Russian special military operation in Ukraine #34

It's easy to dispel those propaganda lies that Russia is anywhere close to Ukraine in casualties

If Russia had 90,000 killed , it would mean 200 to 300k wounded, which would be more than the amount of troops they committed to the war

It's dumb to suggest this when Russia never committed more than 200k to the war at any one time, and we're outnumbered on any front by more than 3 to 1 at any given front, donbass included

The casualty ratio is indeed lopsided 10:1 to Ukraines misfortune

Von Der leyen admitted 100k officers killed alone

Russia is nowhere near that and with such a fire superiority will remain favorable

Once the offensive in winter clears out the left bank, just mine the entire left bank and pull the troops back to the wagner line and call it a day

Karl Haushofer wrote:Twitter BS

Ukropi BS, not buying it.  Why would Wagner have troops cooling their heels in Melitopol when they are busy bleeding out the orcs in Artemovsk?  

Fck me, but only a moron would simply accept Ukropi BS at face value.

Edit: Reality from Rybar

Big_Gazza wrote:Fck me, but only a moron would simply accept Ukropi BS at face value.

The Kings of Arma 3 victories?, made up stories, doctored footage and staged acts?

That is Ukro TV.

Ukraine was under the impression that some RU administration hotshot would be at that place, but he wasn't. So the strike killed 10 local Ukrainian civilians, that's it.

They also hit a former hotel in Lugansk around the same time, apparently hoping to kill somebody in particular there too. Seems like their intel isn't up to scratch, and thus the excuses come.

Karl, seriously. Linking to an Azov-fanclub account, "300 dead Wagnerites" in Melitopol?

Not related to the bridge, but also working in the SMO

Who destroyed Bridge ? If the Orcs , then don't they have troops that need to retreat ? Then they will fight harder to survive . If Russia , then to trap ? Best tell them that temporary Bridge will be provided by Russia , so they can retreat , after giving up guns ! Free to go . But if they fight , then POW in Siberia !

I have translated and commented a long essay of a Russian blogger that analyzes the war so far, the strength and weakness of the opposed sides, and prospects for the future.

For those that know Russian, there's a link to the original source at the beginning. Yandex translation is hardly readable, it doesn't translate well when the style is literary or colloquial, so I did my best to rewrite it in Spanish and the automatic translation to english with my comments I hope it's more understandable and valuable than reading the original source.

It took me hours to compose this, I hope it's interesting read.

https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/12/11/retrospectiva-y-perspectivas-logros-y-fracasos/

Who destroyed Bridge ? 

Russia destroyed the bridge. This is one of the replenishment routes of the Ukro forces towards Bakhmut.

I have translated and commented a long essay of a Russian blogger that analyzes the war so far, the strength and weakness of the opposed sides, and prospects for the future.

For those that know Russian, there's a link to the original source at the beginning. Yandex translation is hardly readable, it doesn't translate well when the style is literary or colloquial, so I did my best to rewrite it in Spanish and the automatic translation to english with my comments I hope it's more understandable and valuable than reading the original source.

It took me hours to compose this, I hope it's interesting read.

https://guerraenucrania.wordpress.com/2022/12/11/retrospectiva-y-perspectivas-logros-y-fracasos/

EDIT: this is the biggest I have translated, hope I got it right. Please put likes on Ispan's post

Hindsight and prospects: achievements and failures
December 11, 2022 Zhukov

Following the principle of two heads think better than one and that of never losing the opportunity to take advantage of someone else's work, for your interest, I copy and revise the translation because machine translation does not work well with colloquial or literary Russian, of an extensive article by a Russian author of very interesting articles on war, who is like the author of this newspaper another self-proclaimed military expert whose only qualification, as he recognizes, is to read a lot of war history and apply that knowledge with logic and common sense. The translation is not literal, but I have tried to explain the author's ideas as best I can, and I have added headings to differentiate the different sections

Original article:

https://dzen.ru/a/Y37DD0pA61sYvZkJ

November 24, prospects of the special operation..

Author, what will happen next, in winter? A very common question, I would pay a lot to know the answer. Only there will be no victory forecasts today, sorry. But to understand the pros and cons is enough to interpret the words of the President (Putin) "we have not really started yet" not in the connotation of a certain threat, but by the statement: The Special Operation just needs to start over and be finished.

Autumn has shown that military failures outweigh good news. The political costs of leaving the Kharkov and Kherson region together with the bridgehead of the Right Bank of the Dnieper are already known facts about which there is no point in crying and wringing your hands. It is time for our leaders to start learning the lessons caused by their lack of political will and the desire to make political decisions without taking into account the opinion of military officials.

Hindsight: stages of the "special operation" and changes in strategy

Today is not the month of February, when the expeditionary force entered the territory of Ukraine, undertaking an enterprise that exceeded its capabilities based on the number of troops employed. If the political will was not directed to the "humanitarian corridors", temporary ceasefires and the Istanbul agreements, the scope of the operation could have been increased, the Kiev and Kharkov railway knots could have been cut and Transdnistria could have been reached. If the "geraniums" had flourished then and the energy sector had been paralyzed by high-precision weapons, Ukraine would not have been able to carry out most of its mobilization.

(That is, if Russia had disposed of the flying bombs or suicide drones "Geranium" or had attacked power plants from the first day, the mobilization of the replacements of the Ukrainian army could have been prevented)

And since we advanced through the territory of Belarus, back then it was possible to cut off the Western supply route. Actually, then our enemy was the army of well-trained and experienced fighters, carefully assembled in the Donbass. The rest of the Ukrainian forces were a mediocre and paralyzed organism, which we found at the first stage of deployment. If we had continued the pressure without taking into account the maneuvers of politicians... we could have held the victory parade on May 9 in Kiev.

