Russian special military operation in Ukraine #50

Another 6 million € leo 2 destroyed by a 100€ drone with a normal rpg7 round. Total destruction of their last leo 2 it seems.

It’s crazy to me how the losses around Avdeevka are still being talked about

Because Ukro losses are only talked about by the Russian side. All western media are silent about them.
While Russian losses (mostly imagined ones) are talked about by the Ukros, all western media and the
5th and 6th columnists inside Russia. Plus the usual doomers.

AWACS is the most important aircraft necessary right now

ATACMS and HIMARS are flying so high that ground based radars can see them from far away.
The most important thing about those interceptions is the usage of long-range missiles with active radars,
either the R-37M or 40N6.

Isos wrote:

Your analysis is wrong.

Between E3 and Global Hawk, NATO maintains nearly 24/7 presence around Crimea and the airspace

The only reason A50u is not patrolling hat long is because there are only 8 of them currently operational

If you spread that to the whole border, it's pathetically low, and a serious problem to the security of the military and civilians

Russia needs more than 20 A100 and drones carrying AFAR radar also

^ The drones are far away now. Saying that the drone flying closer to Italy than Crimea is watching Crimea 24/7 is a bit rich.

Why call it new if it was the S-400? Some sort of network enhancement?

Sounds like they are now using it with AWACS platforms to find the targets.

.and when their wunder-panzers get annilihated by Russian forces, the Murkanz will use this as an excuse why they weren't up to snuff, and will "explain" that if they were full spec then they would have slapped down the Russian mud-hut dwellers. Its predictable and brain-dead nonsense, but that is what desperate liars do when they choose to ignore reality.

Good for Russia though... when they realise they have problems with stuff they might start hiring people to fix the problem instead of the current people who gloss over the problems and pretend they are features...

It is the new long range version (400 km range). Planned weapon but slower getting into production and use.

Likely the biggest thing is actually having the AWACS aircraft there finding targets for it over the horizon to make it work effectively.

They say they shot down the planes at 1,000m altitude which means they were likely well away from the front lines.

They might have been ferrying them into the Ukraine...

The RPG 29v penetrated the better protected Challenger 2 on the thickest part of the armor (lower hull front glacis) on two occasions leading to both drivers having there foot amputated, they had to add extra armor to the lower front hull called Dorchester, and the USA forbade Iraq from buying new stocks of RPG 29Vs

The funny thing is that the RPG-29 is limited to 105mm because of the calibre of the tube... they have had the (disposable) RPG-28 for over 20 years with a 125mm calibre warhead whose penetration is "over" 900mm.

The price of one 155 mm artillery shell increased to 8,000 euros from 2,000 euros before the SVO in Ukraine.

Read an article yesterday on RT about the price of 155mm artillery shells going up 50% from 2000 Euros to 3,600 Euros per shell... but this is even worse... share holders in arms factories will be able to retire soon.

So in order to disable a whole US carrier air wing , you just have to hit the AWACs plane.

Carrier aircraft are not amphibious so just sink the carrier with an Onyx or now Zircon seems to be the preferred method.

No, it's A-50U+ C-400. And targeting using a distributed system, when the target is illuminated by one interceptor, and another launches a missile.
But I would not believe in the figure of 24 downed aircraft. Most likely, at least half of their targets were probably fake imitators. It is unlikely that the UAF now have so much active aviation to lose 24 aircraft in 5 days)

Or refurbished MiGs from the rest of the world were being transferred to Ukrainian dispersed airfields/motorways... being shot down at 1,000m altitude suggests they were being ferried to their forward bases... as opposed to being on missions.

I'm not surprised. During the revolts in Kazakhstan, Russia should have removed Tokayev as well. But they didn't.

Russia is not democratic like the US, who will remove leaders of governments and start civil wars to change leaders they don't like... Russia has a lot to learn about US democracy.... well... actually the world clearly does.

GarryB wrote:

Russia is not democratic like the US, who will remove leaders of governments and start civil wars to change leaders they don't like... Russia has a lot to learn about US democracy.... well... actually the world clearly does.

I used to say the US is a democracy where you get to chose between 2 choices that are about as different as Pepsi and Coke. That was a few years ago. Now its only Pepsi and Diet Pepsi.

There is a US comic called George Carlin or something who said the US is a democracy where you can get hundreds of different flavours of butter but only two choices of political party... you get the illusion of choice...

Watch this from 4 minutes 35 seconds... (well you can watch it all if you want... he is right).



