making them go inside AD engagement zone.

Now they use GPS and can launch MAM L from 14km away. And the drone is just following a preplaned path with GPS instead of radio control.

MAM-L ,exactly like almost the totality of the light ammunitions emloyed by not-heavy UCAV , strictly require semi active terminal laser homing .

in facts with the very reduced potential of theirs warhead those ammunitions need CEP measured in centimeters in order to cause damage or destroy lightly or some medium armoured equipment or aim at weak spot of heavily armoured vehicles (usually above the engine compartement to hopefully cause its immobilization and possibly an uncontroled fire).

There is not escape from that : with GPS you have a CEP (50% of the hits with this radius) measured in several meters even in presence iun the theatre of the ground based stations for GPS signal processing (lacking which, like theirs destruction or suppression in a war against a powerful ebnemy) even nuch more powerful ammunition would become almost not usable anymore like precision munitions; a MAM-L with exclusive GPS guidance also in presence of ground based correction of the signal probably wouldn't have even only damaged a single vehicles until now.

That said is easy to understand that those UAV's munitions attacks employing the old and very well known semi-active laser homing system to engage theirs targets (the most easy to detect and to suppress for advanced military forces ) find an useful niche of employment only against very outdated operators devoid of LWS and obscurant, aerosol or modulators capable to easily diffract the ray causing the missile to go totally out course.

   

The difference is that MAM is extremely visible and half the guys dead on the AZ videos could have been alive with simple NOD's.

This is correct , but often those attacks happen successfully even in plain daytime, reason is that among those soldiers there not exist a protocol or training for those instances ; so not operatives cover the role of sky observers (usually placed in masked elevated positions and equipped with the most advanced surveillance and coomunication means to provide the precise command of cover or disperse........or better aerosol dispersing to destroy completely the attack ) and the number of those equiped with MANPADS can be literally counted on the fingers of two hands in the entire NK theatre.

Anyhow appear that in the latest days Artskh's air defense operators, also with theirs enormous limits, have begun to improve theirs performances against UAV with some tactical adaptations; at this point against a pair enemy (same economical resources) there would not be a single UAV anymore in the stock and the rest of the army would be horribly under-equiped cause the expense in those UAV.......  

Issue are the following.

1. limited theatre recon capability.
2. limited HS recon capability (Armenian Radars can pick up TB's when they lift off, but somehow communication doesn't get through).
3. limited NOD capability (long range NOD/ SR NOD). FFS even the houthis were busy with FLIR pods.

par far wrote:Erdog is looking at Crimea as being Turkish, he has his eyes set on Crimea.


"Neo-Ottomans On Globalists’ Service: Erdogan Ambitious Gaze Turns Toward Crimea."


https://southfront.org/neo-ottomans-on-globalistsservice-erdogan-ambitious-gaze-turns-toward-crimea/

Ok, good for him I guess?

But there are some major obstacles here that South front (absolute shit site tbh) seems to ignore.

1) Russia is a vastly superior military force on every front - bigger army, bigger budget, builds all its own tech, has nuclear weapons.

2) Russia's economy is far more of an autarky and thus less reliant on outside sources. Turkey still relies on heavy imports, especially on needed resources to be a power.

3) Russians are ethnic majority of Crimea.  2014 tries to claim it's about 14% Tatar but guaranteed to be less. Maybe 10% at best.  Try convincing 64% of the population and other 15% that you want to join A economically poorer, military weaker and ethnic cleansing nation as Turkey over a far more important, economically stronger and military power as Russia?

5) if they tried through military, it still wouldn't work cause Ukraine has no military strength left and Russia would obviously use the eastern Ukraine to strike at Ukraine itself while Turkey is so spread thin and has made so many enemies, that no one would come to her rescue if she started a war.

Only upper hand turkey has is mindless brainwashed Muslims who are too busy either fucking their first cousins and producing children like rabbits and or blowing themselves up for some child molesting profit.

