Russian special military operation in Ukraine #9

flamming_python wrote:

SeigSoloyvov wrote:

RTN wrote:Long said, Kremlin lost the plot in Ukraine on Day 1. Now they are looking for a face saver. First they roped in fascist Turkey to facilitate negotiation and now Lavrov wants India.... a third world failed state to mediate between Russia & Ukraine

https://theprint.in/world/india-can-play-mediators-role-between-moscow-and-kyiv-russian-fm-lavrov/898096/

Silly to say no offense and all, the war is far from over and Ukraine is losing, yes Russia did overcommit and they realized the mistake hence their scale downs on some fronts.

You need to remember the russians are waging their war with annoying rules, undermanned and a lot of b tier frontline gear, tho they do some have modernise stuff there, its not a lot.

It's nothing to do with over committing - just the political part of the operation failed, setting up an alternative Ukrainian government. Which actually was plan A.

The hope of scaring Kiev into negotiations failed
The hope of splitting the Ukrainian elites, or the military away from the political leadership - failed
The hope of coming to agreements with more Ukrainian cities and regions failed. Kharkov didn't work out, neither Krivoj Rog - to these cities Russian forces attempted to make advances but then withdrew. Chernigov, Sumy too didn't agree.

So now plan B is just to destroy the Ukrainian army group in the field, 2 groups in fact one in the Donbass and another gathering in front of Zaporozhie. Put them into cauldrons, force a mass surrender and hopefully defections ultimately to the LNR/DNR, and probably advance up the Dniepr, while in the south - seize Nikolaev and Odessa for sure.
There may be some new state set up, like a North Korea and South Korea type of thing.

SeigSoloyvov wrote:

flamming_python wrote:

SeigSoloyvov wrote:

RTN wrote:Long said, Kremlin lost the plot in Ukraine on Day 1. Now they are looking for a face saver. First they roped in fascist Turkey to facilitate negotiation and now Lavrov wants India.... a third world failed state to mediate between Russia & Ukraine

https://theprint.in/world/india-can-play-mediators-role-between-moscow-and-kyiv-russian-fm-lavrov/898096/

Silly to say no offense and all, the war is far from over and Ukraine is losing, yes Russia did overcommit and they realized the mistake hence their scale downs on some fronts.

You need to remember the russians are waging their war with annoying rules, undermanned and a lot of b tier frontline gear, tho they do some have modernise stuff there, its not a lot.

It's nothing to do with over committing - just the political part of the operation failed, setting up an alternative Ukrainian government. Which actually was plan A.

The hope of scaring Kiev into negotiations failed
The hope of splitting the Ukrainian elites, or the military away from the political leadership - failed
The hope of coming to agreements with more Ukrainian cities and regions failed. Kharkov didn't work out, neither Krivoj Rog - to these cities Russian forces attempted to make advances but then withdrew. Chernigov, Sumy too didn't agree.

So now plan B is just to destroy the Ukrainian army group in the field, 2 groups in fact one in the Donbass and another gathering in front of Zaporozhie. Put them into cauldrons, force a mass surrender and hopefully defections ultimately to the LNR/DNR, and probably advance up the Dniepr, while in the south - seize Nikolaev and Odessa for sure.
There may be some new state set up, like a North Korea and South Korea type of thing.

No they tried a multi-prong attack but it failed due to the lack of forces, so they corrected the error by scaling those troops down.

Sure Putin chances are hoped something like that would happen, but he had to know Ukraine will not concede until they are in the worst possible positioned.

You have a very romanticized view of whats going on.

I can agree they will annex those areas, It would be dumb to leave west ukraine alone but if they did I understand why they did it, just it will bite them in the ass later on

Reflections on the situation in the Kyiv-Chernihiv region

I note right away: I DO NOT HAVE reliable operational information from there (unlike Donbass) (although, of course, I have some from direct participants, but it is "late" by several days in time and does not always have value from the point of view of " presentation of the big picture).

