Russian special military operation in Ukraine #23

Backman wrote:

Big_Gazza wrote:[
Perspective is important, as is directing ones personal rage where it is appropriate.    Blaming Russian command or the Kremlin for such battlefield fluidities is helping the Ukrotrash & NATOstani psy-ops in their efforts at desseminating FUD.  

Know whats going on (credit to Gonzalo Lira).

Give the bastards NOTHING.

This exactly. Russia is fighting a war of annihilation. Some ppl including Russians (like RWA) don't seem to realize that. But they expect to gain followers by being objective. There is no objectivity in a war of anihilation.

Dr.Snufflebug wrote:Well-written take:
https://bigserge.substack.com/p/ukraine-counterattacks

tl;dr: Ultimately it amounts to nothing, but does serve as a heads-up.

It is nice that this recent internet panic has compelled some good commenters that have laid low or been absent over much of the summer to come back and inject some much-needed level-headed analyses though.

What the operation reflects instead is Russia’s preference to wage a high-firepower, mobile defense. Frontline positions are, relatively speaking, thinly manned, which powerful mobile reserves are held back. This is a flexible, firefighting approach which allows the Ukrainians to advance into vulnerable positions so that they can be destroyed.

For Ukraine, one of the basic problems is that Russia has such an enormous advantage in firepower - aircraft, tube artillery, rocketry, and tanks - that any offensive must reach operational depth quickly in order to disrupt Russia’s ability to bring this firepower to bear. In the Izyum sector, this simply isn’t possible.

Lacking the ability to operationally compromise Russian forces here, Ukraine will find itself in a good old fashioned shootout against an enemy with vastly superior firepower - not only that, but it is in fact Ukraine that now faces operational complications, having blasted their way into a salient with no prospects for crossing the Oskil in force and exploiting.

Future Conduct of the War

While the actual counteroffensive is turning into a catastrophe for Ukraine, the fact that they were able to launch this operation at all has important implications, specifically in regards to Ukrainian manpower.

Russia has been fighting an economy of force operation that aims to destroy the Ukrainian army through attrition. Ukraine’s ability to launch two counteroffensives (Kherson and Kupyansk-Izyum) suggests two important reasons to modify Russia’s force deployment.

1) The Deficiency of Tripwire Defenses

Many sector’s of Russia’s front are thinly manned, with forces being held in reserve to wage a mobile defense. The actual troops at the front amount to a string of token forces who are there primarily to try to slow the enemy while reserves are brought forward. While holding a mobile reserve is the correct approach given the force deployment that Russia has made, this is problematic because it allows the Ukrainians to make temporary gains.

In an operational sense, this isn’t a catastrophe. Russia has the firepower and mobility to crush these offensives. The problem is that it allows Ukraine to temporarily retake settlements, which exposes the civilians in these areas to reprisal killings, such as occurred in Bucha. In the current example, we can look at Balakliya. In and of itself, these city does not have major operational value, but it does have Russian civilians in it who would be exposed to Ukrainian revenge if the city was temporarily recaptured. Russia must reconsider its force deployment so that it can more firmly hold settlements at the frontline for the sake of these civilians.

2) Ukrainian Force Generation

Ukraine’s meta-strategy so far is predicated on a two-tier army. The lower tier consists of poorly trained cannon fodder who man defensive belts and slow down the Russian army with their bodies, by forcing an exchange of artillery shells for their lives. This is the army that Russia is attriting at horrific loss ratios in the Donbas. The first tier Ukrainian army are the forces that are being trained and equipped by western handlers. The Ukrainian scheme is to delay Russia by trading their conscript cannon fodder while they assemble the first tier forces for counteroffensives.

Ukraine has demonstrated that, even if they haven’t competently used these first tier forces, they still have the capability to assemble real strike packages with western help, so long as the lower tier army is able to buy time. This calls into question the Russian strategy of attrition, because it means that Russia is attriting soldiers that Ukraine doesn’t care about. It is probably unwise to allow the west to build yet another army in the rear for yet another wave of counteroffensives.

Russia should evaluate ways to deny Ukraine access to its manpower pool and raise its force deployment to that effect. Nikolayev, Dnepropetrovsk, Zhaparozhia, Odessa, and Kharkov must be taken from Ukraine to that end, and the Russian army must become serious about destroying Ukrainian infrastructure and logistics to prevent Ukraine from continuing the buildup of first tier forces in the rear.

Russia continues to attempt to win the war with a light hand - bare minimum force deployment and precision strikes, sparing critical infrastructure. While the defeat of the current counteroffensives demonstrate that it is still well on the path to victory, the mere existence of these counteroffensives suggests that Russia must raise its force deployment - taking advantage of its significant powers of force generation - and deny Ukraine access to its population pools, or else victory may well be slower and more costly than necessary.

flamming_python wrote:I'm out of patience here

Some people are seriously intent at turning this thread into a monkey shit-throwing contest. Ukro propagandists can point to this thread as evidence for how demoralized and divided the moskals are. You guys need to find your backbone. And your common sense. Both are lacking.

flamming_python wrote:

mnztr wrote:I am really surprised the Russians do not have a quick reaction force of about 20 US-34's or SU-24 that are ready to be loaded up and deliver 30-50t of bombs in rotating 5 ship formations to stabilize just this sort of thing. I would also be pretty surprised of an intelligence failure of this magnitude...if it were that.

Who told you they don't?
And if the Ukrs streamed in small squads on pickups or on armored vehicles but in small groups then finding them is the main difficulty. They can also conceal themselves as soon as they hear aircraft coming
Now the main challenge is to not let the Ukr squads disengage and return to their lines intact and unharassed as if they have any sense that's what they will be doing very soon.

limb wrote:Western side of kupyansk was already left by the Russians. The Ukrainians are 5-10km from the outskirts of izyum. There are 0 Russian counterattacks.