But we have what we have. The Expeditionary Force, contrary to all military textbooks, did not pave the way for the "main deployment forces", there were none. Reserves were not even provided to compensate for the current losses. And the Ukrainian General Staff with enormous effort began to form new units from the mobilized, reservists, veterans of the Donbass war and peasants stuck on the streets. Framed in brigades and territorial battalions, and soon sent no less than 60 thousand men to the Reserve Corps trained by NATO.

Our second step was to rely on a victorious "artillery offensive" with minimal losses among the personnel. It almost worked, too, as it already seemed in the middle of summer. We brought to the front an incredible number of cannons, multiple rocket launchers and formed "artillery advance corps" in two directions, almost like those that were successfully used in the second half of the Great Patriotic War.

Having no advantage in the means of intelligence and fire control, they turned any line of defense into lunar landscapes with a large expenditure of large-caliber shells. But NATO used a cannibal strategy of its own in response, sending mobilized Ukrainians almost without instruction as human sacrifices to stop the advance of our motorized infantry and shock troops.

Not everyone died, the terbats (territorial battalions) that were reduced to companies and even sections, became very skillful survivors, gained experience and taught replacement recruits to entrench, camouflage, build fortifications and resist to the end. As a result: the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian troops received a valiopsle experience at the cost of a lot of blood, and they always outnumbered our forces (who are also not novices) by a ratio of almost four to one.

The technical advantage and heroism of our guys saved the Special Operation from the collapse of two fronts in September, when the Reserve Corps arrived together with a Foreign Legion of mercenaries. The situation was interesting, most of the old Soviet armored vehicles, artillery, aviation and air defense that the Ukrainian army had was destroyed. But thanks to the titanic efforts of the West and thanks to the American experience in military logistics, NATO weapons came to the front like a river.

Advantages of the Ukrainian forces thanks to the help of NATO

At first, the enemy had an advantage in portable anti-aircraft missiles) and Modernatitank missiles, the front received a huge amount of personal protective equipment, an abundance of thermal imaging cameras, optics, electronic warfare stations and counterbattery, complete artillery reconnaissance tools and a wide range of small drones that exceeded previous standards. This immediately made it possible to significantly reduce the consumption of ammunition, since NATO was able to deploy its own mobile and satellite communications systems at all levels (from tactical to operational and strategic).

According to American and British tactical regulations, artillery fire control algorithms began to work, infantry units received combat tablets and special encrypted smartphone applications for tactical liaison, and the battlefield disappeared the "fog of war", as we suffered from it, being replaced by a full-fledged visual image. With a minimum time to complete the orders to open the same artillery fire. And also a very efficient logistics to deliver ammunition supplies to artillery pieces thanks to satellite navigation.

That is, the attrition suffered by the enemy was stopped and the technical and human potential of the Ukrainian army was used with better performance, the battle began to be carried out with a smaller number of weapons, material and resources. With a satisfactory result. Where the battery previously spent hundreds of conventional shells per day, now a couple of volleys of M777 howitzers with high-precision Excalibur shells are enough. Or a single salvo of HIMARS rockets. Meanwhile, they continued to fire with the remaining ammunition of caliber 122 mm, 152 mm and rockets for the old Soviet systems BM-21 "Grad", 9K58 "Smerch".

The old Soviet artillery pieces gradually gathered in Donbass, where huge ammunition depots were created during the previous eight years of war. In all other places, shelling is carried out with 155-mm long-range guns of Western designs. Which today are partially destroyed not only by our troops, but also by breakdowns due to wear and tear from the intensity of fire, problems with proper operation and negligent routine maintenance.

The Ukrainian army: a Soviet and NATO hybrid

Many of the tubes of our guns are also worn out, and it takes a lot of effort to change them. The forces a on both sides of the front are balanced in a strange parity. The most advanced "digital peripherals" in the world (stations for artillery reconnaissance, target designation and fire control) are set up against the massive scale of Russian artillery, which has Moderna but are still insufficient systems. But the most important thing is time. Decision-making time. It takes the enemy five minutes to order a bombing raid on a target, and it takes us an hour or three quarters of an hour.

From the point of view of a bookworm who has read tons of military literature, it can be argued that the Ukrainian army, thanks to the work of the NATO military headquarters, operates at the operational level in accordance with Soviet military doctrine, but at the tactical level they have completely switched to the Western one. There is a dangerous phenomenon - a merger of two concepts, when the enemy NATO command is not afraid to experiment even at the cost of heavy losses (and why should they feel sorry for the "natives"?), so they quickly discard the old techniques that don't work and adopt the best.

This Ukrainian army is a hybrid of the Soviet academic school and the ruthless practice of the Anglo-Saxons. It has been reformed without hesitation: structure, organization and approaches to operational art and tactics. This solution has put our military, caught in the theoretical traps of the "last war" against NATO, in front of a number of serious problems.

(the author wants to say that Russian military thought still owes a lot from the Soviet concepts of the Cold War against NATO)

The sooner we can recognize our own operational skill lag, the sooner things will get better. I'll explain myself…

Tactics of the Ukrainian army: old ideas and new technologies

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are now a blood-soaked fusion of two approaches to Moderna. The first is the NATO-style tactical defense breakthrough called "a thousand cuts",

(allusion to the ancient Chinese torture of "death by a thousand small cuts")

when numerous small reconnaissance patrols are used to identify weak points, and thus disperse the enemy's attention, intelligence is powerless to determine the place of concentration of the main attack, until the moment it occurs, and the reserves are immobilized because it is not known where the attack will occur.

