Ispan wrote:About Balakleya, report compiled from the best sources I could find. Troubling but not worrysome
https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/09/08/parte-de-guerra-08-09-2022-ofensiva-kharkov/
About the offensive in Kharkov: Balakleya
8 September, 2022 Zhukov
General situation:
In order to distract attention from the unsuccessful offensive in Kherson, the propaganda makes a lot of noise about an alleged offensive to the SE of Kharkov, towards Balakleya and the flank of the Russian army in Izyum, with an estimated strength of three brigades, or up to 9,000 men, which in view of the meager results seems to me exaggerated.
What is known for sure is that the Ukrainian army has not been able to take Balakleya, to advanced north and south of the city, and already on the first day of the offensive had to pawn reserves. For the Russian side the situation is disturbing but it is already being remedied.
Brief summary of Cassad, with map
https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/7848593.html
Summary of Slavyangrad explaining the importance and significance of this action
https://slavyangrad.es/2022/09/08/la-ofensiva-en-la-region-de-jarkov/
Of the multitude of reports this assessment seems to me the best and most accurate and has a special interest for his comments on the tactical problem of attack in positional warfare.
Kharkov front. A sober assessment.
https://t.me/theRightPeople1
The heat of the first day's fighting has subsided and a tentative summary can be made. The Ukraonazis attacked in three directions. As a result, only one tactical success can be noted - the loss of Volokhov Yar and the breakthrough to Shevchenkove. In the other directions, fierce fighting broke out, as a result of which the Ukrainian Armed Forces stopped and bogged down. The fact is that yesterday afternoon the enemy had already begun to bring in reserves. Not even twenty-four hours had passed. Mainly the units instructed according to NATO standards, were launched into battle. They acted competently, but not in a well-coordinated manner. A platoon (section: about 30 men) of motorized infantry of the enemy on Verbovka was attacked by friendly fire due to lack of coordination and was practically completely destroyed, all this happened in full view of our soldiers. In general, no wonder, they have the same problems as us. Our artillery was acting yesterday as usual. All that he could throw, he shoots at the advancing troops, he fulfilled his task, many losses of the enemy reached just in marching order. The units that managed to break through the artillery barrier fire went into combat, but those behind them stopped. Aircraft began to actively work against them. Thanks to this, the enemy forces that took part in the battle near Balakleya were limited. This, in turn, helped the relatively small garrison to contain the enemy. Several fighters took the initiative to send reinforcements to the city in the form of several tanks, which under enemy fire (the road to Balakleya is under enemy fire) managed to getto the city and support the defenders. Several Kamaz truck drivers loaded with artillery ammunition went to the desperate and also managed to get to the city. By the evening, our reserves had reached Balakleya. A longcombined arms battle began, in which our units showed resistance and, as a result, Balakleya remains ours.
In Volokhov Yar, the Nazis were a little luckier, probably their commander was a little smarter. Ukrainian troops did not storm the city, but began to bypass it and moved to Shevchenkove. As a result, our small garrison was surrounded. However, after Semyonovka, the enemy was shelled by artillery and aviation, so he stopped. From Volokhov Yar, the grouping split, a part of it went to Kunya to cut off the transport artery. They also encountered artillery and aviation fire and also stopped.
Simply put: We still cannot talk about any Nazi successes on the Kharkov front.
Except for the loss of Volokhov Yar, the Ukrainian army did not achieve any serious successes. The speed of the attack slowed down already on the first day. If our command continues to competently maneuver and accurately attack the second echelon of the enemy's advancing forces, then by the end of tomorrow it will be possible to talk about a complete cessation of the enemy counteroffensive. At the moment, heavy fighting is taking place on the Kharkov front. The one with the most tempered nerves and a more solid operational approach will win.
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Another important aspect that I find interesting is the Ukrainian material. It is composed of perhaps 50% NATO equipment and 50% obsolete Soviet equipment that even the Soviet Union did not have in service in the 80s (BTR-60s have been seen on the front line in Kharkov) and converted civilian equipment, for example, we have the video of these Ukrainian soldiers going to the front not in an armored car but in a kind of pickup truck.
This does not mean that the Ukrainians do not have war materiel, I think NATO will provide them with everything they need, for example, armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles. But the loss of the army's original equipment is an indication that they have suffered heavy casualties.
If it were a question of updating the army, that is, moving to using exclusively NATO equipment (although the M113 is not an improvement over a BTR in any sense), then we would not see obsolete equipment like the BTR-60.
For example, it has been months since a BTR-4 was seen in combat that was the main infantry armored vehicle of the Ukrainians.
All this points to a large number of casualties.
Does this mean that Ukraine is currently defenseless? No, as I said, the material is coming and also replacements. I'm just talking about casualties. Another issue is the ability to replace those casualties.
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Attacking is a complicated issue in this war, we are in a situation similar to the First World War. If the Russians attack in search of big moves, the casualties will be large.
If Ukraine attacks, the casualties will be many.
The difference from the First World War is that there are no firm lines, so to speak, although the trenches are visible, especially in Donbass. But we have some units that cover positions or areas without anyone (for example, that village behind the Donetsk River with zero Russian troops where the Ukrainians entered and left), this is due to the combination of drones and artillery. In this way, the vast majority of Russian or Ukrainian "frontline" forces are kept kilometers from the battle line, relatively protected from being seen by drones and covered by artillery.
The problem is the attack when the drones easily detect them and the artillery arrives …