It is called the American dream because you have to be asleep to believe it... a dreamer or a sheep...

Shooting down ATACMS missiles is not difficult. In fact, they are quite similar to Thochka missiles, which were frequently intercepted.

From the Military Summary Channel.
The red lines are roughly the range of the R-37M fired from aircraft way behind the russian frontlines.
The yellow lines mean:


The part in the west is the current "sanctuary" for Ukro planes. But Russia can deploy planes in Belarus and start shooting them
down there anytime.

ALAMO wrote:
the whole structure is not more than some 600+ RHAe equivalent against kinetic ammunition designed to defeat bulging plates type of armor.

That is closer to what the turret might offer, in reality it probably offers no more than 380-400mm RHAE since it is designed around lighter NERA elements in order to be more effective against HEAT warheads. I have also never heard of the hull getting DU armour.

Mir wrote:

To downplay the importance of AWACS and other intelligence and ECM assets is not smart at all. Russia needs to pay attention to increase the number of these assets and that includes satellites.

A country with such a border, and such enemies as Ukraine, Turkey, Finland, Baltics,  potentially Kazakhstan, and even China, Korea, Japan

Cannot have 8 AWACS

This is not just willful negligence, it is downright criminal

All these countries possess long range strike capabilities,

So if MOD wants bang for its buck, believe that AWACS will augment the coverage of PVO, and possibly even solve the task of avoiding friendly fire from SAM to VKS fighters

How the **** are there only 8 of these planes?

It's an outrage

People who say Su35 or Su30 can perform early warning/command post tasks are smoking good

These planes don't have coverage that A100 has, nor do they have AFAR

A100 is a priority

looks like the collective West has pissed into china's tea again and China has responded by banning the export of graphite to western countries which will have a massive effect on there arms industry, America buys 90% of it's graphite from China, it comes into effect on December 1st and it will only be available via permit

Graphite is used to make anodes for lithium ion cell batteries.

As in many aspects of life being seduced by the superficially attractive and then becoming dependent on them often has a downside

Zlatti71
@djuric_zlatko
"Starlink" Curse: Ukrainian Armed Forces Complain of Ongoing Destruction of Communication Nodes by Russian Military.

Along the Line of Contact, the Russian Armed Forces have increasingly targeted high-precision strikes on communication nodes and command posts of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukrainian nationalists point the finger at "Starlink" for all their woes.

Recent reports from the frontline indicate the destruction of their control points, communication nodes, and other assets crucial for joint military operations by the Russian military.

Ukrainian nationalists claim that the blame lies squarely with the generously provided "Starlink" by Elon Musk, as it is the primary medium through which they access the internet.

In a bid to reduce the frequency of shelling, they prefer to minimize the use of SpaceX equipment, as its deployment typically invites a swift retaliation from the Russian Armed Forces, shattering their command posts and control nodes within minutes.

Russian military authorities express gratitude to Elon Musk for such assistance, while the Ukrainians grapple with the dilemma of facing the Russians without adequate communication on the front lines, leaving them with no option but to contemplate surrender.



@RussiaaNews

These big bangs are becoming rarer. With a big dump like that you need to Know exactly where to impact your weapon.

Result of today's arrival at the BC/fuel warehouse in the Khmelnitsky region

The Ukrainian authorities reported today that “everything has been knocked down,” and the footage shows the defeat of an “infrastructural facility” ‍�

Judging by the detonation, the strike was struck exactly at the 47th ammunition storage arsenal near the city of Slavuta, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces store long-range weapons.

It is known that the arsenal was equipped with six protected underground ammunition storage facilities, early detection and anti-drone systems.

Source: Ostashko!

Russia ‘Fuses’ S-400 Missiles With A-50 AWACS To Shoot Down Ukrainian Aircraft At Longest Possible Range

TASS said the S-400 was used in “conjunction” with the A-50 AWACS in the ongoing Special Military Operation (SMO). “During the SVO, Russia used the S-400 Triumph air defense system in tandem with the A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft, which ensured the success of using the system against enemy aviation,” the report quoted the agency’s interlocutor.

“The S-400 air defense system was fired at its maximum range at targets that at the time of destruction were at an altitude of approximately 1,000 meters while new warheads of anti-aircraft guided missiles were used.”

Tactics & Procedures

A reasonable guess can be made about the adopted tactical procedure to effect the initial cueing and firing. The missile fired could be the 40N6E missile with the most extended reach of 400 kilometers. The TASS report claims the S-400 “was fired at its maximum range.” One of the two approaches must be adopted.

