MGIMO expert: “The situation in Georgia and Armenia is not just geopolitics”, 09.26.2024.
Leading research fellow at the MGIMO Institute of International Relations and editor-in-chief of the journal International Analytics Sergei Markedonov explained in an interview with RBC what the rhetoric of the Georgian and Armenian authorities means and what the strategy of Russia and the West is in the South Caucasus.
Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, appealed to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to restore Georgia's integrity through mutual forgiveness. "All our steps are aimed at helping our people so that one day we, together with our children, can live together in a happy, united and developed Georgia. On this side of the occupation line, we will always welcome you with an open heart. We must restore all the destroyed bridges in our country," he said (quoted by the Georgian Channel One). This is not the first time that the Georgian leadership has called on Sukhumi and Tskhinvali to reconcile - the honorary chairman of the ruling Georgian Dream and its founder Bidzina Ivanishvili said the same at a pre-election rally in Gori.
RBC discussed how the situation in the South Caucasus is changing with Sergei Markedonov, leading research fellow at the MGIMO Institute of International Studies and editor-in-chief of the journal International Analytics.
Ivanishvili recently stated that the main goal of his party is to restore relations with South Ossetia, "to return not only territories," but "our Ossetian brothers and sisters." He also said that the 2008 war was provoked from outside by the hands of Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement and that after the elections Georgia will face its own Nuremberg Trials, which will become a prerequisite for reconciliation between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, after which Georgia will be ready to apologize to South Ossetia. But, as far as I understand, Georgian Dream is not talking about recognizing the republic's independence.
There is a political consensus in Georgia on the issue of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Even marginal Eurosceptics who advocate neutrality and are against NATO membership say that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are parts of Georgia.
Now about Ivanishvili's words. The pre-election statements of politicians should be divided by at least 50. Will Ivanishvili be ready to apologize and are his voters ready for this, not to mention the opposition? Our politicians often buy into the statements of top officials. But the country is not only the top official. In Georgia, among the supporters of the "Georgian Dream" there are many who advocate for the country to join NATO and the EU. Have you noticed that the West does not criticize Ivanishvili much? He talks about individual excesses, about the West making decisions that are not fully thought out. So I would definitely not perceive Ivanishvili's statements as pro-Russian.
Here is an important point: the situation in Georgia and Armenia is not only geopolitics, Pashinyan or Ivanishvili. It is Uncle Rafik, Uncle Dato, Aunt Sofiko and Aunt Granush. Unfortunately, they are often not seen from Moscow. And in vain. So the situation in Georgia is far from clear-cut.
Of course, normalization of relations with Georgia is necessary. Georgia is the center of the Caucasus. It is no coincidence that in Soviet times the headquarters of the Transcaucasian Military District was in Tbilisi, and in imperial times the Russian governor was in Tiflis. But we must first of all think about our interests and conduct a dialogue with Georgia so that they understand Russia's red lines and that friendship with the West has not helped them much so far. Russia's task in the Caucasus is to pursue a policy so that there is no shooting in our near abroad. And it is desirable that the peace that is ensured there has a Russian residence permit, because any peace has an author. This presupposes certain compromises and concessions.
The Georgian Dream uses rhetoric that is in tune with Russia — the same Ivanishvili talks about protecting family values and Orthodoxy. The parliament under its control adopts laws similar to Russian ones — on foreign agents , on the ban on LGBT . Moreover, Tbilisi does not criticize Moscow as fiercely as before, and Russia makes statements in defense of the Dream’s initiatives and criticizes the West when it imposes sanctions against Georgia. All this taken together looks like an argument in favor of the pro-Russian nature of the Georgian authorities.
As for the lack of criticism of Moscow, you are wrong. Look at the statements of the Georgian Foreign Ministry on the occasion of the anniversary of the five-day war , where it is said that Russia is occupying and developing territories without Georgia's consent, and so on. This is not the focus of attention, which does not mean that it does not exist.
