Russian military intervention and aid to Syria #13

Cyberspec wrote:A pair of Su-35's from Hmeim airbase intercepted 2 x Turkish F-16's who were threatening SAA positions around Khein Shaykoun
http://avia.pro/news/rossiyskie-su-35-perehvatili-dva-tureckih-f-16-zastaviv-ih-sbezhat

Show the Ottomans their place.

Spetznas soldier with "Intrigan" multifunction recce system

Big ship come. Many things come.

https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1166305251974103041

Cyberspec wrote:Spetznas soldier with "Intrigan" multifunction recce system

Is this in the Homs desert?

Monster supply anotov landed in Syria, wonder what fun things it was delivering.

BabakTaghvaee claims Latakia is off limits to Israel...

#Russia blocked #Syria's airspace on #Israel Air Force and foiled its plans for carrying-out airstrikes in #Latakia on 18 & 19 September. Russians blocked the airspace via activating S-400 SAMs, flying Su-35s & also conducting Naval exercise across #Syria coastline!

https://twitter.com/BabakTaghvaee/status/1175020692653449222

https://mobile.twitter.com/RALee85/status/1176571431901106177



Podlet k1 S-band survelliance radar in Hmeimim acquired by russia since 2016. It is said to be an anti stealth radar and probably used to monitor israeli f-35.

But I can't find any real data about it. Anyone knows something more about that ?

Isos wrote: But I can't find any real data about it. Anyone knows something more about that ?

Low level radar and yes, reportedly anti-stealth

posted some details here
https://www.russiadefence.net/t2547p450-russian-radar-systems#265545

Rob Lee
@RALee85
·
1h
The Russian MoD spokesman, Major General Igor Konashenkov, said that Russian air defenses have destroyed 118 UAVs over the past 2 years, including 58 in 2019.
He also said 31 missiles from Pantsir-S1 and Tor-M2 have destroyed 27 incoming rockets in 2019.

31 missiles for 27 targets which is very good but that proves that no system in the world can have 100% success rate. Quantity and early warning radars are always needed. That should be an argument when selling air defence weapons.

Isos wrote:

Rob Lee
@RALee85
·
1h
The Russian MoD spokesman, Major General Igor Konashenkov, said that Russian air defenses have destroyed 118 UAVs over the past 2 years, including 58 in 2019.
He also said 31 missiles from Pantsir-S1 and Tor-M2 have destroyed 27 incoming rockets in 2019.

31 missiles for 17 targets which is very good but that proves that no system in the world can have 100% success rate. Quantity and early warning radars are always needed. That should be an argument when selling air defence weapons. 

But of course your not aware that many of the SAMS deployed by the Federation have a standard practice of launching 2 missiles per target.

Isos wrote:31 missiles for 17 targets which is very good but that proves that no system in the world can have 100% success rate. Quantity and early warning radars are always needed. That should be an argument when selling air defence weapons.

.....Except that the rocket destroyed was 27 with 31 interceptors and the point stressed was just that the ratio was near to 1 with one interceptor for each target.


"Более того, в пoследнее время наши зенитные ракетные cредства ПВО - "Панцирь-С1", "Тор-М2" - также уничтoжают попытки террористов нанести удар реактивными cнарядами. С 1 января 2019 года былo уничтожено 27 реактивных снарядов террoристических группировок, которые запускались преимущественнo из зоны безопасности "Идлиб", - уточнил генерал.

Конашенков отметил, что эти 27 реактивных снарядoв были уничтожены 31 ракетoй комплексов "Панцирь-С1" и "Тoр-М2". "То есть эффективность поражения близка к единице: oдна цель - одна ракета", - подчеркнул он."


https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6937443


This ratio of interception has been constant in the Syrian theatre for Панцирь-С and Тoр-М2 since theirs first inception; even more similar ,even if somewhat lower, ratio has been repeatedly proved also by Syrian-operated Панцирь against US made and Israeli made missiles and planning bombs of latest production.

Except that the rocket destroyed was 27 with 31 interceptors and the point stressed was just that the ratio was near to 1 with one interceptor for each target. Rolling Eyes

Typo error. Corrected.

I just pointed out that 100% is never achieved and redundancy in air defence is very usefull.