The missile is fired in a ‘lock on after launch’ mode. Guidance and targeting data would be received in the ‘mid-course’ phase from the airborne A-50 and stored in the missile’s navigation system. Fusing the terminal stage seeker and the navigation system would do the rest.

The A-50 and the S-400 crews communicate separately, pre-feeding the targeting coordinates in the missile. However, the efficacy and accuracy of this approach can be doubted since pre-installed target data for a moving aircraft would not be relevant since the plane will have changed direction.

This is actually a real gamechanger, 40n6e can be fired dormantly, allowing for terminal active homing in final stage of interception

It makes S400 impenetrable, because you can see low flying targets hundreds of meters from the ground

Lots and lots of dead...........1200

https://t.me/sitreports/16994
Russian Defence Ministry Report on the Progress of the Special Military Operation (25 October 2023)

The RF Armed Forces continue the special military operation.

In Kupyansk direction (https://t.me/mod_russia/31808), units of the Zapad Grouping repelled 15 attacks of assault detachments of the 14th, 32nd, 43rd, 54th, 67th Mechanized, and 101st Territorial Defence Brigades near Timkovka, Sinkovka (Kharkov reg), and Nadiya (LPR).

Up to 145 troop, 2 IFVs, and 2 MVs have been neutralised.

Counterbattery warfare wiped out 1 US M777 howitzer, and 2 Gvozdika SAUs.

Ammunition depots of the 1st Special Operations Brigade were destroyed close to Volchansk and Ogurtsovo (Kharkov reg).

In Krasny Liman direction (https://t.me/mod_russia/31809), units of the Tsentr Grouping repelled 3 assault group attacks of the 15th National Guard Regiment, and the 67th Mechanized Brigade close to Grigorovka (DPR) and Chervonaya Dibrova (LPR).

Strikes were launched at troops and hardware of the 63rd Mechanized Brigade near Torskoye (DPR).

Up to 30 troops, 2 AFVs, and 3 MVs were eliminated.

In Donetsk direction (https://t.me/mod_russia/31810), units the Yug Grouping repelled 5 assault squad attacks of the 24th Mechanized, and 77th Airmobile Brigades close to Kurdyumovka, Andreyevka, Kirovo, and Maloilyinovka (DPR).

Russian units delivered strikes at troops and hardware close to Krasnoye, Andreyevka, Kleshcheyevka, and Bogdanovka (DPR).

The enemy lost more than 500 troops, 1 tank, 3 AFVs, and two pickups.

Counterbattery warfare wiped out 1 US M119 howitzer, and 1 Gvozdika SAU.

In South Donetsk direction (https://t.me/mod_russia/31811), units of the Vostok Grouping inflicted losses on troop clusters of the 72nd Mechanized, 58th Motorized, and 128th Territorial Defence Brigades near Ugledar, Urozhaynoye, and Staromayorskoye (DPR).

The enemy lost up to 160 troops, 1 tank, and 3 pickups.

In Zaporozhye direction (https://t.me/mod_russia/31812), units of the Russian Grouping repelled 5 assault squad attacks of the 82th Mechanized, and 65th Airborne Brigades near Verbovoye and Rabotino (Zaporozhye reg).

Up to 85 troops, 4 tanks, 5 AFVs, and 2 MVs were neutralised.

Counterbattery warfare destroyed 2 US M777, 1 D-20, and 1 US M119 howitzers.

In Kherson direction (https://t.me/mod_russia/31812), strikes were launched at located AFU troop clusters near Alyoshinsky island and the small railway bridge over the Dnieper.

The AFU lost more than 110 troops, 3 MVs, and 1 D-30 howitzer.

Operational-Tactical and Army aviation, UAVs, sile Troops and Artillery engaged AFU troops and hardware in 105 areas.

1 command and observation post of the 15th Ukrainian National Guard Regiment was wiped out near Serebryanka (DPR).

Air defences intercepted 2 MiG-29 aircraft, 1 Su-25 ground attack aircraft, and 1 L-39 combat training aircraft close to Krasnoarmeysk (DPR), Kazachy Lageri (Kherson reg), and Sinelnikovo (Dnepropetrovsk reg).

