Russian made Scopes and Optics

Morpheus Eberhardt wrote:

magnumcromagnon wrote:

Morpheus Eberhardt wrote:

magnumcromagnon wrote:

Asf wrote:
And here

Wow, it has a ridiculous amount of capabilities...but unfortunately it'll probably cost at least $10,000 a piece even with the devalued Rouble. However if mass produced then the cost could go down by 2/3rds...but the real question remains, would the Ru ground forces want something like this?

What does the Rouble rate have to do with its price?

The cost of labor of manufacturing.

To what extent the Russian labor rates follow the Rouble rate?

magnumcromagnon wrote:
Usually a highly valued currency makes the cost of paying for a manual laborer a lot more expensive, while a lowered valued currency makes manufacturing significantly cheaper. Hence the reason why Su-27, it's variants and derivatives are highly competitive on the export market. If the Su-35 was built in Europe or America, it would cost well over a $100 million like most overly priced NATO equipment, thankfully it's not. In fact if Russian export fighter jets are so highly competitive that if arms deals weren't so politically motivated, and everything was on a level playing field, the Su-27 variants would beat out any fighter from the West in arms competitions, easily by sheer cost-effectiveness alone.

Asf wrote:

And here

Viktor wrote:Check this out

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08mq8clzHJY

Viktor wrote:Check this out

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08mq8clzHJY

flamming_python wrote:

AlfaT8 wrote:The only thing that still worries me is how Russia intends to prevent the personnel IFF from being compromised??

If someone captures and studies this sight system - then they would know how to decrypt Russian IFF signals - but they wouldn't know how to encrypt/create them.

This is called asymmetric cryptography.
In such a system; one key is kept private, while the other is public.

Now imagine - that you have a block of data - say 10 megabytes big. Both parties (that's to say both the weapon sight, and whatever device emits the friendly IFF signal) have this same identical block of data in their respective storage space.

The friendly IFF device creates a digital signature on the basis of that block of data, using the private key - and then transmits that signature..

..which the sight promptly picks up, and then uses its public key to process that signature and compare the result with the copy of that block of data it has. If the result is as expected - then the system knows that's its a friendly that the signal came from.

Now.. let's say that the enemy kills a soldier and captures his gun & sight, sending it to their research labs. What will the enemy have now? They will have the public key - and they will have that 10Mb block of data.
Which means that they will be able to interpret Russian IFF signals; so that 'friendly' Russians will show up as blue to them instead of red.
But what good will that do them? They already know who the enemy is and how he looks like - and if they bothered researching the Russian IFF receivers/sights then they probably have an IFF system of their own that would already perform the function of telling them who the bad guys are; so Russian IFF receivers would be useless for them.

Now, I say this - but there is a flaw to this system. Which is of course - that in the same way as you have IFF receivers such as those sights; you must also have IFF transmitters that would be able to broadcast whether the soldier/vehicle in question is a friendly or not in the first place.
And if the enemy captures THAT, then the system will be compromised altogether.

Which is why I suspect that in practice, if they do use assymetric cryptography - they would change either the keys in both the receivers & transmitters, or the common block of data stored in both on them - on a fairly regular basis. All it would take is a quick firmware update of both sets of devices, after verification with some command vehicles, officers or what not. Perhaps they might be issued keys for manual input, or physically via memory cards; as having this stuff update automatically would mean that any gear the enemy captured will update automatically too.
But of course there could be problems associated with this - what if some soldiers are stranded, surrounded, their satellite uplinks or comms are destroyed, etc...?

There could also be measures taken to protect the transmitters of IFF signals; so instead of every soldier having a transmitter lets say - they might have a relay device, that reroutes/retransmits an IFF signal coming from some command vehicle in such a way so that it appears that the signal is coming from them - and such a device would only function at all within a certain radius of the command vehicle.
But there are problems with this approach too, as you might imagine.

I haven't had much time to think about this - but it's an exciting topic you must agree. There are many possibilities and it'd be interesting to see what the Russian military might go for - if they decide to go for an IFF system at all (IMO, it might just be more trouble than it's worth).

The only thing that still worries me is how Russia intends to prevent the personnel IFF from being compromised??

I wish they made a video using real-world footage instead of just going with full CGI.

I haven't had much time to think about this - but it's an exciting topic you must agree. There are many possibilities and it'd be interesting to see what the Russian military might go for - if they decide to go for an IFF system at all (IMO, it might just be more trouble than it's worth).

and also a Self-destruct order either from the soldier himself/his nearby officer or even a Self-destruct signal from there local command( the nuclear option),

Now these are some things that can be done on the battlefield, but what i am worried about is sum bastard sneaking into the facility and straight up stealing one, i guess the timed self destruct would take care of it unless they can replicate the "don't self-destruct" signal, maybe a glonass signal could also be used, lets say the module has left Russia's borders it detonates, it'll also detonate if it doesn't get the Glonass signal/positioning.

Like I said, all that's necessary to remove the risk from a compromised system is to change the codes, or change the data which the codes are being authenticated on. Doing either is a trivial matter with modern technology - you just establish an uplink to whatever satellite/command vehicle or whatever has this week's codes - and update; or alternatively take the memory card, put it into that sights' memory card slot and wait for it to update, then passing it along to the next soldier in your squad until the last man updates - at which point he destroys it.

Monitoring soldier vital signs could figure into such a system; in that as soon as a soldier's vitals drop to zero - or the sensors are disabled, taken off or damaged - the gear is automatically locked out of the grid so to speak, and won't auto-update anymore until manually reset at a command vehicle or some such.

As a grunt I would use fricking wristbands like today, but I would hope that they are barelly(but still) vissible in thermal

They might as well add an air-burst grenade capability and put it the next Call of Duty.