Well for clarity I would say 100% can be achieved and can be achieved quite often.

Destroying 27 incoming threats when there was only 27 incoming threats is a 100% defence record.

Needing to use more than one missile per target is about kill probability, so with 31 missiles launched and 27 targets destroyed you need more information to say anything useful.

As mentioned sometimes for seriously threatening targets two missiles can be fired to improve kill probability... both missiles might score hits but it can only be recorded as one kill.

The performance is determined by the number of enemy weapons that hit their targets, either because they were not detected before impact or they managed to locally overwhelm nearby systems.

So a 100% rate is certainly possible... like when your patriot battery is informed that the oil refinery you are defending is currently burning, but that is 100% fail where no targets were detected or shot down.

JohninMK wrote:BEIRUT, LEBANON (4:25 P.M.) – The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on a Russian company and three people for providing jet fuel to the Russian Air Force in Syria.

According to a press brief from the Treasury Department, the Moscow-based Maritime Assistance LLC company and three other Russian nationals were sanctioned because the U.S. intelligence believes the fuel they are providing to the Russian Air Force is being used to attack opponents of the Syrian government.

“The FBI is proud to have been a part of the team that unraveled this complicated scheme that supplied fuel for Russian jet fighters supporting Assad’s regime,” said FBI spokesperson Alan Kohler.

Sigal Mandelker, Under Secretary of the US Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, said that the U.S. has dealt a blow to the scheme to illegally send jet fuel to the Russian army in Syria, and is resolved to cut off access to the international financial system for all those who “enable the cruel war machine in Syria”.

The Treasury has also placed sanctions on three Russian citizens who are believed to hold senior positions in the company Sovfracht, which is already under sanctions. The department’s statement mentions the company’s director of maritime transport, Ivan Okorokov, his first deputy Karen Stepanyan (Sovfracht’s website describes him as the first deputy director general of maritime and river transport), and Ilya Loginov, deputy director general for legal support.

Unbelievable.  This is how utterly fuktarded these stupid c*nts have become.  Russian companies supplying fuel to Russian military units fighting terrorism and foreign-backed regime change in an allied nation that has requested their assistance is now a criminal act in the eyes of the Mandarins of the accursed Seppostani Continuum and requires "sanctions"...

You just can't make this shit up.  

This is exactly the sort of rectal-cranial inversion that destroyed Rome and undermined the Soviet Empire.  What a bunch of ignorant shaved apes...  

Isos wrote:Typo error. Corrected.

I just pointed out that 100% is never achieved and redundancy in air defence is very usefull.

Obviously a 1:1 ratio between launched interceptors and interceptions is rarely achieved ,while 100% interception of enemy volley is almost a constant for modern domestic SHORAD; naturally this ratio, for short range SAM, depend also on the type of incoming targets ( mostly theirs speed and manoeuvrability).

This factor -n. interceptors: n. interceptions- influence the resilience of a particular air defense system to saturation attacks and if you take into account the interception ratio described by Federation's Ministry of Defense deputy you can easily compute the absurdely high resilience to saturation by part of domestic modern SHORADs.

Discounting effects of domestic EW and area masking systems -the most advanced and efficient at world by a long margin- that will already greatly reduce the number of incoming UAVs/ammunitions to be kinetically destroyed, anyone can realise how an attack with very costly stand-off ammunitions and/or UAVs , therefore with range at least superior to 200 km for area defended by relatively old С-300ПМУ2 (we talk of AGM-158 JASSM, TLAM, KEPD 350 Taurus, Storm Shadow/SCALP, Delilah, SOM etc....and medium range UAV/UCAVs ) and with the presence of even a single battery of Панцирь-С or Тoр-М2 considering the previosuly named Pk operatively demonstrated in Syria, should be planned taking into account a number of UAV/missiles surviving after EW systems and area decoy and masking system of the following type:

1) For a typical battery of 6 Панцирь-С at least 94 surviving missiles after EW decoy and area masking (one hit on the defended target) coming from 63 interceptions by part of the 72 ready to fire missiles and at least other 30 from the 6 twinned 30 mm autocannons at range of 2,5 km or less.