A Syrian fighter captured: https://lenta.ru/news/2020/10/30/terrorist/

Azerbaijan Making Gains in Karabakh Fighting   https://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2020-10-09/6_1112_armament1.html?print=Y
Putin Calls for Turkish Involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh Talks In Pictures: Civilians Killed in Attack Near Nagorno-Karabakh  Russia will apply a strategy of attrition to Turkey  https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3103358.html	With Ropes and Wooden Guns, Returning Armenians Train for War

Russia Watches as Karabakh War Reaches Decisive Turning Point
Azerbaijan’s ‘five day’ war turns uphill battle

Sounds like Aremnia didn't use any ADs

Azerbaijan's new offensive triggers panic in Karabakh

President of Nagorno-Karabakh (NKR) Arayik Harutyunyan appealed to the nation with an appeal to make every effort to protect Shusha, the second most important city in Karabakh. It is at him that the new offensive of the Azerbaijani army is now aimed. Over the past few days, Azerbaijan has been forced to change not only the direction of the main attack, but also the tactics of hostilities. How and why?

The advance of the Azerbaijani southern corps to Lachin was stopped a few days ago. The days of relative calm, during which intensive foreign policy consultations are taking place, were used by the Azerbaijani command to come to their senses, reorganize forces and seriously reconsider the tactics of the offensive.

In the direction of Lachin (initially the main goal of Azerbaijan), the front froze. Moreover, several Armenian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) are still hanging in the rear of the Azerbaijani group. As a result of the fighting in the Lachin direction, the Armenian troops managed not only to stop the advance of the Azerbaijanis, but also to regain control of Kubatly and five more villages around this town, which is confirmed by video materials.

The defeat at Lachin led to the fact that Baku had to look for new paths not previously prescribed in the action plan in order to achieve in the shortest possible time one of the main objectives of the offensive - Shushi. Moreover, it is believed that the Azerbaijani army needs to achieve significant success by October 31 - the date of the first election of Ilham Aliyev as president of Azerbaijan in 2003.

This kind of conspiracy theories are very popular in the East, and do not always correlate with reality. It is more likely that time is really running out, resources are not eternal, foreign policy is pressing, and the assault on the "mountain fortress of Karabakh" has become like an impossible mission.

The original Azeri plan called for the capture of Lachin first and, therefore, the interruption of supplies from Armenia. It looked logical from the point of view of military planning. But the recent defeat on the way to Lachin forced Baku to reorient itself directly to Shusha. And this is problematic, illogical and can lead to serious losses. Shusha is not only one of the key positions for the defense of the NKR, but also a moral symbol. The historical capital of Karabakh, the religious center and the "place of power" of the 1988-94 war.

Now the entire group of Azerbaijanis advancing on Lachin hung in the air with open flanks. A small throw into a narrow gorge is enough for the Armenian troops to be able to completely cut off the recently triumphantly advancing Azerbaijani grouping, or at least simply to reclaim these territories. But the Armenians, apparently, do not have enough resources to turn local success into a strategic victory. Several Armenian BTGs, which found themselves in the rear and on the flanks of the advancing Azerbaijani group, were deprived of supplies. They are unlikely to be able to independently drive the Lachin group of Azerbaijanis into the cauldron.

Therefore, the Azerbaijani corps rebuilt on the move in about five days. From the corridor to Lachin, the advancing units are gradually withdrawn (possibly, including avoiding encirclement) into the neighboring, practically uninhabited high-mountain gorge.

The Armenians have created a new line of defense there from Hadrut to the Red Bazaar along the edge of the highlands. Heavy equipment cannot pass there. Only with your feet. In classical terms, this is not a tank-hazardous direction, and it is possible to advance there in a straight line to Shusha only by the forces of infantry and special forces.

That is what the Azerbaijani corps has been doing in the last day. Parts of special forces climb the mountains in small groups, bypassing the fortified positions of the Armenians. According to the Armenian headquarters, in the last 24 hours, separate units of the Azerbaijani army advanced in a straight line at a distance of about five kilometers from Shushi, which created a new threat to the Nagorno Karabakh defense strategy itself.

In the mountainous zone, the Azerbaijanis are trying to bypass the Armenian front from the villages of Khtsaberd and Ukhtadzor in a general direction further along the gorge to Khavertanots (Avertanots, in another vocalization of the Armenian language), which is actually not far from Shushi. Hence the panic reports about the advance to "5 kilometers from Shushi." In this gorge, no one has ever lived and still does not, and you can reach this direction only on foot crossing the mountain range. The new tactics of the Azerbaijani corps boils down to the fact that, having crossed the mountain ridge by the forces of special detachments, bypass the Armenian defense and go to Khavertanots.