Because this attack does not exist in the classical sense. Thanks to the network-centric image of the battlefield, when each sergeant sees his neighbors on the tablet and enemy resistance nodes constantly appear. He receives orders to join one platoon and then another. This is how they probe the resistance, look for the points of union between units and the gaps in the defense, and penetrate through them as deep as possible. Only after such maneuvers, the command gets to assemble company-sized shock groups. Small patrols, like drops of mercury, flow to the designated point and strike the first blow.

If the attack is unsuccessful, the unit instantly disintegrates, flees at full speed from a possible pursuit, and covers its retreat with ambushes. With one main mission— to dissolve back into the "fog of war" and continue the scoring attacks to achieve infiltration elsewhere. And having identified the "oporniki" (points of resistance) and settlements of the enemy artillery, attacks on these points with artillery shelling with almost perfect accuracy and in the shortest possible time. Without a long coordination in several headquarters, drawing markers on a paper map, choosing the forces and means of destruction, as usual with us.

Comment :

This tactic is a combination of old ideas with Moderna satellite navigation and communications technology that makes it viable. They combine the tactics of infiltration and deep penetration leaving behind the resistance of the "Sturmtruppen" of the First World War, the tactics of guerrilla warfare to advance dispersed and concentrate for attack, and flight if it does not pay off. Tablets and satellite positioning replace maps and compasses, satellite communications and the internet to the phone and radio, and at the command level all own units and enemy units and positions are displayed as if it were a video game, the "Command and Conquer" style to name the most representative. The advantage it has is that it can be executed by section and platoon leaders without any special instructions. It is no longer necessary for them to know how to interpret a map, analogously in civilian life to the fact that many drivers no longer know how to orient themselves or draw a route that takes them to their destination if they are limited to following the instructions of the GPS navigator, or that they know how to observe or direct artillery fire, it is enough for them to give the coordinates of the target. The transmission of requests and orders is of course much faster than with the old analog radios.

This is the first time that the concept of "network-centric warfare", which the American army was experimenting with at the beginning of this century, or maybe even earlier, in the 90s, has been put into practice. I remember reading about it in some publication, maybe in TIME magazine. Then the technology was not yet mature, there were no flat screens and tablets. The results were mixed. On the one hand, much of the "fog of war" was dissipated and the work of the commanders was greatly facilitated. On the other hand, having better information and a broader vision of the battlefield than that of the junior commanders, the tendency of the command to intervene to correct their subordinates and directly control the companies, sections and platoons was introduced, which is known as "micromanaging", but at a level never seen before.

In the conclusions, this tactical control was seen as harmful, because it reduced junior officers to simple automatons that executed orders mechanically, like soldiers in closed formations of the Napoleonic wars, and that by reducing individual initiative and decision-making, in the long run it would have the effect of incapacitating those officers to learn to make decisions and perform at higher levels when promoted. The idea was also contrary to that of previous decades of the 70s -90s that in order to face the Soviet threat there was an interest in giving lieutenants and captains more initiative and responsibility, following the German model of the Auftragstaktik, orders based on the mission, that is, the higher command communicated the mission, the objective and the intentions of the command, and subordinates were left free to choose how to carry out their mission. In short, initiative, autonomy and improvisation were encouraged, agility in making decisions without waiting to receive orders, and in making their own decisions assuming that the command on the scene knows the situation better than the higher commands away from the battlefield. As every solution has its advantages and disadvantages.

As far as I remember, the experimental brigade or division was disbanded due to cost considerations and the needs of the wars against insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, but from the looks of it the concept and the means, including Elon Musk's Starlink satellites, were available for application in this war.

If the attack is successful, the company tactical groups unite and turn overnight into full-fledged battalion tactical groups, creating one, creating a "bubble" that goes deep into the enemy's defense.

Comment:

What the author describes. instead of being a penetration with protected flanks and a supply line, it is the advance of a motorized group with the ammunition and fuel carried by their own vehicles. A useful and appropriate comparison could be the mobile columns of the war in the North African desert, where there were often no continuous fronts or flanks.

These mobile groups have self-propelled artillery, air defense, armored vehicles and a large supply of fuel and ammunition. In their advance they threaten to encircle the main defense positions. Ours then have to make "difficult decisions": to risk the units being encircled, or to get them out of danger by a rapid "regrouping", inevitably losing territory and heavy weapons.

This tactic is good, but it has a number of serious limitations. In the extension of the "Sherwood Forest" of the Kharkov region, it worked perfectly, the second line of our defense did not exist, the first was a colander defended only by small units. When a five-verst front line was defended by only one battalion (and sometimes reduced to one company). It was possible to create only small isolated fortified posts and without a link and the depth required by the regulations. The lesson was painful.

But we learned quickly. The tactic of "a thousand cuts" and deep penetration of the defense with shock "battalion bubbles" is a good thing when the airspace is controlled with air defense systems and the attacked front line is full of gaps. As soon as the Special Operation began to receive reinforcements, and reinforced the battalions and brigades to their full strength, all the successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stopped. And when the second defensive echelon appears, the tactics completely stop working.

Then the Ukrainian army has to remember the Soviet military school and try to crush the enemy's forces with blunt blows. What was seen before the withdrawal of Kherson. The classic model of a battle of attrition when a multiple numerical advantage is created in personnel and armored vehicles (without much concealment) and the opponent is forced to carefully manage his deployment and reserves to cope with these attacks.

This is done in order to suffer much less losses than to engage in a fixed defense at all costs, but losses are still suffered. Without the physical ability and reserves to conduct a classic Soviet counteroffensive after exhausting the enemy in defense. Once again, we are faced with the "difficult decision": withdraw with the bulk of the forces intact, at the cost of losing all the territory, or sacrifice troops to hold the ground. Our command always chooses the first option, due to the small number of troops it has.