Regarding the law on foreign agents. Why are we repeating the theses of Western propaganda that this is a Russian law? Who said that foreign agents are exclusively Russian know-how? Such a document exists in the States, in Australia, for example. The problem is that in Russia, foreign agency has become widely interpreted and has moved to broad law enforcement practice. But in many countries, indicating the source of funding is the norm. Secondly, why do we think that the law on foreign agents is beneficial to Russia? It was adopted primarily so that Ivanishvili could retain power. He understands that he has been in power for quite a long time, for 12 years already. It is clear that in the event of a defeat in the elections, not only Ivanishvili, but also the establishment of the Georgian Dream will face criminal prosecution, as was the case with Saakashvili's team when it lost to the "dreamers". You don't have to be Cassandra to understand what the consequences will be in the event of revenge. Therefore, now it is important for the Georgian Dream to take a constitutional majority, elect a government, a prime minister, and then elect “its” president in order to achieve homogenization of power, and for this it will use all available means.
The problem is that we are trying to explain all processes in the binary format of "West - Russia". But Moldova, Georgia and Armenia have their own specifics, which often cannot be reduced to this structure. Russia and the West are simply playing out this situation for themselves. There are many parties in Georgia, but in fact there is a struggle between two forces - the collective Ivanishvili and the collective Saakashvili. If the West had not assessed the "Georgian Dream" as a hand of Moscow, it could have reached a pragmatic format of relations, which it has with Azerbaijan, and everything would have been wonderful. But the West decided to "show character", now objectively it is advantageous for Russia...
Regarding conservatism. Please tell me, which EU country has a conservative approach to both LGBT and abortion? The answer is Poland. It is clearly not a pro-Russian country. Let's look at the Trumpists in the US, what an off-the-charts level of conspiracy theories there is - but does that make the rednecks who vote for Trump our allies? It doesn't all boil down to a simplified two-color picture. The fact that they don't like LGBT there doesn't make them supporters of Russian approaches.
How do you assess the chances of the Georgian Dream to gain a majority in parliament? How predictable is the outcome of these elections?
Elections in Georgia have a certain variability. Now the key task for the ruling party is to take a constitutional majority. There are problems with this — they are simply tired of the Georgian Dream. When Ivanishvili came to power, there was the same tiredness of Saakashvili. The question is how third parties that are not connected with either Ivanishvili or Saakashvili will perform in these elections. If they gain enough votes, they will be able to enter into an alliance with the United National Movement and not allow the Georgian Dream to turn around.
We can accurately predict that, whatever the outcome, Georgia will see mass protests – partly internal, partly external. There have been many of them in the last two years, and rallies took place after the elections four years ago. The question is whether the internal protest will be enough for the external one to help it – if the internal protest is weak, its external support is unlikely to play a decisive role.
What does the recent aggravation between Russia and Abkhazia mean — how critical is it? And what is the fundamental difference in relations between Russia and Abkhazia and Russia and South Ossetia?
Problems in relations with Abkhazia have arisen before — let's recall at least the elections of 2004-2005. This is not something that happens for the first time, and the current scale is smaller than the previous one. Where is it more difficult? Probably, with Abkhazia it is more difficult in the sense that South Ossetia is, after all, an entity that aims to unite with North Ossetia under the auspices of Russia. Abkhazia strives to build its own statehood and is doing so with an obvious deficit of resources, its own capabilities and limited external legitimization. The Abkhazians strive precisely for independence. Yes, with Russian security guarantees, economic support. The problem is that these intentions of independent statehood are not complemented by economic and social opportunities. Plus, Abkhazia is a republic that has experienced a very serious demographic crisis. The consequences of the 1992-1993 war were that approximately 3% of the Abkhazian population died.
Abkhazia perceives any external pressure, external assistance with caution. They are afraid, for example, that Russians will come to them, buy everything up and they will be in the minority. These fears do not take into account the fact that in the conditions of limited international recognition for Abkhazia, Russia is, by and large, the only channel of globalization. That is, without Russian investments, educational programs, without interaction in the sphere of law enforcement, it is impossible to move forward.
The same law on apartments - Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania proposes not to transfer land to private ownership, but to lease it out for a long time, so that people with money come to Abkhazia and the republic moves from a protracted post-conflict transit to development. Moscow sometimes wants to speed up this process. And there, many people, especially behind the scenes, will say: "We are already supporting Abkhazia, helping, why are they showing off, roughly speaking." But we must understand the peculiarity of their history. Here, tact and accuracy are extremely important. Russian business projects should be promoted so that Abkhazian representatives feel part of them and can also benefit. Yes, this will take time, it is difficult, but there are big stakes at stake.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan periodically makes accusations against the CSTO — and each time they sound harsher. The other day, he said that the organization poses threats to the security, existence, and sovereignty of Armenia. Yerevan has frozen its participation in the CSTO, but has not withdrawn from the organization. In your opinion, what goals does Pashinyan pursue with these statements? Why does Armenia not leave the CSTO if the organization threatens it? Will it eventually leave the CSTO and, if so, when?
