China's Military and Geopolitics

China Reveals New Proposal to Boost Defense Ties With ASEAN

On October 16, China hosted ASEAN defense ministers for the first-ever informal meeting of this kind in Beijing.

The holding of the inaugural ASEAN-China Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting (ACDMIM) is itself an achievement for China and ASEAN.

For China, it is the realization of a proposal it has been floating for years to boost defense ties with Southeast Asian states (See: “China to Hold First Meeting with ASEAN Defense Ministers in Beijing”).

For ASEAN, it is another step in the deepening of the regional grouping’s security relations with major powers. Despite the singular focus on China, a point often missed amidst sensationalist headlines is that this comes after the holding of similar ‘first’ defense ministerials with the United States and Japan in 2014. The timing and sequence of these events is not insignificant.

But beyond this general significance, what did China aim to achieve at this inaugural meeting? Close observers of ASEAN-China relations know that China is fond of making proposals in numerical terms – with the “2 + 7 cooperation framework” in 2013 and the “ten point proposal” in 2015 being just two recent examples of this (See: “Beijing Unveils New Strategy for ASEAN-China Relations”).

Things were no different at the first ACDMIM. Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan, who chaired the meeting, put forth a “five point proposal” for boosting security and defense cooperation between China and ASEAN. The first two points essentially lay out the link between defense cooperation and the broader ASEAN-China strategic partnership as well as the Asian Security outlook respectively. The first point is fairly boilerplate – Beijing is fond of emphasizing that security ties are just one part of the overall ASEAN-China relationship.

The second point, though, is notable. In referencing the Asian Security Outlook, which was a product of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA), Chan was emphasizing China’s vision for a new security concept and related institutions to replace the U.S. alliance system, with Asians solving their own problems (or ‘Asia for Asians’). To be sure, few doubted that this was part of China’s objective – ACDMIM itself, after all, was held back-to-back with the Xiangshan Forum which is another China-led institution. But the inclusion of it in the five-point proposal, and the suggestion that it “should be honored,” will only add to the suspicion in some quarters about China’s designs in the region.

The remaining three points are relatively more operational. They call for the boosting of defense ties through the continued building of security mechanisms – including ACDMIM and others like the ASEAN Regional Forum; the deepening of cooperation in functional areas ranging from humanitarian operations and military medicine science to anti-piracy and anti-terrorism; and the management of disputes including through the holding of new joint drills.

The third point is not without consequence, since it situates ACDMIM within the context of an evolving regional security architecture which is being shaped in a competitive environment with ASEAN seeking to preserve its prized centrality. It also clearly lays out China’s vision for how the building of this architecture should proceed: “with openness, inclusiveness, transparency and equality.”

But among these, the fifth one has garnered the most attention. That is no surprise, since China has proposed the holding of both a joint drill involving the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) as well as another one involving maritime search and rescue and disaster relief in the South China Sea. Yet as I pointed out in a separate piece for The Diplomat, these proposals are not as revolutionary as they seem (See: “The Truth About China’s New South China Drill Proposal With ASEAN”). In particular, the South China Sea joint exercise – while intended to seem like a conciliatory gesture to calm tensions – is quite limited in scope and will not be without its challenges if it is pursued alongside China’s illegal artificial-island building and militarization campaign. As I note in the piece, a Philippine senior naval commander told Reuters rather cheekily that Manila welcomed the proposal as it offered an opportunity to verify if China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea truly had no military purpose.

Of course, as with other Chinese proposals in the past like the “2 + 7 cooperation framework” and the “ten point proposal,” some of these initiatives will move forward with varying speeds while others may eventually not progress at all. But with the inaugural ACDMIM, China has clearly laid out its parameters for the advancement of defense ties with ASEAN.

Out of Africa: Will China's Military Displace the US on the Continent?

China is apparently set to open its first military base in Africa. The move has already thrilled the US media, which was quick to suppose that it is aimed at “edging out Western influence in the region and securing access to the continent’s vast mineral resources for itself.”