2) For a typical battery of 6 Тoр-М2 at least 85 surviving missiles after EW decoy and area masking (one hit on the defended target) coming from 84 interceptions by part of the 96 ready to fire missiles.

To notice is that the presence of integrated multispectral AD radars of latest generation render practically null the effect of the presence, in the attacking volley, of decoys of any kind.

Even a similar attack in an area devoid of medium range AD systems and Air Force coverage and with only a single modern SHORAD battery show how the economy and affordability of similar attacks is terribly lopsided in favour of the defending side (Israel is already experiencing that severe economic/production problem since it has been forced to substitute stand-in laser/GPS guided gravity bomb with costly stand-off PGMs against a third tier opponent) and would be practically inexecutable in a conflict against a peer enemy.

Advocates of "saturating attacks" today propose ideas that only in appareance seem rationally grounded but all, indistinctly, fail the tests of an accurate examinations of the economic/time of production implication of the production of "UAV swarm" ; if you attempt to remove the avionic content from each element of this UAV swarm relying on third party guidance or guidance by part of few UAVs of the swarms the attack become terribly susceptible to coomunication guidance channel's corruption or interruption by part of enemy electromagnetic warfare system ; on the other side adding independent guidance , communication or IA algorithms to each UAV cause theirs cost to skyrocket to over an order of magnitude more than the interceptors designed to destroy them in the 20-30 km from intended target.

Even more while the military value of the production of those inteceptors will be always maintained and capable to defend by themselves the financiary investment in them, those UAVs will have only a very specific niche of employment and will not be capable in any way to defend theirs area of deployment or productiuon from enemy attacks.

The S-500 complex was tested in Syria:


Testing the S-500 in Syria allowed to work out the detection of "inconspicuous" targets
Today, 06:10
27

Some time ago, VO published material about the start of testing a promising S-500 air defense system. During the tests, as it turned out, some technical problems were discovered, but they were eliminated. However, manufacturers did not report the specific location where these tests were conducted.








Now it became known that the verification of the S-500 "Prometheus" anti-aircraft missile systems was carried out in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. Such an information message is published by the Izvestia newspaper . The material says that testing of the S-500 in Syria is confirmed by sources in the military-industrial complex and the Ministry of Defense.

The statement about the testing of the S-500 Prometheus in Syria has already caused a violent reaction abroad. In particular, it is noted that Russia continues to use the territory of the SAR as a "platform for testing its weapons." Western sources note that over the years of participation of the Russian Armed Forces in the Syrian campaign, a variety of weapons were tested, including Caliber cruise missiles, fifth-generation Su-57 fighters, and now the S-500 Prometheus air defense system.





It is worth noting the importance of the “Syrian” tests for the S-500. It (importance) for our country consists not only in checking the complex in special climatic conditions. Verification in the ATS is important primarily in that it allows you to confirm the wide functionality of the complex, which, in fact, is also a powerful anti-ballistic missile. Also, the radar of the complex got the opportunity to test in the direction of detecting "invisible" targets. Considering that the 5th generation fighter of the US Air Force (F-22) and Israeli Air Force (F-35) appear in the sky over Syria, the experience of the “Syrian” tests is extremely important for developers and the military. Naturally, both the developers and the military will conduct a thorough analysis of the S-500 verification carried out on the territory of the SAR, which in itself will become an invaluable experience in the development of an air defense missile defense shield.

It can be assumed that the testing of the S-500 in Syria was carried out without the “physical” launch of missiles - primarily tests of target detection characteristics. Earlier, the S-500 tests, as it became known, were carried out in the Astrakhan region.


https://topwar.ru/163100-testirovanie-s-500-v-sirii-pozvoljalo-otrabotat-obnaruzhenie-malozametnyh-celej.html

ultimatewarrior wrote:

even the reporter looks like a big bruiser!

does russia fly in construction crews under military command or are they part of russian engineer teams (from the vid they're obviously using some local labour)?

^^^

What's this ...barage baloons over Khmeim ?

Cyberspec wrote:^^^

What's this ...barage baloons over Khmeim ?

Either a weather balloon or an Aerostat carrying radar and or other sensors, an excellent way to extend coverage into radar shadow areas.