At the moment, the desired progress has not been recorded. Clashes go along the edge of the ridge. However, the new threat of Azerbaijan looks very dangerous for the NKR, which caused such an emotional appeal of the Karabakh president to the people. Along the way, important changes took place in the army in Karabakh. Major General Mikael Arzumanyan was appointed the new commander of the Karabakh army. Former commander Jalal Harutyunyan was seriously injured and cannot perform his duties.

The problem of the new offensive operation of the Azerbaijani army is that it is forced to use tactics completely unfamiliar to it.

Now the battles are taking place exclusively in the mountainous zone, in which it is impossible to rely on tanks and artillery, and where even the action of drones is limited. So far, the Azerbaijanis can count on entering the deserted gorge in small groups of special forces, which is recorded by the Armenian side. What is happening is more like a local special operation than a large-scale offensive.

The Azerbaijani offensive group can really cross the ridge. But after that, with a high probability, she will be left without supplies in an impassable area. You can, of course, continue to advance along the deserted gorge to Havertonots, theoretically threatening Shusha. But there is a very great chance of falling into the same trap as the Azerbaijani BTG near Lachin recently fell. In addition, the terrain is such that even separate groups of infantry will be able to pass through the gorge to Havertonots, it is not a fact that they will actually be able to reach Shusha. There is a mountain 1700 meters high, and even if you pass it, the ascent to Shusha itself from the south is almost unrealistic.

The question is to what extent the Armenian units, sitting along the edge of the mountains near Khtsaberd, will withstand, and which, in this way, can themselves be surrounded. The new Azerbaijani tactics looks convincing precisely because if the Armenian defense on the edge of the mountains collapses, it will really create a threat to Shushi. The Armenian defense entrenched in the mountains is experiencing the same (if not great) supply problems as the advancing advance units of the Azerbaijani infantry. Perhaps the supply issue will be the decisive one in the next few days.

After all, Shusha itself is a fortress on a mountain. It could have been taken on a swoop in 1992, but even then it took General Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan ("Commando") several months to bring special trained (including mountaineering) units along mountain paths. And then Shusha was defended by Shamil Basayev as well. Now a secretive approach to the mountain from the south is impossible, and the use of aviation is practically out of the question.
In principle, a slight exertion of forces on the part of the Armenians is now enough to turn the military situation in their favor and throw off the advancing parts of Azerbaijan from the mountains. However, the big question is whether there are resources for this, and not only physical, but also psychological, what is called morale. The emotional speeches of the leadership of Karabakh were aimed at finding and mobilizing such resources.

But everything is decided on the ground. More precisely, in the mountains, where the Armenians have a historical and purely geographical advantage.

Isos wrote:

ahmedfire wrote:Sounds like Aremnia didn't use any ADs

If they used effectively their AD those 12 or so TB2 drones would be dead long time ago.

Buk M2 can cover a large part of NK. If they had 6 ot 7 systems with each 4 TELAR and some Nobium (small nebo) they would have total air control.

Not just that, but Manpads use would be effective against suicide drones lets say. Recently Ka Band radar systems, small and cheap, are being made to simply pick these things up within a few km's. Well trained and organized AD structure would handle it fairly easily.

There is just a lot of dumb decisions in this conflict and Azerbaijan is taking full advantage of it.

It's not over yet for Amenians: https://vz.ru/world/2020/10/30/1068244.html

Well, technically the Verba is designed for hitting targets the user cant see. Most older manpads too. You cant spot with the eye a target at 3km dude. Igla-S can still pick it up. If a radar station can pick up the target before hand, it can allow manpad users to direct to its attention, or even some kind of vehicle carrying multiple igla launchers.

Isos wrote: Manpad won't be that effective and suicide drone are not easy to spot until the kast moment.

All drones are difficult to spot until the last moment. However, JSTAR and AWACS will be able to pick up their signatures quite fast.

More importantly you can launch these drones only when you are close to the adversary as drones don't have very high endurance.

Isos wrote:

miketheterrible wrote:Well, technically the Verba is designed for hitting targets the user cant see.  Most older manpads too.  You cant spot with the eye a target at 3km dude.  Igla-S can still pick it up.  If a radar station can pick up the target before hand, it can allow manpad users to direct to its attention, or even some kind of vehicle carrying multiple igla launchers.

Idk how their optics work but the operator still needs to see the target, be it with eyes or IR camera. Radar can spot them but you still need to lock with the manpad and to do that you need to point exactly at the target.