Beijing has signed a ten-year leasing agreement with Djibouti to build a logistical hub in the East African nation, located in the Horn of Africa, according to a report of the US political newspaper The Hill.

“They are going to build a base in Djibouti, so that will be their first military location in Africa," it quotes US Army Gen. David Rodriguez, commander of US Africa Command, as recently telling defense reporters.

The base, he further suggested, would serve as a logistics hub for China to be able to "extend their reach."

“Setting up a military base in Africa makes perfect sense given China’s vast economic presence in the region,” the outlet further quotes J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, as saying. “The base would be cheaper than China’s current, temporary arrangements that allow for docking ships at Djibouti ports to conduct naval patrols.”

“The base also gives China an airfield that could significantly improve its intelligence gathering capabilities over the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Eastern Libya and well into Central Africa.”

However, the newspaper was quick to suggest that “the move into Africa represents a challenge to the dominance of the US, which has its own military base in Djibouti, at Camp Lemonnier, from which it conducts intelligence, counter-piracy and counterterrorism operations.”

Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.), a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, said that “the US has to be vigilant in the face of China’s growing ambitions,” the article notes.

The idea is echoed by The National Interest magazine, which, in turn, supposed that “the Chinese public relations offensive combined with its new base means that Beijing is in Africa for the long haul. Going forward in the years to come, Beijing could edge out Western influence in the region and secure access to the continent’s vast mineral resources for itself.”

The magazine explained that “China has somewhat of an advantage in competing for business in Africa because it does not have any intention or desire to impose its values on the locals or their governments.”

“As such Chinese investments don’t come with any strings attached in terms of human rights or governance.”

Djibouti is a small country in East Africa, across from Yemen and on the Gulf of Aden, with a population of a little over 872,000, according to the World Bank estimates. The vast majority of the population (94%) is Muslim; about 6 percent are Christian.

Djibouti is strategically located near the world's busiest shipping lanes, controlling access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

The country is a home to the US Camp Lemonnier base, which houses 4,500 American military personnel and is the only US military base in Africa.

Camp Lemonnier, according to its website, is a “Navy-led establishment that supports and prepares ships, aircraft and other deployments for regional and combatant command requirements. It also enables US military operations in the surrounding Horn of Africa while fostering positive US-African Nation relations."

It is also a major operational center for drone operations in Yemen and Somalia and one of America’s key intelligence-gathering posts on Islamic State and al-Qaeda, according to The Telegraph.

Read more: http://sputniknews.com/africa/20151125/1030744256/china-africa-military-base.html#ixzz3sXo2b0LW

That is interesting. How will the Chinese or the whole nation of Africa begin to see that they have other countries bases in their little countries. France and the US have drone/Reaper unites in Chad, Ethiopia, and Niger. Bokka Haram boarders these areas and do raids. So what will China do when Bokka Harem or another terrorist group decides to set its sight on the new Chinese base?

What are the Chances of China Deploying Troops to Syria?

Last week, lawmakers adopted China's first-ever dedicated anti-terrorism law. The new law's most interesting provision, as far as foreign observers are concerned, is an article authorizing the Chinese military to take part in counter-terrorism missions abroad. Will China now join the Syrian, Russian and Iranian-led anti-terror campaign in Syria?

On Thursday, commenting on China's new counterterrorism law, and specifically its provision allowing the People's Liberation Army to participate in anti-terrorism operations overseas, Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujin emphasized that China has a "proactive" attitude when it comes to international cooperation against terrorism.

Speaking at a regular monthly briefing for reporters, cited by Reuters, Yang explained that in the event that Chinese forces were ever deployed abroad for the purposes of fighting terrorism, it would be in full respect of international norms, including countries' sovereignty.

"Overseas anti-terrorism operations by the military and People's Armed Police must respect the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, adhere to the norms of international relations and fully respect the sovereignty of the country concerned," the spokesman emphasized.