2 US ATACMS missiles, 1 S-200 Converts, 2 HARM antiradar missiles, and 2 US HIMARS projectiles, were intercepted.

51 UAVs were intercepted close to Zolotaryovka, Nyrkovo, Topolevka (LPR), Novosyolkovka (DPR), Ingenernoye, Mirnoye (Zaporozhye reg), Peschanovka (Kherson reg), Tavolzhanka, and Olshana (Kharkov reg).

In total, 515 aircraft and 253 helicopters, 8,271 UAVs, 441 air defence systems, 12,930 tanks and other AFVs, 1,169 MLRS vehicles, 6,875 guns and mortars, and 14,662 units of special military equipment have been destroyed during the SMO.

This is a very long post as I don't have a link to the original. There are some real gems in it. Well worth the read.

The last autumn of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

What you need to know about the main battle of this war.

Large front-line report on October 17-23, 2023 from journalist Marat Khairullin

The third week of fighting near Avdeevka finally formalized this operation as the main battle of the autumn. And, perhaps, the entire 2023 campaign, which could change the nature of the war.

Probably, success (I don’t even want to think about non-success) will entail serious political consequences. But let political scientists talk about this, and as for the military component, I personally, being directly at the front, inside a combat unit working in the main section of the Avdeevsky direction, am sure that another victory awaits us. It may not be simple.

This confidence comes not only from what I observe with my own eyes, but from elementary statistics. Even Arestovich spoke about this - where Russia was concentrating, inevitable success awaits us: Mariupol, Severedonetsk, Lisichansk, Soledar, Bakhmut.

The campaign near Avdeevka is developing exactly according to these patterns - now the enemy is being encircled along the flanks. With further grinding and destruction of the enemy group in the resulting bag. The only difference is that the fire bag was originally formed here by the Ukrainian Armed Forces itself.

And again, Arestovich’s suddenly working logic is surprising (it turns out that he still has it) - the key to the success of the Russian troops is the stubbornness of the dill, who never retreat anywhere, even if the strategic situation is not in their favor. In other words, even the Ukrainians themselves have realized that they are simply predictable, but they continue to stubbornly eat any number of cactus.

And this, among other things, means that the time factor is on our side - we just need, using our power, to calmly destroy the dill, little by little gnawing away at their deteriorating defenses.

They still won’t be able to come up with anything new - they will stupidly drive manpower to Avdeevka for slaughter and launch counterattacks that are lethal to themselves over and over again. Arithmetic, algebra, higher mathematics and geopolitics are on our side in this battle. And even the weather is on our side here - the Ukrainians need to drag reinforcements along muddy country roads, and our logistics are shorter and do not suffer at all from muddy roads.

Dill entered the Battle of Avdeevka at a minimum: after destroying their reserves in the enchanting counter-attack, they are in the stage of total degradation - everything is bad for them:
•combat readiness - it would be necessary to take a break and accumulate reserves;
•firepower - it would be necessary to stockpile ammunition and maintain equipment participating in the summer campaign;
•moral spirit - we should take a break and catch our breath after a series of failures;
•financial, sorry, ass - end of the year, damn it, we should account for what has already been spent and create new budgets;
• humanitarian catastrophe - the mortality rate of wounded Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in the near rear is a record 50-70 percent (data from our military intelligence). And these are only those who manage to evacuate.

Here we need to make a small digression and focus on this factor.

Three weeks of the Avdiivka battle revealed a completely unexpected problem for the Ukrainian Armed Forces - almost 100 percent mortality of troops on the front line. For example, as a result of last week, my First Slavic Brigade took and secured eight enemy positions. In total, 42 people were killed at these positions - everyone who was directly on them, no one managed to retreat. Plus they put in some money when dill tried to recapture these positions.

The question arises: why such terrible losses? It’s very simple - due to their stubbornness, the dill have formed such a complex line of contact that they have to take very confusing routes to bring soldiers to the front line. Special guides lead soldiers to these positions at night along cunning paths. And when the battle begins, the dill simply do not know where to retreat - this is the secret of their stubbornness. Evaluate the degree of cannibalism of the enemy with whom we are fighting - the Nazis chained their soldiers to machine guns, and the Ukronazis stupidly lead their people into traps and throw them to death. That is why today they have a 100% mortality rate on the direct line of contact.

Here I immediately want to say a few words to the hooting of our stupid or simply corrupt blogger network, regarding the fact that we cannot maintain some positions.

Yes, you have to roll back from some positions - it’s not always possible to gain a foothold in order to save the lives of soldiers. Because we are not dill.