Drones have a very small IR signature.

There was a video on youtube showing the track of a Mi-8 on the camera of what I think was an Osa system. It came from 5km to very close range and was seen only when it came very close. I can't find it again.

Armenians don't have the very last russian stuff but soviet techno from the 70s.

No, operator doesn't. The system has to pick up the IR signature or something else.

Yes, you have to point within the general area of the aircraft, that is true.

But anyway, this is what Russia's defense mantra is now as well with especially introduction of Verba.

Anyway, it is up to these other nations to refine their AD strategy. If they don't they wont survive this.

Azerbaijan’s next move will make or break Karabakh war

https://korrespondent.net/world/4290262-baku-y-erevan-dohovorylys-ne-vesty-ohon-po-myrnomu-naselenyui

The Barnaul IADS gives MANPADS operators cues as to which direction to look for targets... the sensor on the missile is better than human vision so a lock could be acquired without needing the target to be directly visible... the IADS has a cueing system built in to the system that indicates to the operator where to point the missile and warns of a lock on target...

jhelb wrote:

Isos wrote: Manpad won't be that effective and suicide drone are not easy to spot until the kast moment.

All drones are difficult to spot until the last moment. However, JSTAR and AWACS will be able to pick up their signatures quite fast.

More importantly you can launch these drones only when you are close to the adversary as drones don't have very high endurance.

and Azerbaijan have the initiative with their surveillance drones. They have Heron, which clearly the reason on why they knew there is ST-68 operating or where likely the S-300's.

For some reason Armenian forces are never attempting to engage these surveillance asset or even maybe attempt to gain similar asset be it buy or from Russia. Had Armenia also have the capability they should have a very good aim on Azeri drone controls.

Beginning of the end.

https://twitter.com/301_AD/status/1322431516174131200

Stealthflanker wrote:

jhelb wrote:

Isos wrote: Manpad won't be that effective and suicide drone are not easy to spot until the kast moment.

All drones are difficult to spot until the last moment. However, JSTAR and AWACS will be able to pick up their signatures quite fast.

More importantly you can launch these drones only when you are close to the adversary as drones don't have very high endurance.

and Azerbaijan have the initiative with their surveillance drones. They have Heron, which clearly the reason on why they knew there is ST-68 operating or where likely the S-300's.

For some reason Armenian forces are never attempting to engage these surveillance asset or even maybe attempt to gain similar asset be it buy or from Russia. Had Armenia also have the capability they should have a very good aim on Azeri drone controls.

Jesus guys really?

Mapping of NK positions and pinging of NK AA was done during the last exercices in July 2020. Turkey Ran multiple mock attacks on Ganja and also spoofed the VHF relays in Martakert. Their E-7 is mapping ground which allows to see pathways through ARM defense lines. Armenia has no money for that. Neither has Azerbaijan.

This us a Turkish led war through and through.

miketheterrible wrote:

Isos wrote:

miketheterrible wrote:Well, technically the Verba is designed for hitting targets the user cant see.  Most older manpads too.  You cant spot with the eye a target at 3km dude.  Igla-S can still pick it up.  If a radar station can pick up the target before hand, it can allow manpad users to direct to its attention, or even some kind of vehicle carrying multiple igla launchers.

Idk how their optics work but the operator still needs to see the target, be it with eyes or IR camera. Radar can spot them but you still need to lock with the manpad and to do that you need to point exactly at the target.

Drones have a very small IR signature.

There was a video on youtube showing the track of a Mi-8 on the camera of what I think was an Osa system. It came from 5km to very close range and was seen only when it came very close. I can't find it again.

Armenians don't have the very last russian stuff but soviet techno from the 70s.

No, operator doesn't. The system has to pick up the IR signature or something else.

Yes, you have to point within the general area of the aircraft, that is true.

But anyway, this is what Russia's defense mantra is now as well with especially introduction of Verba.

Anyway, it is up to these other nations to refine their AD strategy. If they don't they wont survive this.

Oh God. TB-2 are VERY visible on thermal narrow field (See UAE Pantsir shooting down TB-2 in Libya). They are difficult to accurately track with Radar due to slow speed and large noise reverberation on the dish. However they can be filtered and tracked if the crew is smart they can do a switch, just like UAE crew showed. The issues start when you have more than 1/2 TB-2’s which is usually the Turkish MO. Then you need more of them.