Su-57 Stealth Fighter: News #5

Austin wrote:Viktor Bondarev: no one could surpass the combat capabilities of the Su-57

https://aviation21.ru/viktor-bondarev-boevye-vozmozhnosti-su-57-poka-prevzojti-nikto-ne-smog/

Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security Viktor Bondarev in an interview with "News»I highly appreciated the technical, flight and combat characteristics of the Su-57 fighter.

According to him, the subtle, highly maneuverable, high-speed Russian fighter of the fifth generation, is able to escape from enemy attacks at supersonic speed without the use of a boost.“Not a single long-range radar detection aircraft is able to detect it, not a single anti-aircraft missile system to shoot down. At the same time, it can hit any targets both on the ground and in the air. On-board electronics helps the pilot to solve several tasks at the same time, to conduct an all-perspective battle with missiles of different range of destruction. The combat capabilities of this aircraft at this stage of industrial development could not be surpassed by anyone, ”said the chairman of the committee of the Federation Council.

He added that on board the Su-57 you can place the most modern precision weapons. Moreover, the current range of combat equipment is not finite. There are great opportunities for modernization, for development, Bondarev concluded.

As for the price, the senator admitted that, although it may be somewhat high, it fully justifies itself.

“We see the fate of countries that have saved on national defense and security. And even if some of them managed to preserve their sovereignty, like Syria, it is difficult to even imagine what fabulous money they have to spend now on rebuilding the country. Much larger than those that they
would have invested in equipping the army with better weapons, ”concluded the senator.

Hole wrote:First use Kinzhals  against Ticonderogas/Burkes/Zumwalts( ) and then Kh-32 against carriers.

verkhoturye51 wrote:

Hole wrote:First use Kinzhals  against Ticonderogas/Burkes/Zumwalts( ) and then Kh-32 against carriers.

10 mach Kinzhal against 15 mach SM-3? Do you solve it with more inflight maneuvering to reduce Kinzhal's speed even further? Or with more terminal phase maneuvering, which might be too late (Aegis radars have cca 1000 km radius that buys significant reaction time).

Cruise missiles are more realistic try.

Theodore Postol is Professor of Science, Technology and National Security Policy in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society at MIT. He did his undergraduate work in physics and his graduate work in nuclear engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After receiving his Ph.D., Dr. Postol joined the staff of Argonne National Laboratory, where he studied the microscopic dynamics and structure of liquids and disordered solids using neutron, x-ray and light scattering, along with computer molecular dynamics techniques. Subsequently he went to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment to study methods of basing the MX Missile, and later worked as a scientific adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations. After leaving the Pentagon, Dr. Postol helped to build a program at Stanford University to train mid-career scientists to study developments in weapons technology of relevance to defense and arms control policy. In 1990 Dr. Postol was awarded the Leo Szilard Prize from the American Physical Society. In 1995 he received the Hilliard Roderick Prize from the American Association for the Advancement of Science and in 2001 he received the Norbert Wiener Award from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility for uncovering numerous and important false claims about missile defenses.

https://sts-program.mit.edu/people/emeriti-faculty/theodore-postol/

Biography of Professor Postol
Theodore A. Postol is Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). During the periods prior to taking his position at MIT he worked as a research physicist at the Argonne National Laboratory, an analyst studying the MX missile at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, at the Pentagon as an advisor on matters of military technology and policy to the Chief of Naval Operations, and as a Senior Research Associate at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control.

During the period 1982 to 1984 when Dr. Postol worked at the Pentagon he acted as the principal advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations on ICBM/SLBM vulnerability, including the Air Force's Closely Spaced Based (CSB) MX deployment, the strategic applications of Navy and Air Force nuclear weapons systems, Soviet and U.S. ballistic missile defense systems, strategic anti-submarine warfare, strategic command, control and communications, and advanced sensor technologies. His work on missile defense questions included Navy requirements for reentry systems, penetration aids, and analysis of SLBM tactical and technical countermeasures to missile defenses. His duties also involved regular participation and/or reviews of activities within The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Strategic Systems Projects Office, The Defense Nuclear Agency, and The Strategic Submarine Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

His scholarly work includes technical and policy analyses of strategic and tactical missile defenses, the potential effects of superfires from nuclear attacks near urban areas, the possible civilian casualties from nuclear counterforce attacks, nuclear weapons targeting practices, policy and technical questions associated with the possibility of a Nuclear Winter induced by fires following nuclear attacks, Accidental Launch Protection Systems, and Soviet tactical missile threats to NATO.

Dr. Postol has also done extensive technical work on the question of the Patriot anti-missile system's performance during the 1991 Gulf War and technical and policy work on the implications of Highly Advanced Theater Missile Defense Systems for the ABM Treaty. His analysis of the performance of the Patriot system during the 1991 Gulf War is the only detailed and refereed technical assessment of Patriot's performance during the Gulf War -- exploiting the most extensive body of technical data available to anyone on Patriot's Gulf War performance, video data taken by the press during Patriot-Scud engagements. The Congressional investigation of Department of Defense claims about Patriot's Gulf War performance revealed a near complete failure to instrument Patriots fire units during the Gulf War, and also the failure to exploit the rich and detailed information available in the public video record.