Therefore, there is only one way to counteract this Soviet-NATO hybrid tactic - the creation of a stable, staggered and equipped with all weapons front line. With considerable reserves, ready to launch strong counterattacks from the rear. When the factor of intelligence based on spy satellites, or the communications network, is nullified, a simple law comes into play: who has resources at their disposal, and the speed with which it replenishes casualties.

(the author alludes is that suddenly the Ukrainians stopped enjoying the advantage of Star Link satellite communications when Elon Musk cut the service. It is not known whether the reason is Russian electronic warfare interference, or simply non-payment. Be that as it may, it seems that the advantages in command and control have disappeared)

Prospects of the Ukrainian army: strength and losses

With due caution, I agree coon some reliable military experts. The percentage of NATO weapons and equipment in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is 40% in armored vehicles, 60% in artillery and almost 80% in the "service echelon" (electronic warfare, radar of all kinds, reconnaissance, targeting/designation of targets, high-precision weapons and attack unmanned aerial vehicles). Many Soviet systems no longer work due to a lack of ammunition or spare parts.

At the end of autumn, we again notice a repetition of the summer tactics of the "meat grinder", when replacements with little instruction are thrown into battle, but professional regular units are withdrawn to be rebuilt with replacements. The lack of heavy weapons is compensated by infantry, which is difficult to destroy with our imperfect artillery without excessive expenditure of ammunition. According to some forecasts, in 2023, we will face another large army, at least 600 thousand only in combat units. Almost five hundred battalion groups.

Comment: This topic has already been covered at length in the blog comments and in numerous entries from previous years. My opinion is that it is a very exaggerated number. The human potential is exhausted and in any case there are not enough weapons or equipment to arm that army. I think it more likely that they can continue to maintain the level of a quarter of a million men at the front, but if the war continues with this average of a thousand daily casualties, not for long.

If we use the latest data on the supply of Western weapons, and take into account the material in service, the Armed Forces of Ukraine after the New Year will have about 600-700 obsolete tanks, a thousand pieces artillery, multiple rocket launchers and heavy mortars. For such a large number of infantry, this amount of material is very poor, almost three times less than existed on the 24th of February.

Graph with Ukrainian losses according to Russian reports as of November 22



Comment: The figures are so high that the first impulse is to reject them, but in the first months, even counting a certain overestimation due to the "fog of war", damaged but repaired material, duplications, destruction of decoys ... etc, the figures given by the Russian reports were largely confirmed by videos and photos of destroyed and captured material. During the autumn fighting on the Kherson front, reports of the destruction of armored vehicles and other war materiel were confirmed by evidence when the Russians were in possession of the battlefield, the same with the collected body counts.

Of course the graph makes "traps", according to Soviet practice, cannons and mortars are counted together, and no distinction is made between tanks and armored vehicles, when the ratio is 1 to 10, that is, according to official Russian data, the Ukrainians would have lost about 700 tanks. Fighter jets and helicopters are also counted together.

However, once they are contrasted with other data, as Sherlock Holmes said: "Once the impossible has been discarded, what remains, however improbable it may seem, must be the truth"

The figures of Ukrainian casualties revealed by von der Leyen in an oversight of one hundred thousand dead, or irretrievable losses, so much so, are not only plausible and true, and those predictable in the progression of partial counts over the previous months, also confirms the statements of Zelensky and other senior officials of the regime, who have sometimes admitted that they suffer hundreds of casualties a day, and on occasion up to a thousand a day and obviously they are figures much lower than the real ones, if they also fit with the figures of war material destroyed according to Russian reports.

As I have observed repeatedly since the war began, there are constants that are met in all Moderna wars: the ratio of dead to wounded is usually at least 1 to 3, and for each cannon, tank, armored or any other war material destroyed as a truck, an average of 10 casualties are suffered.

The funny thing is that adding up all the concepts and excluding airplanes and drones, it gives me about 20,000 units of war material of all kinds, which would imply about 200,000 casualties.

But European diplomacy has recognized an even higher figure, therefore, or, to the reasonable figure of 300,000 Ukrainian casualties, 100 thousand unrecoverable, 200 thousand wounded, comparing it with the destroyed material would give a ratio of 15 casualties per unit of material. That is, they come out lower than expected, it must be borne in mind that a lot of material is destroyed in bombings in their warehouses or is lost without a fight when abandoned or captured.

Then there is the undoubted fact that Ukraine has lost so much Soviet war material that it now has to fight largely with Western weapons, or Soviet weapons of the former Warsaw Pact. If 40% of the armor and 60% of the artillery is supplied by NATO, that means that an equal proportion has been lost, which confirms that Ukraine has lost hundreds of tanks, and thousands of armor, guns, rocket launchers, and mortars.

About the aviation claims, which NATO's paid poisoners say are exaggerated because Russia has shot down more planes than Ukraine had in service when the war began. And it's true. But it is no less true that we are not in the world wars, that due to the confusion of aerial combat and the claims of shootdowns by multiple pilots, the duplicities when counting shared victories twice and the exaggeration when counting probable shootdowns as insurance made the accounting of victories used to be triple the real losses. Now Ukrainian planes and Ukrainian helicopters appear in isolation, and flight data and their downing are recorded by radar in electronic form, not to mention that many of the downed aircraft fall on Russian positions. The figure of 500 planes and helicopters destroyed seems reasonable, considering that we have been at war for 300 days and almost every day the fighters or the air defense shoot down a Ukrainian plane, which they fly practically on suicide missions. It would also be necessary to count the planes destroyed on the ground by attacks on their bases. It is possible that if there is an excess it is due to having destroyed decoys or unusable aircraft.