At the same time, some general considerations "drew" with a fairly high degree of certainty.

1. As I have repeatedly noted - an operation with a "throw to Kyiv" (both along the Right Bank - landing on Gostomel and a strike group through the "Chernobyl zone", and on the Left Bank - past Chernigov and Sumy along the "guts" - to Brovary) - It was built on the basis of an initially and fundamentally incorrect calculation for panic and a quick capitulation of the Kiev authorities in the event of a threat to their military-political center, and also on the belief that "the Armed Forces of Ukraine will behave as in the 14th."

Based on this, the troops were given the task of "going forward as quickly as possible, without looking back at the rear." And the troops kept going. Which already in the first few days of the operation led to large and unjustified losses in people and equipment - as a result of enemy attacks on unguarded rear columns on unprotected communications.

Having reached the outskirts of Kyiv and "bogged down" in heavy urban battles in its "satellites" - Russian troops quickly lost both the "tempo of the operation" and - over time - the ability to move forward at all.
It was not possible to complete the blockade of Kyiv - the available forces and means for this turned out to be acutely insufficient. The resistance of the enemy was growing, forcing the formation of a more or less continuous front line in order to cover the rear from enemy raid operations (weakening, at the same time, shock groups). In fact, the groups of the RF Armed Forces (both to the west of Kyiv and to the east) have become like "mushrooms" - with massive hats on thin fragile legs. At the same time, the Right-bank (western) group does not have a real logistical connection with the Left-bank - due to the lack of bridges across the Dnieper. - Some bridges (in Kyiv) - failed to capture, others - remained in the rear in Gomel. In such a situation, maneuvering forces between groups turned out to be impossible, which weakens their strike capabilities and creates the threat of defeat from an enemy capable of rapidly maneuvering forces through the most powerful Kiev transport hub (at one time - near Moscow, in the winter of 1941 - I faced exactly the same problem Wehrmacht).
Meanwhile, the area of ​​operations of the Pravoberezhnaya grouping itself is located in a wooded and swampy region, relatively poor in normal roads and other infrastructure, which seriously complicates the supply of Russian troops bogged down in heavy battles.

2. Now - when the calculation of "success in a swift attack" turned out to be untenable - the Russian command faced a logical question: "what to do next in a situation where there are no forces to successfully attack, but there are no forces to successfully defend the captured huge area either"? Moreover, in 2-3 weeks (depending on the weather) - this whole wooded area will "turn green" and the enemy's DRGs will significantly increase their impact on communications?

There could be two answers to this question:

1) "We will hold on to what we have taken with our teeth in the hope of a quick approach of reserves!"

2) Since it "failed" with the offensive - in time (not waiting for the enemy to take advantage of the mistakes made and organize a counteroffensive) - withdraw the troops "stuck in a dead end" from the resulting "bag" in order to use them on others - more promising - directions.

Political arguments "scream" for the first option (in civil wars they are very, very weighty): the retreat of the RF Armed Forces from Kyiv inevitably means a sharp rise in the enemy's morale, the emergence of confidence that "Russians can be beaten."

For the second - military expediency reaching an urgent need. After all, the reserves necessary to turn the operation in their favor, which could be additionally transferred "from the mainland" - are not at the disposal of the command. THEY SIMPLY ARE NOT. It is impossible to remove troops from other directions (where the "offensive with spread fingers" was carried out in exactly the same way). And the preparation of new units and formations - in any case, will take considerable time (from 2 or more weeks - and this is with the most primitive approach, such as: "caught, gathered, put into operation and driven into battle without the slightest training and combat coordination").

In the current situation, in my opinion, the command of the RF Armed Forces made the only right decision. Since if the abandonment of the occupied territory is inevitable anyway, it is better to do this without first defeating your troops by the enemy.

The troops will still be useful to us - the war will be long ...