Here we should start with the characteristics of Nikol Pashinyan as a politician. Today, we hear a lot about him being a pro-Western figure, and the 2018 “velvet revolution” [as a result of which Pashinyan came to power] was originally conceived in this capacity. I think that this assessment requires some adjustment. Indeed, against the backdrop of Armenian politics, Pashinyan stood out even before 2018 with his extravagant statements about the need for closer ties with the West. But let’s not forget that, having become prime minister, he did a lot to correct this image. He often visited Russia, made many complimentary statements about it, about President Vladimir Putin, and even called the 2018 revolution velvet, not color, drawing a strict dividing line: color — in favor of the West, velvet — in favor of internal transformations and democratization in Armenia.
Then, in 2020, the second Karabakh war happened, and in 2023, the third. And here it is important to record the thesis that Armenia and Russia have an asymmetrical perception of the situation. Moscow balanced between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, pursuing a line on a mutually beneficial settlement of their conflict. Yerevan perceived cooperation with Moscow as a reliable barrier against any intentions of Azerbaijan and Turkey. At the same time, public perception in Armenia differs significantly from the political one: the Armenian leadership understood perfectly well that compromises had to be made, especially when it came to territorial concessions, but public opinion has entrenched that Russia is the guarantor that Armenia's maximalist geopolitical demands will last forever. In short, "Artsakh is ours, period." When 2020 and 2023 happened, public negativity towards Russia intensified.
And here we return to Pashinyan’s political portrait: he is a populist politician, whose tactical considerations outpace strategic ones. He declared the CSTO as a threat on the anniversary of the third Karabakh war, after which the entire Armenian population left Karabakh, which in Armenia is perceived not only as a military defeat, but also as a national trauma.
September marks another anniversary: in 2022, a sharp escalation occurred not in Karabakh, but on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan beyond its borders, when the Armenian resort town of Jermuk came under fire. The CSTO's reaction to these events has become an important tool for shifting attention. At the same time, it is not only Pashinyan's team that speaks of disappointment in the CSTO and Russia: the first Prime Minister of independent Armenia, its Minister of Defense during the victorious first Karabakh war for Yerevan, Vazgen Manukyan, who after 2020 tried to become the leader of the united Armenian opposition, said that Moscow did not behave in the best way. These sentiments exist in Armenia, and Pashinyan is promoting them in a certain way, although he could minimize them. But he is trying to "be one of our guys" instead of complex and unpleasant explanations with his fellow citizens. In the second case, he would have to justify his mistakes, but the prime minister clearly does not want this.
Why does Armenia not leave the CSTO? Because symbolically, the CSTO is in many ways equal to Russia. Leaving the organization can be perceived as an unambiguous negative towards Moscow, and Pashinyan is not ready for a complete break with it. At the same time, he is turning to the West - we see regular contacts with France, increasing contacts with NATO and the United States.
Against this background, how strong is the cooperation between Armenia and the European Union and the United States? And what is the West’s interest in Armenia?
These contacts exist, but so far neither the United States nor the European Union have provided any security guarantees to Armenia. Yes, France has supplied some equipment. And I would like to ask, if there is some aggravation from the Azerbaijani side or, say, from the Turkish side, how will France or the United States help Armenia? The United States and France are very sad about Armenia, they talk about how bad Russia is, but they do not offer any security guarantees. Russian guarantees, although not what they were before 2020, are there in the form of the same border guards (although their presence is decreasing right before our eyes) and the military base in Gyumri. When some Armenian observers say that Russia is doing nothing in Armenia, I would like to ask why they think that without the Russian presence the situation would be limited to Karabakh, and not, in fact, to Armenian territories.
This is an open question in fact. And here we have a situation where, if we play for an escalation with Russia, a certain hour "X" may arise when the situation in the Caucasus will not be in Armenia's favor and Russia will do nothing at all. Then there will be hope for the West, but this West, in fact, is neither in the economy nor in security.
However, the US is sending its military advisers and conducting joint exercises with Armenia...