If the Ukrainians continue to fly, it is that thanks to the help of NATO they received spare parts to put more aircraft into service and subsequently received airplanes and helicopters.

The conclusions are inexorable: this is a conventional war in which Ukraine suffers losses that can only be covered by mass mobilizations and enormous assistance from NATO, which has emptied warehouses of its stocks of Soviet weapons, its surplus of old material and, in the case of anti-tank weapons and portable anti-aircraft missiles, a good part of its war reserves. And still it's not enough. Personnel casualties are replenished, material losses are not.

This armament sufficient to sustain a static defense, even to conduct an offensive operation with limited tasks. But then the Ukros have to dig trenches again and ... hope for a miracle. Already in August-September, the lack of material and accoutrements was acutely felt, for the Kherson offensive, the advanced fortified area near Donetsk (Peski) was disarmed, and all self-propelled and towed artillery pieces were withdrawn from there.

As a result - the discovery of this fact by our intelligence, a series of short assaults and a complete victory with three captured "anthills", one large and two small. Against which we beat our heads unsuccessfully for six months.

(the "anthills" were heavily fortified and practically impregnable rubble hills)

Now such "windows of opportunity" will open more and more often, as the Ukrainian army will have to shift its dwindling war materiel from one part to another, exposing entire sectors.

Missed opportunities and problems of the Russian army

Can we take advantage of those opportunities? Alas, in the near future... doubtful. Our forces on the entire front line are pinned to their positions by NATO "thousand cuts" tactics, even in third-rate sectors, active maneuvers of small groups (up to one company) are constantly taking place, with attempts to infiltrate and create an attack group. Despite the losses, a permanent pressure is created. In this way the enemy manages to retain the strategic initiative.

Therefore, there is only one way to counteract this Soviet-NATO hybrid tactic - the creation of a stable, staggered and equipped with all weapons front line. With considerable reserves, ready to launch strong counterattacks from the rear. When the factor of intelligence based on spy satellites, or the communications network, is nullified, a simple law comes into play: who has resources at their disposal, and the speed with which it replenishes casualties.

(the author alludes is that suddenly the Ukrainians stopped enjoying the advantage of Star Link satellite communications when Elon Musk cut the service. It is not known whether the reason is Russian electronic warfare interference, or simply non-payment. Be that as it may, it seems that the advantages in command and control have disappeared)

Prospects of the Ukrainian army: strength and losses

With due caution, I agree coon some reliable military experts. The percentage of NATO weapons and equipment in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is 40% in armored vehicles, 60% in artillery and almost 80% in the "service echelon" (electronic warfare, radar of all kinds, reconnaissance, targeting/designation of targets, high-precision weapons and attack unmanned aerial vehicles). Many Soviet systems no longer work due to a lack of ammunition or spare parts.

At the end of autumn, we again notice a repetition of the summer tactics of the "meat grinder", when replacements with little instruction are thrown into battle, but professional regular units are withdrawn to be rebuilt with replacements. The lack of heavy weapons is compensated by infantry, which is difficult to destroy with our imperfect artillery without excessive expenditure of ammunition. According to some forecasts, in 2023, we will face another large army, at least 600 thousand only in combat units. Almost five hundred battalion groups.

Comment: This topic has already been covered at length in the blog comments and in numerous entries from previous years. My opinion is that it is a very exaggerated number. The human potential is exhausted and in any case there are not enough weapons or equipment to arm that army. I think it more likely that they can continue to maintain the level of a quarter of a million men at the front, but if the war continues with this average of a thousand daily casualties, not for long.

If we use the latest data on the supply of Western weapons, and take into account the material in service, the Armed Forces of Ukraine after the New Year will have about 600-700 obsolete tanks, a thousand pieces artillery, multiple rocket launchers and heavy mortars. For such a large number of infantry, this amount of material is very poor, almost three times less than existed on the 24th of February.

Graph with Ukrainian losses according to Russian reports as of November 22


Comment: The figures are so high that the first impulse is to reject them, but in the first months, even counting a certain overestimation due to the "fog of war", damaged but repaired material, duplications, destruction of decoys ... etc, the figures given by the Russian reports were largely confirmed by videos and photos of destroyed and captured material. During the autumn fighting on the Kherson front, reports of the destruction of armored vehicles and other war materiel were confirmed by evidence when the Russians were in possession of the battlefield, the same with the collected body counts.

Of course the graph makes "traps", according to Soviet practice, cannons and mortars are counted together, and no distinction is made between tanks and armored vehicles, when the ratio is 1 to 10, that is, according to official Russian data, the Ukrainians would have lost about 700 tanks. Fighter jets and helicopters are also counted together.

However, once they are contrasted with other data, as Sherlock Holmes said: "Once the impossible has been discarded, what remains, however improbable it may seem, must be the truth"

The figures of Ukrainian casualties revealed by von der Leyen in an oversight of one hundred thousand dead, or irretrievable losses, so much so, are not only plausible and true, and those predictable in the progression of partial counts over the previous months, also confirms the statements of Zelensky and other senior officials of the regime, who have sometimes admitted that they suffer hundreds of casualties a day, and on occasion up to a thousand a day and obviously they are figures much lower than the real ones, if they also fit with the figures of war material destroyed according to Russian reports.

As I have observed repeatedly since the war began, there are constants that are met in all Moderna wars: the ratio of dead to wounded is usually at least 1 to 3, and for each cannon, tank, armored or any other war material destroyed as a truck, an average of 10 casualties are suffered.

The funny thing is that adding up all the concepts and excluding airplanes and drones, it gives me about 20,000 units of war material of all kinds, which would imply about 200,000 casualties.