In 1990 Dr. Postol received the American Physical Society's Leo Szilard Award for "incisive technical analysis of national security issues that [have] been vital for informing the public policy debate..." He is also the recipient of the 1995 Hilliard Roderick Prize in Science, Arms Control, and International Security from the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) for "outstanding contributions that advance our understanding of issues related to arms control and international security ... that have important scientific or technical dimensions." During the award presentation by the AAAS he was described as "by-far the strongest, technically-trained, independent arms control analyst of his generation." He was also cited for work that "has become well known and highly valued for its rigor, honesty, and attention to detail," and for having been "a key player in educating a whole generation of independent arms control policy analysts." The AAAS also noted that he "has repeatedly presented accurate, but at times, unpopular analysis to the international security and arms control community."

http://web.mit.edu/course/17/17.919/www/postol_bio.html

verkhoturye51 wrote:

Hole wrote:First use Kinzhals  against Ticonderogas/Burkes/Zumwalts( ) and then Kh-32 against carriers.

10 mach Kinzhal against 15 mach SM-3? Do you solve it with more inflight maneuvering to reduce Kinzhal's speed even further? Or with more terminal phase maneuvering, which might be too late (Aegis radars have cca 1000 km radius that buys significant reaction time).

Cruise missiles are more realistic try.

a faster interceptor can get to the new interception window  whereas a slower one might not be able to make it

problem for the Yanquis is that the most recent Russian glider tech can move the ICBM warhead target far enough away as to
render even nuclear armed ABM missiles useless.

GarryB wrote:Generally the interceptor missiles are located close to the target they are protecting, or at least between the target and the incoming attack weapon... if that is not the case then there are problems for the defence... and obviously the attacker has satellites and knows where Patriot batteries are most of the time, because they are mobile... just not very...

kvs wrote:The above discussion is why the US will arm its ABM missiles with nuclear warheads.   I have been saying this for years and
the recent US pullout of the INF confirms it.   Not only is Aegis ashore a direct violation of the INF since it can host nuclear armed
cruise missiles, its is also a violation because the ABM missiles will be nuclear armed.  

The problem for the Yanquis is that the most recent Russian glider tech can move the ICBM warhead target far enough away as to
render even nuclear armed ABM missiles useless.

Sucks to be master of the universe wannabes.

verkhoturye51 wrote:

a faster interceptor can get to the new interception window  whereas a slower one might not be able to make it

My point is that it wouldn't have to. If fast interceptor is launched and then incoming missile turns, when the interceptor gets the command to turn it will be far from the missile and will lack fuel to go on. Now if we have a dense radar network (or many AWACS airplanes), slower - supersonic interceptor can be launched very early. After small change in trajectory of the incoming misisile, the interceptor won't be far from the new trajectory. If it turns a little bit and has a good chance of hitting the missile, unless it turns immediately before the impact. All the inflight maneuvering will this way make little sense.

If Kinzhal's range (excluding carrier's range) is 1000 km.

problem for the Yanquis is that the most recent Russian glider tech can move the ICBM warhead target far enough away as to
render even nuclear armed ABM missiles useless.  

Like they could tell real warheads from decoys in the first place. If US actually deploys anything like this in Europe, Russians can increase Kinzhal's size a bit to put several warheads/decoys inside.

LMFS wrote:

kvs wrote:The above discussion is why the US will arm its ABM missiles with nuclear warheads.   I have been saying this for years and
the recent US pullout of the INF confirms it.   Not only is Aegis ashore a direct violation of the INF since it can host nuclear armed
cruise missiles, its is also a violation because the ABM missiles will be nuclear armed.  

The problem for the Yanquis is that the most recent Russian glider tech can move the ICBM warhead target far enough away as to
render even nuclear armed ABM missiles useless.

Sucks to be master of the universe wannabes.

Yeah, problem is SM-3 is a kinetic interceptor of very limited size, most probably incompatible to be equipped with a nuclear head. And it is, if I am not wrong, the only ABM system carried on board of US ships + AEGIS ashore. So they would need to substitute all that and it wont be cheap

Explosives. The Mark 3 prototypes used an outer fast-burning layer of Composition B high explosive over a middle layer of slow burning Barotol and then another layer of Comp B. There were 32 of these “explosive lenses” and the whole system was designed to create a perfectly spherical shock wave that would evenly compress the core allowing the fission reaction to take place. One early avenue of post war research was into more efficient high explosives which could generate more compression with less weight and bulk. Modern high performance explosives can deliver greater performance in a layer only 1-2 inches thick and weighing on the order of tens of pounds.

Kinzhal flies 3km/s. Changes trajectory  bit

Zircon's range is 1000km+ so no need to use Kinzhal in such case.

Why would you expect only 1 Kinzhal  flying at first place?

GunshipDemocracy wrote:How many SM-3 are needed to intercept 1 Kizhal? 10?

kvs wrote:The Arrow has a 150 kg warhead. I could not find any data on the SM-3. But I bet it is over 100 kg. Clearly it
can be replaced by a nuclear device that would fry any ICBM warhead in a 300 m radius. It would even deflect
it under exo-atmospheric conditions which will result in failure to hit the target.

Kinzhal flies 3km/s. Changes trajectory  bit

Let's be fair: Kinzhal flies 3 km/s, changes trajectory, doesn't fly 3 km/s anymore. Repeat that several times to get actual speed at the interception point. Considering the missile can maneuver in all stages of the flight, if this actually happens, max speed probably can't be achieved at all. And slower speed makes everything easier for the interceptor...

verkhoturye51 wrote:

Zircon's range is 1000km+ so no need to use Kinzhal in such case.

I wonder how many imaginary Ticonderogas can imaginary Zircons on Leaders take out right now.

V wrote:

Why would you expect only 1 Kinzhal  flying at first place?

Because that's how many Migs and Sukhois can carry.

Tsavo Lion wrote:Doomed to Fail: Why Russia's Stealth Su-57 Is In Serious Trouble
Is there any truth in this statement?