Well, the fact that the defeat (the forced withdrawal of troops from the previously expensively paid lives of soldiers and officers of the liberated territory) still "takes place" is a bitter fact, but not fatal. In the history of Russia, in general, there are very few wars in which such "incidents" were not present due to the outstanding bungling of the generals. The main thing is that the defeats do not go "in non-stop mode" and are again replaced by victories.

SeigSoloyvov wrote:This image alone doesn't prove the claim you are making though, from what evidence I see this is a propaganda post.

You have his face on image? can you prove the face matches the name?

flamming_python wrote:Strelkov on the matter

Again, I don't vouch for his views. But he is an experienced military officer, tells it like he sees it, and it seems like his analysis of what should have been done (encircle the Donbass grouping with armored fists from Kherson and Kharkov) is set to be followed by Russian command now. Although who knows, with all this fog of war and maskirovka

Reflections on the situation in the Kyiv-Chernihiv region

I note right away: I DO NOT HAVE reliable operational information from there (unlike Donbass) (although, of course, I have some from direct participants, but it is "late" by several days in time and does not always have value from the point of view of " presentation of the big picture).

At the same time, some general considerations "drew" with a fairly high degree of certainty.

1. As I have repeatedly noted - an operation with a "throw to Kyiv" (both along the Right Bank - landing on Gostomel and a strike group through the "Chernobyl zone", and on the Left Bank - past Chernigov and Sumy along the "guts" - to Brovary) - It was built on the basis of an initially and fundamentally incorrect calculation for panic and a quick capitulation of the Kiev authorities in the event of a threat to their military-political center, and also on the belief that "the Armed Forces of Ukraine will behave as in the 14th."

Based on this, the troops were given the task of "going forward as quickly as possible, without looking back at the rear." And the troops kept going. Which already in the first few days of the operation led to large and unjustified losses in people and equipment - as a result of enemy attacks on unguarded rear columns on unprotected communications.

Having reached the outskirts of Kyiv and "bogged down" in heavy urban battles in its "satellites" - Russian troops quickly lost both the "tempo of the operation" and - over time - the ability to move forward at all.
It was not possible to complete the blockade of Kyiv - the available forces and means for this turned out to be acutely insufficient. The resistance of the enemy was growing, forcing the formation of a more or less continuous front line in order to cover the rear from enemy raid operations (weakening, at the same time, shock groups). In fact, the groups of the RF Armed Forces (both to the west of Kyiv and to the east) have become like "mushrooms" - with massive hats on thin fragile legs. At the same time, the Right-bank (western) group does not have a real logistical connection with the Left-bank - due to the lack of bridges across the Dnieper. - Some bridges (in Kyiv) - failed to capture, others - remained in the rear in Gomel. In such a situation, maneuvering forces between groups turned out to be impossible, which weakens their strike capabilities and creates the threat of defeat from an enemy capable of rapidly maneuvering forces through the most powerful Kiev transport hub (at one time - near Moscow, in the winter of 1941 - I faced exactly the same problem Wehrmacht).
Meanwhile, the area of ​​operations of the Pravoberezhnaya grouping itself is located in a wooded and swampy region, relatively poor in normal roads and other infrastructure, which seriously complicates the supply of Russian troops bogged down in heavy battles.

2. Now - when the calculation of "success in a swift attack" turned out to be untenable - the Russian command faced a logical question: "what to do next in a situation where there are no forces to successfully attack, but there are no forces to successfully defend the captured huge area either"? Moreover, in 2-3 weeks (depending on the weather) - this whole wooded area will "turn green" and the enemy's DRGs will significantly increase their impact on communications?

There could be two answers to this question:

1) "We will hold on to what we have taken with our teeth in the hope of a quick approach of reserves!"

2) Since it "failed" with the offensive - in time (not waiting for the enemy to take advantage of the mistakes made and organize a counteroffensive) - withdraw the troops "stuck in a dead end" from the resulting "bag" in order to use them on others - more promising - directions.