But European diplomacy has recognized an even higher figure, therefore, or, to the reasonable figure of 300,000 Ukrainian casualties, 100 thousand unrecoverable, 200 thousand wounded, comparing it with the destroyed material would give a ratio of 15 casualties per unit of material. That is, they come out lower than expected, it must be borne in mind that a lot of material is destroyed in bombings in their warehouses or is lost without a fight when abandoned or captured.

Then there is the undoubted fact that Ukraine has lost so much Soviet war material that it now has to fight largely with Western weapons, or Soviet weapons of the former Warsaw Pact. If 40% of the armor and 60% of the artillery is supplied by NATO, that means that an equal proportion has been lost, which confirms that Ukraine has lost hundreds of tanks, and thousands of armor, guns, rocket launchers, and mortars.

About the aviation claims, which NATO's paid poisoners say are exaggerated because Russia has shot down more planes than Ukraine had in service when the war began. And it's true. But it is no less true that we are not in the world wars, that due to the confusion of aerial combat and the claims of shootdowns by multiple pilots, the duplicities when counting shared victories twice and the exaggeration when counting probable shootdowns as insurance made the accounting of victories used to be triple the real losses. Now Ukrainian planes and Ukrainian helicopters appear in isolation, and flight data and their downing are recorded by radar in electronic form, not to mention that many of the downed aircraft fall on Russian positions. The figure of 500 planes and helicopters destroyed seems reasonable, considering that we have been at war for 300 days and almost every day the fighters or the air defense shoot down a Ukrainian plane, which they fly practically on suicide missions. It would also be necessary to count the planes destroyed on the ground by attacks on their bases. It is possible that if there is an excess it is due to having destroyed decoys or unusable aircraft.

If the Ukrainians continue to fly, it is that thanks to the help of NATO they received spare parts to put more aircraft into service and subsequently received airplanes and helicopters.

The conclusions are inexorable: this is a conventional war in which Ukraine suffers losses that can only be covered by mass mobilizations and enormous assistance from NATO, which has emptied warehouses of its stocks of Soviet weapons, its surplus of old material and, in the case of anti-tank weapons and portable anti-aircraft missiles, a good part of its war reserves. And still it's not enough. Personnel casualties are replenished, material losses are not.

This armament sufficient to sustain a static defense, even to conduct an offensive operation with limited tasks. But then the Ukros have to dig trenches again and ... hope for a miracle. Already in August-September, the lack of material and accoutrements was acutely felt, for the Kherson offensive, the advanced fortified area near Donetsk (Peski) was disarmed, and all self-propelled and towed artillery pieces were withdrawn from there.

As a result - the discovery of this fact by our intelligence, a series of short assaults and a complete victory with three captured "anthills", one large and two small. Against which we beat our heads unsuccessfully for six months.

(the "anthills" were heavily fortified and practically impregnable rubble hills)

Now such "windows of opportunity" will open more and more often, as the Ukrainian army will have to shift its dwindling war materiel from one part to another, exposing entire sectors.

Missed opportunities and problems of the Russian army

Can we take advantage of those opportunities? Alas, in the near future... doubtful. Our forces on the entire front line are pinned to their positions by NATO "thousand cuts" tactics, even in third-rate sectors, active maneuvers of small groups (up to one company) are constantly taking place, with attempts to infiltrate and create an attack group. Despite the losses, a permanent pressure is created. In this way the enemy manages to retain the strategic initiative.

The format of the "special operation" is out of print. Our army has serious problems, the command has not restored order in the direction of operations, the headquarters suffer from terrible turnover, some commanders of large formations have already been replaced for the third time, and there is a terrible shortage of junior officers because Serdyukov's reforms destroyed military academies. The appearance of General Surovikin inspired and encouraged the troops, but such wars are not won in the "Russian spirit", a well-established command mechanism is needed.

I don't know how long it will take for order and discipline to be restored. If the military police and prosecutors do not stay in deep rear, but take on direct and sometimes not very pleasant functions... it will take a month or two to develop the correct reflexes of unquestioning execution of orders. The passivity of our commanders in the campaign is also understandable, they fought for too long with white gloves and were overwhelmed by political decisions to "minimize personnel losses."

Comment: The good Igor Strelkov, who by intrigues has once again seen his desire to fight thwarted, has had to return home. Among his criticisms of everything and everyone, he made a similar observation. Except for the Donbass militias who are motivated by the desire to liberate their land and hatred of the Ukrainian occupier, and the Wagners, many Russian commanders and soldiers fight by inertia, it is not that there is demoralization or defeatism, but unfortunately that the vacillations of the political leadership and the lack of a clear strategy in conducting the war affect the commanders on the campaign. Unfortunately, there are also many who do not take the war seriously.

That said, I wouldn't take it too seriously, morality is a transitory thing that grows and wanes. As soon as the confusion of the command is cleared up, a clear objective is set and the offensive is launched, everything will change.

In fact, such a situation of "neither peace nor war" in the Army always results in a loss of military discipline, even elementary combat tasks are not performed under the plausible pretexts of "taking care of the soldiers", initiative and daring commanders are suppressed if not sent not far out of sight. Yes, it is necessary to be strict in asking for explanations and responsibilities for discharges, but this requires a well-established system for observing the transmission and execution of orders. Which I haven't heard of yet.

Therefore, I will not be optimistic about the offensive in the winter campaign. I have heard about the habits of General Surovikin in the Syria campaigns and in Kherson, who first builds solid chains of command from his headquarters to the last soldier on the front line. The second step is to instruct and coordinate the different weapons and services for coordinated combat.