Let me remind you that Georgian military personnel have been trained under the American Train-and-equip program since 2002. Did it help much in 2008? The Americans trained all sorts of military personnel. Let's remember Afghanistan…
Before the special operation began in 2022, the United States, the European Union and France calmly accepted the fact that Russia was the exclusive moderator in the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement. Not because they loved it more then and love it less now, but for pragmatic reasons: let Russia take responsibility for the disengagement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It requires compromises that could provoke discontent with Moscow in both Yerevan and Baku. If before 2022 it was accepted that Moscow and the West cooperated on some issues, competed on others, and even were at odds with others, then after that everything became much more categorical. Russia is sensitive to any Western presence in the Caucasus, even an ineffective one. For example, the EU observation mission in Armenia - did it prevent anything, did it give any unambiguous assessment of the shootings on the border? No. But there is a European flag in Armenia, and Moscow finds this dangerous.
The West's interest in the Caucasus is to show that Russia is a dying breed there, that it has already played out its role by getting stuck in Ukraine. At the same time, we do not see any real help for Armenia - three tanks or three symbolic programs do not change the situation. Some time ago, Pashinyan had a meeting with Ursula von der Leyen and Anthony Blinken, many words were said there, but no serious sums or large projects were proposed.
Around the same time that Pashinyan called the CSTO a threat, the Armenian Investigative Committee reported that a coup had been prevented in the country and that those who could have been involved in it were trained in Russia. How significant are these reports given the current state of Russian-Armenian relations? And is Russia interested in a change of power in Armenia?
Let's start with the fact that in 2018, Russia did not say anything critical after the "velvet revolution" took place in Armenia. Moscow said then that it was Armenia's internal affair. In 2021, after the second Karabakh war, early parliamentary elections were held in Armenia. The first of the leaders of the Minsk Group co-chairs to congratulate Pashinyan on his re-election was the Russian president. Moscow perceived Pashinyan as a leader who signed a series of trilateral statements on the settlement and took responsibility for it. But the situation changed, and with the escalation in September 2022, Pashinyan began to rely on reorientation - primarily towards the West.
As a Russian, I have a thousand questions for Russia, not everything can and should be discussed today. But Russia is the country that in the current conditions can give Armenia at least a minimum, while the West cannot give anything. At the same time, I will make a reservation: I understand the feelings of ordinary Armenians, their certain disappointment. They had the idea that Russia would always help out, and it somehow helped out, from their point of view, not very much. But politics, if we talk about the strategic perspective, is not done on emotions.
There is talk in Armenia about the possibility of joining the European Union. To what extent does the idea of European integration enjoy public support?
In 2015, there was the so-called “Electro Maidan” (mass protests against rising electricity tariffs) in Armenia — then a well-known Armenian public and political figure Paruyr Hayrikyan came to the rally with the EU flag. He was simply asked to leave the rally. Now the situation has changed a lot. There are certain thoughts and sentiments in favor of European integration, but I cannot say that this idea enjoys overwhelming support. I will say it more carefully, I cannot yet. Many countries that were enthusiasts of the European agenda have not achieved great results. Look at Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia.
They are candidates now.
Excellent. How long will they be candidates? And even if they become members, will they achieve prosperity on the level of Germany and France? The European Union is not a social security agency. It is a rather strict structure with its quotas, rules, high level of regulation, certain value approaches and agendas.
Does membership in the European Union solve Armenia's security problems? Unlikely. Even if Armenia declares that the idea of a referendum or an initiative for rapprochement will gain a majority, this does not mean that the European Union will immediately accept Armenia. This is a two-way process.
How would you characterize Russia’s position and its strategy in the South Caucasus?
Russia's relations with various countries of the Caucasus have always been changeable — in the 1990s, the biggest problems were with Azerbaijan, but since 2001, relations have begun to level out; at that time, relations with Georgia began to deteriorate. Now we see certain prerequisites for normalization in this direction as well.
In the case of Armenia, there are several factors at work. First, the asymmetry of perception, which I have already mentioned. Second, with the start of the NWO, the role of Turkey and Azerbaijan in Russia's foreign policy has grown in terms of access to the outside world, the creation of infrastructure hubs, and the minimization of pressure from the West. Five to ten years ago, the positions of Baku and Ankara were not taken so seriously, but today they have become important parts of this equation.
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/26/09/2024/66edafbf9a7947f67ad01b88
Home
Latest images
Register
Log in
flamming_python
