Since fortunately it's a slow day at work, here's my reply to a comment in my blog, regarding the battle for Krasny Liman, I thought it was worth it translating and posting it here
The trees don't let us see the forest. The last entries in my war journal are all about reporting the fighting on the northern front because it is the most active, and the one with the most interest, but it is only a small part of the overall picture.
Yes, it's a difficult situation. But in the grand scheme of things it doesn't matter that much.
The decisive offensive was to be in Kherson. It's been a bloody failure. To the point that recaps of the month-long fighting are already being published. Yesterday the unjustly reviled Russian aviation was "ironing" with 500 kilo bombs the last Ukro positions at the Andreyevka bridgehead. The Ukrainians have lost the opportunity to force the Ingulets River and launch a maneuvering battle in the steppe to take Kherson.
It is possible that they will still attempt an offensive in Zaporozhe, on the central front, but the reserves accumulated in the south that were ready to react to a rupture in Kherson, are now available to cope with that threat.
The Ukrainian Kharkov offensive was successful due to a gift given to them by the Russians, but it has not led anywhere. The Russian group in Izyum escaped from the encirclement. As it was easy to foresee, given Zelensky's psychology and the imperative need to achieve a victory, at any place, at any cost, given the failure of the offensive in Kherson, driven by inertia, the Ukrainian command tried to cross the Oskol river and advance beyond. Enemy has not succeeded in the two most dangerous directions, Kupyansk and Borovaya (where the bridges were located), in the second he has not even tried. Only by going around the Oskol reservoir from the south did they manage to outflank the position of Krasny Liman, but this is because they failed in all direct assaults against the city. They have reached Redkodub, but they have abandoned the attempt to continue East, to Svatovo and this is a familiar pattern for anybody student of the history of war. When an offensive fails, the initial objectives are lowered and then becomes a question of getting the "consolation prize".
The Oskol offensive so far is a failure. They have not broken the Russian new front at the river, have not managed to penetrate to the rear and encircle the Russian and Novorussian troops in the Seversky Donets, now they only aspire to take the "prestige prize", the city of Krasny Liman. If they have made some tactical advances so far, it is due to the disproportion of forces. The Ukrainians are making their main effort on this front, which is secondary for the Russians. The losses suffered by the Ukrainians, in a terrain that favors defense and the arrival of Russian reinforcements, although in a trickle, are leveling the scales.
Having failed attempts to attack Liman from the East and from the North, yesterday the Ukrainians made an unexpected move by crossing the Seversky Donets at the eastern end by Belogorovka. Well, they have achieved a bridgehead but they have to go through the "green belt", the forest plantation and its flank and rear are exposed to Russian counterattacks that are attacking the ruins of Spornoye, south of the river. It is unlikely that they will be able to fuel the battle and shift the main effort to this bridgehead.
Krasny Liman has become a battle for prestige reasons. The logical thing would be that in a few days, when they are ready, the Russians will go on the offensive from Belgorod, between the two reservoirs, to take in the flank and rear the Ukrainians who are worn out in the battle for Kupyansk - Liman, and the more units they put into the bridgeheads, the worse for them.
The Krasny Liman garrison and the Kupyansk defenders have already fulfilled their purpose, which was to gain time and prevent the Ukrainian Kharkov offensive from going further. I do not know if the Russian command will order a withdrawal to avoid the encirclement, or if to avoid negative repercussions on morale, it will send reinforcements and make counterattacks to maintain the city, for reasons of prestige. From a strict military point of view, Liman and the rivers fronts should be reinforced the longer the resistance lasts, the more losses the enemy will suffer and the more troops it will have committed to the other side of the rivers, leaving it without reserves or forces to face future Russian offensives and without the ability to maneuver, as it it would be difficult to go back across the rivers to face a new threat from another direction. Given the psychology of the "Generalissimo Tshirtov" (Zelensky, for his habit of appearing in a military T-shirt)and the political constraints, the Ukrainian command will cling to its conquests and leave its troops caught in a mousetrap. Even if the hypothetical Russian offensive does not take place behind their backs, the Russians can simply crush the bridgeheads with artillery and gradually wear them out, as they do on the Ingulets river.
The fall or retreat from Krasny Liman would be regrettable... and likely. But returning to the historical comparisons with the Spanish Civil War, our Spanish military colleagues I think would agree that there is a parallel with Belchite. After Brunete, Franco this time did not react to the Republican offensive in Aragón and sacrificed the heroic defenders of Belchite so as not to be distracted from his main goal for 1937, to finish off the Northern Front before the arrival of autumn rains. A sacrifice on a secondary front was accepted in order to achieve a decisive victory for the course of the war.
Last edited by Ispan on Wed Sep 28, 2022 10:22 am; edited 6 times in total