Only then does he perform his assigned missions with a quick offensive. While we are not objectively ready, the training of the mobilized has not reached the stage of combat coordination at the brigade level, I have not yet heard of such exercises. As soon as they start, from that moment the preparation of combat-ready reserves would take a month and a half

The limits of mobilization

I will not talk about the political firmness of the Kiev regime and the desire of Ukrainians to fight to the end. But war is not so much the battle, trenches, tanks charging and the thundering of hundreds of artillery cannons as a matter of mobilization. By its form and rhythm, one can judge how the country is ready to wage war, what awaits in the end. I don't know what the Kremlin or the Russian General Staff is up to, but the mobilization measures taken will not win a long war. Not even a short war

A little history... the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the first days of March entered the stage of permanent total mobilization, the count of the "waves" has been lost. This imitates the Soviet practice of the Great Patriotic War, the continuous process of forming new units and the flow of replacements of marching units to existing ones. The Wehrmacht carried out a different type of mobilization until 1943, a cyclical type: conscripts or reservists were recruited strictly by age, passed a full 16-week training course and combat coordination as part of a squad-platoon-company.

After that, whole units of instructed recruits were sent to the front. Of course, these recruits were better prepared and instructed than the mobilized soldiers of the Red Army, well prepared according to the doctrine of General Seeckt.

(Seeckt, head of the Reichswehr, the interwar German army, who secretly laid the future foundations for the rearmament and expansion of the German army to circumvent the restrictions of the Versailles treaty)

But the Wehrmacht lost the Moscow battle by the minimum due to the fact that this cyclical process left it without replacements at the crucial moment, since the next "surge of reserves" was not ready. This factor, apart from Zhukov's command, had much more importance than the winter cold. And the development of the Soviet counteroffensive operation was slowed down by the arrival of German reinforcements after the completion of the 16-week course in training regiments.

The Red Army acted differently in mobilization measures, mostly forced by circumstances. He had to continuously create divisions and regiments, brigades and corps. Without proper coordination and even sometimes recruits did not receive shooting instruction, sending to the front in a hurry with one goal - to stop the Wehrmacht at all costs, or at least slow down its advance. At the cost of huge losses, the survivors gained invaluable combat experience, and competent commanders were forged, who until 1945 did not learn to parade on the parade ground. But they knew how to win and survive.

Comment: This is not entirely true, although it is true that entire divisions of reservists and workers' militias were recruited to slow down the German advance, which convinced the German commanders of the erroneous idea that the Russians were finished, the Soviets in parallel continued the long-term training of cadres of officers who did not enter combat until 1943, which demonstrates the foresight and confidence of the Russian command in the final victory, since except for specific episodes in which students of military schools were sent to the front, like the Podolsk cadets, the period of instruction was not shortened and every man in the rear was not sent in despair to the front even in the blackest moments of the first period of the war. This long-term mobilization and training is one of the keys to the Soviet victories in the third period of the war.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine use both methods of mobilization, most of the hastily recruited Terbatov soldiers (territorial battalions) are thrown into the hell of our fire, but after a month and a half there are experienced survivors left who are very good and tenacious in defense. And units of experienced regular soldiers, after a short attack, are taken to the deep rear of the country to be reconstituted, they are even sent to NATO states, where soldiers undergo a three-month training course or a two-month instuduction.

They are not sent to the front line "non-stop", but form reserve units. We destroyed two of these cams during the autumn campaign and seriously damaged the Foreign Legion of Mercenaries, but a couple more waves are on the way, and they will try to launch powerful attacks again in December and January. Either in the direction of the Crimea, to cut off the supply... or in the direction of Belgorod, which is not ruled out. They will again try to impose tactics in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine have an advantage: insensitivity to losses, network-centric control of the battlefield and tough defense of the "survivors" in other sectors of the front.

The setbacks of September-November may be repeated if General Surovikin has not prepared a novel solution on how to regain the strategic initiative. The enemy has less and less artillery, tanks and armor, but thethe troop's training has improved. And it has a huge number of anti-tank weapons, man-portable air defense systems and light armored vehicles. Do not forget the advantage in all means of intelligence, from satellite to spies. And high-precision systems with updated target designation systems.

Finding

By the time the winter is over, there will be almost nothing left of the Soviet weapons of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and we will face a million-strong NATO army (counting rear and volunteer units), equipped and supplied according to all Western standards, except for heavy offensive weapons. But I am sure that if Moderna feels our weakness and indecision, everything will immediately appear: cruise missiles, HIMARS long-range rockets, aircraft piloted by mercenaries and British, tanks "Abrams" and "Leopard-2", armored "Marder", modern air defense systems and unmanned aerial vehicles.

(Comment: As has been discussed in the comments of this newspaper, I do not believe that Ukraine has neither the men nor the ability to increase its armed forces, it has hardly been able to replace the losses to maintain a force at the front of a quarter of a million men, it does not seem credible to me that they can recruit and arm more. What is a cause for concern is that the Americans send more sophisticated weapons, but I also do not think that they can supply weapons in the necessary quantities, much less Moderna tanks. The Ukrainian army is turning into a light infantry force moving on trucks and light wheeled armored vehicles, when there are any)

Is it possible to prevent the tables from turning against us? Yes, you can.

To continue every day the attacks with "Geranium" flying bombs and "Caliber" cruise missiles against the energy and industrial infrastructure. Prepare a strategic air offensive operation to completely paralyze the transport system of Ukraine. Organize humanitarian chaos and encourage millions of civilians to "winter" in Europe. Then speed up the production of of our own military-industrial complex, multiplying the availability of the entire range of "digital peripherals" in the troops.