And sometimes a diversionary attack is simply carried out, and, by the way, the people directly in the troops who are going on this diversionary attack do not know about it. They are not told about this, because everything has to look real for the Ukrainians to throw reserves there. And they don’t tell you, stupid bloggers, about this either. Therefore, sometimes it seems that our troops are rolling back, but we are actually diverting serious enemy resources to a secondary direction.

Three weeks of fighting near Avdiivka have already clearly shown that the enemy has no chance of surviving here. Remember, near Bakhmut and Zaporozhye, the dill recorded the mortality rate of their troops at the front from 50 to 70 percent. Avdeevka already shows almost 100 percent - that is, the Russian meat grinder has achieved some unprecedented efficiency here. And it should be noted that this is only the beginning of the operation.

Avdeevka is today the main fortress of the war. I have already described in detail what a heavy fortified area the dill created here. To attack it head-on is real suicide. That is why such systematic destruction is taking place.

In general, as far as I can judge from my experience here, all major operations of our army are multi-layered. That is, on the surface there is only what they want to show us. And there are a lot of surprises hidden under the hood. For example, here’s a small touch that can probably already be mentioned. Throughout the summer months, communicating with the military, especially informally, I was faced with grumbling about military intelligence. This has become such a common place - like they can’t and don’t know anything at all.

Even then I thought why this was being emphasized in front of me, a journalist. But then the operation began, and suddenly it turned out that our military knew literally every meter of the battlefield and far beyond it.

All conversations of the dill are intercepted, and the airspace is very, very tightly controlled - as soon as the enemy bird takes off, we already see it. And this is only part of what can be said. Believe me, when you are inside the process, the awareness of our troops about the real situation on the battlefield is impressive.

Especially when there is something to compare with. For example, how they fought in 2014 or even in 2022, and how it is now. This is not just heaven and earth - these are already structural, deep changes, qualitatively completely different troops.

How many communication channels, for example, were built in the battalion according to directions - this seems to us nonsense, but this is very important. Previously, everyone was on the same channel, but now everyone has their own and is very protected, plus a mandatory reserve. ommunication with the soldiers going on the attack is not just online, the company commander directly controls their actions from his bird. And so on.

Dill is very much behind us in this component - the deep organization of troops. The vaunted NATO, which organized all this for them, simply sticks out in one place. This was clearly shown by their counterattack - not only did we know about their every step, we also simply disrupted all their lines of communication - the troops that they threw into meat assaults over and over again found themselves without communication at the entrance. Their company birds did not correct the actions of their infantrymen - ours did not allow it.

And, by the way, it was precisely this component that NATO strategists considered their advantage - awareness of the situation on the battlefield. But it turned out that we had overplayed our hand with our washing machine chips. And that is why, time after time, dill slams our passages. For example, we knew very well about the counterattack, but they missed the start of the Avdeevka operation.

Let me emphasize once again - this is only what is accessible to me, an absolute amateur, with a superficial glance. It’s scary to even think about what’s hiding in the depths. Or rather, I am very pleased to think about it, but dill is very scared.

And when I write that I am confident in the success of the Avdeevka operation, my confidence is based on such observations, I emphasize, in dynamics - I see the constant progress of our army from the beginning of the Northern Military District to this day.

Of course, anything can happen in war, but even with the naked eye it is clear that everything created by our Defense Ministry is a powerful system that relies on the resources of our great country. And the less systematic Armed Forces of Ukraine, relying on the degrading resources of NATO, are fighting against us.

And therefore, with a very high degree of probability, we can judge that this is the last autumn of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as an organized structure.

This, by the way, is confirmed by the statistics that are summarized daily by the guys from Interception Z. I recommend it because it is very clear. On other days, the losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in October exceed 1,000 people.

In general, three directions have been identified where the intensity of fighting is higher than normal - Kupyanskoye, Krasnolimanskoye and now Donetsk. Ours are actively putting pressure on the enemy in three out of five main directions. That is, a total war really begins on most sectors of the front. And there is no doubt that this is just the beginning - in this regime, judging by what I see here, ours can fight for months.

If we talk about specifics in the Avdeevsky direction, then ours were entrenched in the Stepovoye area. We finally cleared the waste heap and secured a foothold in the area.

On the southern front they have secured a foothold on the approaches to the Northern one, and now work begins directly in the direction of Avdeevka.

I’ll tell you more about this during the week. As well as about the situation in other areas. That's all for today, as they say at the front - we don't say goodbye!