"Going forward, whether or not to send the military and People's Armed Police overseas to fight terrorism, will be arranged in accordance with a unified national plan," he added, without elaborating.

After the law was passed, speculation quickly emerged suggesting that China could deploy its armed forces to Syria to combat jihadist militants, including radicals from the al-Qaeda-backed East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which operates in the western Chinese province Xinjiang. It was earlier reported that militants from this organization had gone to Syria to fight alongside jihadists there, and that some have returned home to carry out attacks in western China. But is there any truth to the rumors? Will China join the anti-Daesh coalition fighting in Syria anytime soon? Not likely, according to Russian journalist Anton Mardasov.

"It's worth recalling," Mardasov noted, in his article for independent Russian newspaper Svobodnaya Pressa, "that soon after Russia's intervention in the Syrian conflict, the media was filled with reports that a Chinese fleet led by the Liaoning aircraft carrier had passed through the Suez Canal to take part in the war in support of the Syrian government."

However, the journalist continued, the rumors were soon quashed.

In his own article on the matter of the phantom Chinese aircraft carrier for Russian military newspaper Voyenno-promyshlennyy Kuryer, Alexandr Khramchikhin, the deputy director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, explained that Beijing does not seem prepared to abandon its policy of maintaining good relations with those countries in the region which support the ouster of Syrian President Bashar Assad, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, some experts, Mardasov noted, believe that China's possible interest in destroying terrorists abroad stems from the fact that like Daesh in Iraq and Syria, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement threatens to separate Xinjiang from China, and to create an Islamic State on its own territory. In Syria, these experts have emphasized, ethnic Uighur jihadists, associated with the al-Nusra Front and Daesh, have their own bases and training centers.

In October, Russian observers discovered photos showing Chinese military jeeps – presumably operated by the Syrian Army, suggesting that this was the first confirmation of the supply of Chinese military equipment to Syrian government forces. This, Russian military blog BMPD suggested, could be a sign that China has abandoned its earlier-stated position that it would not support any party to the conflict militarily.

"In the war in Syria, a large variety of Chinese weapons has been used, including the HJ-8 MANPADS FN-5 anti-tank system, various types of small arms and light weapons. However, in most instances this was a case of weapons transferred to Syrian rebel groups from various Arab armies, or from the Islamists' seizure of Iraqi military supplies. Apparently, now China's position on the question of military and military-technical assistance to Syrian authorities has begun to undergo changes," BMPD wrote at the time.

In an interview for a separate Svobodnaya Pressa piece, Alexei Maslov, the head of the School of Asian Studies at Moscow's Higher School of Economics, explained that after Russia's intervention in the Syrian crisis, Beijing actively pondered whether or not to join the Syrian-Russian anti-Daesh coalition. Ultimately, according to the analyst, the country's leadership decided that such a move would not serve the country's interests.

"More than anything, [such a move would be problematic] from the point of view of the country's image. For many years, China has not taken part in conflicts abroad, fearing that this could lead to a negative reaction, both domestically and abroad," Maslov noted.

Nonetheless, Alexandr Larin, senior research fellow at the Moscow-based Institute of Far Eastern Studies, told Mardasov that the new counter-terrorism law allowing the PLA to conduct anti-terrorism operations abroad will naturally stoke the rumor mill.

"This could be one of the factors which has led some experts and media to get the impression that China may participate in the Syrian conflict. This idea is supported by the fact that on the side of the militants in Syria are a number of Islamist separatists from China's Xinjiang," the expert noted.

However, Larin added that in his view, "Chinese intervention in the Syrian conflict seems very unlikely. Beijing maintains a policy of equidistance in relation to most countries in the world. Accordingly, it has a special line when it comes to the Syrian crisis. China adheres to three principles – a settlement by political means, the combined action of anti-terrorist forces, and humanitarian assistance. I should note that China is in a rather advantageous position, given that the fighting is being carried out by other countries."