We lack Moderna, electronic warfare, artillery reconnaissance and aiming systems for high-precision ammunition. Little use is made of gliding guided bombs, the improvement of the thermobaric rocket launcher "Solntsepek" is going slowly, there is a shortage of long-range large-caliber guns, I again insist that the replacement of worn-out barrel tubes is slow. There are no serious shortcomings, but some units of the mobilized ones have been marking the step for a month in the training process and have not received all the necessary equipment and war materiel.

The only encouraging fact is that the enemy's problems are more systemic and serious, and some are generally beyond the scope of an adequate solution. We produce our own weapons, and NATO countries have not put measures in place to replenish their empty arsenals. The whole dance around the "consultations on possible negotiations" is about this: get a breather, prepare new sanctions mechanisms and pray to Satan to see if a miracle happens, an economic or political collapse of Russia.

It makes no sense to wait for the former, said everyone's "very dear" professional Alexey Kudrin (whom it is difficult to suspect of sympathizing with our actions in Ukraine): this year, the decline in Russian GDP will be about three percent. Not fifteen or twenty, as almost all Western economic gurus swore with blood. Ukraine is being demolished, its vital activity can be maintained only thanks to external infusions. Against the background of a systemic crisis and a recession in Europe (and soon in the USA) Sooner or later, the accounting department will knock on NATO's door.

The military and financial assistance of the West has limits, the greatest shortage of military equipment is expected in early spring for all key categories especially for 155 mm shells and artillery systems, the Ukrainian army has already begun to switch to 105 mm caliber. For our part we calmly prepare replacements, increase our power and do not pay attention to political "chatter". We are restoring discipline, and we are waiting for novel solutions from General Surovikin. Military arithmetic is still against him, the available forces of the "Special Operation" are not enough for a total victory. But if his hands are untied…

   Who destroyed Bridge ? 

Russia destroyed the bridge. This is one of the replenishment routes of the Ukro forces towards Bakhmut.

Looks like a railway bridge.

EDIT, yes it was and looks like it blocked the road as well. Hard to move out of the way. Maybe Russian SF.

//Spriter///-
@Spriter0000
·
35m
On the northern outskirts of Bakhmut (Artemovka), a railway bridge was destroyed, passing over the M-03 highway.

There are no characteristic signs in the photograph indicating that the bridge was hit by artillery, air or missile strikes. Most likely, the bridge was blown up by Ukrainian sappers, which may indicate the gradual preparation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to leave Bakhmut.

Note he called (in the translation) the Russians "the liberators"

From the different time between the blasts I'd say that this was two separate hits on the same area.

More on the welded tanks.

Latest $275 million US Presidential Draw Down Assistance Package for Ukraine...

Capabilities in latest US package include (link (https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3241679/275-million-in-additional-assistance-for-ukraine/)):

• Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
• 80,000 155mm artillery rounds;
• Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems equipment;
• Counter air defense capability;
• High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) Ambulances and medical equipment;
• Approximately 150 generators;
• Field equipment.

NOTES:

80,000 155m rounds will last Ukraine less than half a month at 6,000 rounds per day. This follows 20,000 rounds sent over a month ago.

No more pickup trucks or HMMWVs for troop movements, instead ambulances for growing medical emergency in Bakhmut.

150 generators + 200 from last package = 300 for an entire nation with a failing power grid.

Conclusion: It's obvious Ukraine needs much more than this just to fight Russia to a stalemate - but isn't getting it. It is clear Ukraine isn't getting what it needs because the US is incapable of supplying it.

https://t.me/brianlovethailand/1157

Conclusion: It's obvious Ukraine needs much more than this just to fight Russia to a stalemate - but isn't getting it. It is clear Ukraine isn't getting what it needs because the US is incapable of supplying it.

......

Clearly insufficient... Meanwhile Russia increases weapons production, Shoigu speaks of 50% next year, and perfects his weapons based on field experience.

https://twitter.com/venik44/status/1601942869668937734

-///Spriter///-
@Spriter0000
The Russian army attacks the positions near Artyomovsk and Avdeevka and inflicts fire damage on the Armed Forces of Ukraine near Kremennaya and Svatovo -


-///Spriter///-
@Spriter0000
Ukraine steps up diplomacy amid fighting and power outages - Reuters.


ДражаМ
@DrazaM33
M777+Lancet, Nikolaev direction.


IOSTOCONPUTIN
@ilciclistainblu
Another column of the Russian Armed Forces has arrived in the NVO area

Thank you to Finland for supplying some APC 

What is that startup device on the msta? The sound and flame looks like a gas turbine but it runs on a diesel engine?

https://odysee.com/@airbornewolf:8/Msta-S-M2-operations-in-Ukraine:b?src=embed

So amazing seeing that shockwave moving all the foliage from that camera distance. Must be amazing standing close to it.

So that Telegram channel "Divanniy genshtab" (couch warrior's general staff...) that was mentioned earlier published a more complete rundown:


So these are supposedly Ukrainian KIAs confirmed by public obituaries, arranged by region of original residence.

A total of 86,060 KIA more or less confirmed. Then add to that that far from all "enjoy" publicly accessibly obituaries, and that UA prefers to label them MIA for as long as possible. So it could well be 100,000+, upwards to 150,000.

But, I am still not 100% sold, as I haven't inspected the methods of gathering this information, but with that caveat out of the way, I will also admit that 80-100k does not seem implausible whatsoever. Rather likely, in fact, given other indications.

An interesting skew is the apparent overrepresentation of Transcarpathia by the Hungarian border, and the mid-Dnepr region (Poltava and thereabouts). But as I said, it could be the result of varying media situations, different attitudes to public obituaries etc, not necessarily an indication of where Kyiv prefers to grab its cannon fodder. But, it could be the latter too... Saving on the pure Lvovan ubermenschen. Wouldn't put it past them.