Political arguments "scream" for the first option (in civil wars they are very, very weighty): the retreat of the RF Armed Forces from Kyiv inevitably means a sharp rise in the enemy's morale, the emergence of confidence that "Russians can be beaten."

For the second - military expediency reaching an urgent need. After all, the reserves necessary to turn the operation in their favor, which could be additionally transferred "from the mainland" - are not at the disposal of the command. THEY SIMPLY ARE NOT. It is impossible to remove troops from other directions (where the "offensive with spread fingers" was carried out in exactly the same way). And the preparation of new units and formations - in any case, will take considerable time (from 2 or more weeks - and this is with the most primitive approach, such as: "caught, gathered, put into operation and driven into battle without the slightest training and combat coordination").

In the current situation, in my opinion, the command of the RF Armed Forces made the only right decision. Since if the abandonment of the occupied territory is inevitable anyway, it is better to do this without first defeating your troops by the enemy.

The troops will still be useful to us - the war will be long ...

Well, the fact that the defeat (the forced withdrawal of troops from the previously expensively paid lives of soldiers and officers of the liberated territory) still "takes place" is a bitter fact, but not fatal. In the history of Russia, in general, there are very few wars in which such "incidents" were not present due to the outstanding bungling of the generals. The main thing is that the defeats do not go "in non-stop mode" and are again replaced by victories.

JohninMK wrote:A UkA Humvee in SKD (Semi Knocked Down Kit) form after falling out of its crate and sustaining some minor damge, 'easily repairable' someone on the BBC said.

SeigSoloyvov wrote:The answer is simply, Putin will not permit a larger scale mobilization.

So all the Russian MOD can do is use its limited forces, Strelkov is right the MOD hoped for bigger success against Ukraine but they the gov did not provide the level of forces needed for these pushes.

As for why they underestimated the ukies, probs a mixture of arrogance and bad intel to a degree.

Arkanghelsk wrote:The strike on Belgorod was icing on the cake

The monumental shit hit the fan

If the info war did not matter until now, the feints toward Kiev and Odessa now look like retreats and they bloody our noses as we do it

The population is raring for expansion of the war, but The leadership was inept at implementing it

The result could be disastrous if the next steps are not prosecuted with resolve , these blunders are epic scale

There is no excuse for this , any one defending it has no shame

I am 100% patriot, but Ukraine fucked us , and it's our leadership fault for not committing to this war

It is compounded by the half measures taken by the leadership

First was the landing ship, okay everyone watched silently, then medinsky bending over in Istanbul, and finally those mi24 destroying our shit like fucking aces

The situation is clear, being adaptive while having the means to destroy the enemy is incompetence

We don't have such luxuries right now

Arkanghelsk wrote:The strike on Belgorod was icing on the cake

The monumental shit hit the fan

If the info war did not matter until now, the feints toward Kiev and Odessa now look like retreats and they bloody our noses as we do it

The population is raring for expansion of the war, but The leadership was inept at implementing it

The result could be disastrous if the next steps are not prosecuted with resolve , these blunders are epic scale

There is no excuse for this , any one defending it has no shame

I am 100% patriot, but Ukraine fucked us , and it's our leadership fault for not committing to this war

It is compounded by the half measures taken by the leadership

First was the landing ship, okay everyone watched silently, then medinsky bending over in Istanbul, and finally those mi24 destroying our shit like fucking aces

The situation is clear, being adaptive while having the means to destroy the enemy is incompetence

We don't have such luxuries right now

SeigSoloyvov wrote:The answer is simply, Putin will not permit a larger scale mobilization.

So all the Russian MOD can do is use its limited forces, Strelkov is right the MOD hoped for bigger success against Ukraine but they the gov did not provide the level of forces needed for these pushes.

As for why they underestimated the ukies, probs a mixture of arrogance and bad intel to a degree.

limb wrote:
What made russian generals assume that the ukrainian army of today is the same as the one of  2014. Poor military intelligence?

Isos wrote:

SeigSoloyvov wrote:The answer is simply, Putin will not permit a larger scale mobilization.

