Especially their highly networked force structure is impressive. A modern US heavy division tied into their force structure is really impressive when it comes to punch, agility, reconaissance and responsiveness. So the individual system has less impact on the capability of such a heavy division than with a force which can hardly employ combined arms tactics let alone the sort of networked sea/air/land-battle the US can
Excuse me for say that, but i absolutely don't agree on this position, not in its premises neither in its main inferences.
If you have read Net Working Warfare by David S. Alberts, Frederick P.Stain and John J. Garstka ,or other publiation ,in particular on the sensor network in tracking and surveillance operations, you will realize that obviously net working warfare, like any concept in this world, don't contain only positive trends and potentials, but also evident lackings leading to points of breacking of its same constituent structure.
One of those weak points is just related to surveillance and tracking sensor network, the information's chain linked to it and the strategic and the tactical actions triggered ,at an unified level, by that same data flow; one of the most fearful point of breacking in NWW is just that any system technically capable to neutralize or interfere with the main elements in tracking sensor network, cause effectively the whole net worked structure to act as a potent catalyst of completely wronged proactive or reactive actions.
This potentially destructive sequence’s cascade in the force command structure is ,obviously ,enormously exacerbated in conflicts against enemies which have invested in systems enjoying "metric" or, for better say, extensive advantages (engagement envelop of missile, the off-road speed of an IFV, the time of reaction or number of target engageable in a time unit by a particular SAM, etc..etc...) offering hardware linear advantages not easily reducible .
To clarify even more what now expressed i will do some examples : Image an offensive/defensive operation where E-8 Joint STARS or an E-3 AWACS was scanning a particular sector ,now in a group of trees of this sector a Penela-1/2 ,under a Volchitsa-KR ,go active. The surveillance assets scan the sector providing the overall position of various enemy assets (a mobile command center, an advancing mechanized regiment, a pair of SAM launchers , sevral MRLS etc...),with the only particular that those informations has been selectively corrupted and twisted by the Pelena-1/2.
From this moment those wronged information begin to spread at enormous speed in the whole force structure quickly triggering an horrible ,almost instantaneous ,chain of wronged decisions and net worked reaction, the system, in brief, begin to act against itself !
Naturally an enemy enjoying hardware parametrical advantages against the correspondent systems of its enemy, can transform a similar situation from serious to deadly; an air attack against the MLRS artillery pieces tracked in a position ,and in reality at 50-60 km of distance, could cause the whole air group committed at the task to be washed-out by the SAM elements not tracked or tracked in completely different positions, the allied ground forces contestually retreated to prevent that them was engaged and destroyed by the enemy superior (both in range and fire power) MLRS ,could open a deadly corridor for the enemy ground divisions to exploit etc..etc... the possibilities are infinite.
In brief any enemy asset capable to act even only slightly and slowly in the mechanisms of the surveillance and tracking sensor network is very likely to produce exponentially greater and quicker negative effects in the whole chained structure of a networked force.
ahmedfire you can, at this point, easily realize how a system as Nakidka, at the exact contrary of what you had asserted, represent an example of those a
crucial assets capable to produce disproportionate effect just against an enemy which have heavily pointed on situational awareness superiority and information data sharing/management superiority, (important also for compensate several metrical deficiencies ,on a one vs one basis , of its offensive/defensive systems against the corresponding of its main competitor).
A regiment of Iskander-M equipped with Nakidka not detected by a RQ-4 Global Hawk at useful range would lure the US command to order the quick coordinate transference to a “safe” airfield of bombers, fighter, AWACS ,EW aircraft and other assets for a planned air attack, obtaining instead ,as disastrous outcome, that in few minutes you would have that airfield literally reduced to a sprawl of smoking craters; with losses simply incalculable for your side and lacking any systems with the same kinematical qualities of that employed by your opponent you wouldn’t have any chance to respond.
A division of T-90 followed by a mechanized infantry with BMP-3M or “Smerch” MLRS equipped with Nakidka could effectively use the opponent’s dependency on shared tracking data and quick decision and reaction chain as a powerful weapon against them effectively engaging enemy forces perfectly coordinated for displace themselves, manoeuvre and concentring assets as the area was free of enemy presence; of course,the Nakidka-equipped elements could in this way also exploit at maximum the enormous difference in engagement envelop and fire power enjoyed over the enemy equivalent assets ,with fatal consequences for the opposing forces….. the examples possible are almost infinites.
When you think at a particular type of warfare concept ,you must image what would be the countermeasures adopted by
high end enemies not immensely inferior ones, moreover while you cannot teach to your missile to go farther , to your aircraft to have a greater autonomy, to your air defence to engage more target contemporaneously etc…etc…the military forces of an advanced nation can, with very little modifications to operational process ,force structure or employment of the introduction of purposely designed system greatly influence the delicate system’s architecture at the basis of a force constructed around a Network Centric structure
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