Russian special military operation in Ukraine #58

Secondly, test flights from Romania in the direction of Odesa region have already been made and more than once. F-16s flew over Tulcea, flew to Vylkove and made several circles over Snake Island.

Thirdly, the fighters will be safer on the territory of NATO countries.

A strike on Alliance airfields would lead to total escalation, which is why it was officially announced that NATO infrastructure would be used by fighter jets to strike Russia.

Let Romania cry for Article 5 like the pussies they are.

If all else fails, Russia may use tactical nukes high over unpopulated areas of Ukraine to clear the sky of enemy fighters- no need to strike airbases in Poland & Romania.

While NATzO trash talks about war on Russia it is sending its last AD systems to the Kiev regime. Does not look to me like these clowns
are expecting a Russian attack. If they were, then they would be giving the Kiev regime nothing. There are no replacements in ample
quantity.

"A very short and very succinct analysis of what is happening at the front . I have written many times that movement is the only panacea for excessive positional losses under drones. But there is an important nuance here that eludes “Junker” (https://web.telegram.org/a/#-1002138767726).

In 2023, the enemy tested in certain sectors of the front a global digital target analysis and combat control system ( ATCS ), which is capable of simultaneously observing the entire front and in real time redistributing firepower efforts to the required areas.

In 2024, this system became fully operational during our offensive operation in Kharkov , which, together with other efforts, made it possible to quickly break down the offensive impulse.

Further more. This system has its own “NATO” military language, unified with all means of reconnaissance and destruction of the alliance. Now all units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are studying it, abandoning the military “surzhik” “Nettle”.

When this system is fully deployed , the flexibility of the enemy's defense will increase significantly .

What is the weakness of each section of the front separately? In the limited means of destruction, reconnaissance and the narrowness of the commander’s capabilities. At the point of interaction between different combat units , a significant part of the effectiveness of command and control is lost.

Now imagine that the center for making all defensive decisions, together with the reconnaissance complex, is moved beyond the competence of individual commanders, and each of them knows every second not only the combat situation in himself and his neighbors, but also receives precise instructions about the types and intensity of fire impact on the enemy.

The effectiveness of such defense increases significantly due to the elimination of “friction” and “subjectivity” of individual commanders. This is the kind of defense that you will have to deal with when trying to break into operational space.

The only available panacea for such automated control systems is the destruction of communication means for the base terminals through which control occurs . In our case, this is Starlink satellite Internet and Ukrainian cellular communications. To overcome a section of the front equipped with an automated control system, it is necessary to completely shut down the operation of satellite communication terminals and destroy cellular communication towers.

ЖИВОВZ
Two Majors | https://web.telegram.org/a/#-1001861575578

Lapain wrote:
"
If what described here is true, then it is a headache for Russian strategy of movement inside 404 and could extend the conflict far beyond 2026, perhaps into unsustainable grounds. Perhaps the best way of retaliation in due course would be a coordinated and crippling strike against NATO's LEO constellation, specifically Starlink. Would European populations rush towards WW3 for some billionaire's assets getting blown up by S-500? I kinda doubt it.

Lapain wrote:A very interesting comment from Two Majors TG in response to Junker channel which advocated for further mobilization in order to capitalize on advances and breakthroughs.

Now imagine that the center for making all defensive decisions, together with the reconnaissance complex, is moved beyond the competence of individual commanders, and each of them knows every second not only the combat situation in himself and his neighbors, but also receives precise instructions about the types and intensity of fire impact on the enemy.

The effectiveness of such defense increases significantly due to the elimination of “friction” and “subjectivity” of individual commanders. This is the kind of defense that you will have to deal with when trying to break into operational space.

The only available panacea for such automated control systems is the destruction of communication means for the base terminals through which control occurs . In our case, this is Starlink satellite Internet and Ukrainian cellular communications. To overcome a section of the front equipped with an automated control system, it is necessary to completely shut down the operation of satellite communication terminals and destroy cellular communication towers.

"


If what described here is true, then it is a headache for Russian strategy of movement inside 404 and could extend the conflict far beyond 2026,

Lapain wrote:

No amount of Nudol will be enough to take down the whole system.
Also not just Europe, as Starlink is worldwide, taking down European part is likely cause disruption in other part of the world too.  and those outside might not be happy too.

PhSt wrote: if these systems can play such a decisive role in warfare,

Lapain wrote:If what described here is true...

Scorpius wrote:
This is not how orbital mechanics works. Thousands of satellites, right? Have you heard about the Kessler effect? Is a large array of dominoes resistant to external influences?

In addition, a satellite constellation used in an armed conflict does not require the disabling of thousands of satellites - the main purpose is the mission control center and the satellite production site. Also add launch pads to the list. This is a maximum of dozens of targets, not thousands.

Just stop pushing the logic of armed conflict into idiotic fictional frameworks.

Kiko wrote:Well, we'll see to that on an ex-post basis, if the F-16s for Kyiv based in Romania and Poland are of a defensive nature or not.
Let NATO proceed with the starting initiative whether to attack Russia inside its territory or not.
If they do, then Russia should defend itself by strikes on Romanian and Polish F-16 warehouses and airfields, and there will be no justification for invoking NATO's Article 5:

Rodion_Romanovic wrote:

franco wrote:Close but no cigar...

Russian MoD reports 1990 Ukrainian casualties in the past 24 hours.  

This includes also "code 300" aka wounded soldiers or only "code 200", i.e. irretrievable losses?