So all the Russian MOD can do is use its limited forces, Strelkov is right the MOD hoped for bigger success against Ukraine but they the gov did not provide the level of forces needed for these pushes.

As for why they underestimated the ukies, probs a mixture of arrogance and bad intel to a degree.

Numerous advantage was meant to be countered by air force strikes. However the survivability of ukrainian AD and the fact that they were told to not hurt civilians made all that operation impossible.

If those su-34 were free to use 500kg bombs like in Syria it would have ended in 1 week.

The SEAD operation were not done in time and correctly. Intel about ukrainian AD is what they lacked. And it's quite weired they don't hunt them correctly. Because the front is at russian borders and they should be able to effectively secure the area around their troops to allow bombers to fly safely and support the ground forces, I'm talking about hunting wheeled systems at 30km away from the front. With drones, su-34 pods, ELINT aircraft and satelittes it should have been done easily.

Ambush tactics like flying a fast su-24 to let them use their systems with another su-34 targetting it with kh-31 or kh-25. Drones can coordinate toshka or smerch attack on them too. Most of their AD have less than 40km range so securing an area going from the front to 50 back in Ukraine should be easy.

Ukrainian operating such systems on the front is big blow to russian army.

Isos wrote:No but since the systems are still operational and very effective they have to fly very low which is isn't very good for bombing missions or reccon missions. Flying higher allows you to have a better vision of the batylefield and use bigger bombs as well as optical pods.

The pilots are also less afraid. Right now they must feel very scary when entering an area where a tor or a Osa can shoot them in matter of seconds. They are human so emotions impact their work. We are talking about getting shot by missiles with powerful warheads or being captured by nationalists crazy people.

They better hubt the remaining systems and destroy the ones being sent by nato very fast.

OminousSpudd wrote:It seems to me that a few of the fundamental linchpins to the start of the operation didn't pan out. The surrendering of the cities in the East, and the swift demoralizing and subsequent routing/surrender of Ukrainian regular forces would have made for a stellar operation, one that would have been talked about for decades to come. Obviously we know what actually happened. So now we're on Plan B; draw the UAF into the open through maneuver and demolish them, or as Scott Ritter put it, Big Arrow warfare.

This concern trolling, panicking over the different phases of the operation is pretty sad. No plan survives first contact.

Here's what I have gathered so far, for what it's worth: the UAF have suffered significant material and manpower losses. This is undeniable, there's endless amounts of footage to corroborate, + a lot more that we're not seeing due to Ukrainians being muzzled from filming their own losses, and Russians not filming Ukrainian losses due to the strict orders on cellphones (which is a nice contrast to 2015). However, there is pretty radical resistance, which I think plays the biggest part in the underestimation element, Azov/neo-nazi battalions are what have kept the regulars and the conscripts in line. Compare with Syria, where equally radical elements were dispatched through a whole plethora of ways, weirdly enough Al-Nusra/ISIS seemed more open to negotiation than what we've seen in Ukraine. It makes sense to me that Russian commanders were leaning on their prior experience in Syria, even Chechnya when dealing with the nationalist battalions.

Arkanghelsk wrote:Those are excuses my brother

Shit happens, but this is some stinking shit

Backman wrote:I don't think Kiev falling and occupation was ever a goal.

Imagine that happened. It would be back to the Yanukovych status quo. Even a Russian friendly govt in Kiev would find it very difficult to give away the Black sea regions and Donbass.

This way, a with a stubborn anti Russian govt in Kiev, Russia can do what it needs to do in the south east.
I think they are waiting for a civil war to start within Zelenskys government. And let that regime burn up itself. It's close. 2 negotiaters have been killed

Arkanghelsk wrote:Hitting afghanistan is not the same as Ukropian mi24s flying into belgorod and rocketing the **** out of infrastructure

The tochka falling on aircraft was one thing, then came the rocket attack at Kherson, then the landing ship

It is incompetence of a level that is not justifiable