"On the whole," the analyst continued, "up to now I have not seen any serious signs that would indicate that Beijing is really going to take part in combat operations in the Middle East. It is clear that China has a profound interest in a stable situation in the region, particularly given it gets much of its oil from countries there (mainly from Iran), and makes serious investments there."

"Moreover," Larin noted, "it is through the Middle East that the [southern route of the] 'New Silk Road' is to extend. This too forces Beijing to smooth out the situation. But the Chinese are unlikely to risk getting involved in the Syrian conflict – moreover via the sending of their troops there, which would mean joining a coalition and automatically receiving rivals and opponents from the other alliances. Thus everything up to now suggests that China will be unlikely to intervene directly in the Syrian war."

Read more: http://sputniknews.com/military/20160101/1032581067/china-troops-syria-analysis.html#ixzz3w34or4de

One China, One Taiwan


Nice unbiased article

China's First Overseas Base in Djibouti Will 'Help Fleet'

Read more: http://sputniknews.com/asia/20160206/1034344528/china-base-djibouti-fleet.html#ixzz3zPnZgYcY

Inside China’s Plan for a Military That Can Counter U.S. Muscle


With a series of edicts, speeches and martial ceremonies, President Xi Jinping has over the past six months unveiled China’s biggest military overhaul since the aftermath of the Korean War.The plan seeks to transform the 2.3-million-member People’s Liberation Army, which features 21st-century hardware but an outdated, Soviet-inspired command structure, into a fighting force capable of winning a modern war.

China is shifting from a “large country to a large and powerful one,” Xi explained in November. The restructuring will be a major focus of the country’s new defense budget, which will be announced Saturday as the annual National People’s Congress gets under way in Beijing.

“A lot of countries do military reforms, but they are rarely as tectonic as what we are seeing in China,” said Dean Cheng, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington who specializes in military capabilities. “Any single one of these elements constitutes a bureaucratic overhaul of the first order.”



Here are the key elements of Xi’s plan:

Fewer Singers, More Sailors

The first piece of the overhaul — announced by Xi during a grand military parade through Tiananmen Square on Sept. 3 — calls for eliminating 300,000 PLA personnel by 2017. While Xi presented the cutbacks as proof of China’s commitment to peace, they’ll largely target non-combat personnel and should make the country’s forces more focused and efficient.



Out are military cooks, hospital workers, journalists and some 10,000 members of the PLA’s famed troops of singers and dancers. Even so, China’s military will remain by far the world’s largest, with more than 600,000 more active service members than the U.S., according to estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The reorganization will also chip away at the army’s dominance as modern mechanized warfare requires far fewer conventional troops. China needs more pilots, sailors, commandos and drone operators to achieve ambitions of projecting force farther afield.

Who’s the Boss?

Advanced military actions such as intercepting rival aircraft, carrying out drone strikes and using special forces to extract hostages, demand the sort of close collaboration China’s army-centric military has lacked. Xi intends to fix that by reorganizing the armed forces into five branches under a joint-command structure modeled after that of the U.S.

In addition to the existing army, PLA Air Force and PLA Navy, a new Rocket Force will be responsible for China’s nuclear arsenal and conventional missiles while a Strategic Support Force will oversee cyberwarfare and protect China’s financial system from attack.


Redrawing the Map

As part of the move toward a unified command, China consolidated its seven military regions into five “Theater Commands” or “Battle Zones,” with each service reporting to a single commander, a move first reported by Bloomberg News in September. How these zones will function remains unclear.




“A lot of energy will be spent figuring out who commands who; who supports who; and most importantly who controls which budgets?” said Felix Chang, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.
Many will be watching to see how far beyond China’s borders the new zones reach and how the revamped military map will shape PLA activities in regional hotspots such as the South China Sea.

Consolidating Power



Xi is also centralizing his authority by breaking up the military’s massive, back-office bureaucracy. Four existing general departments will be divided into 15 smaller units responsible for everything from training and logistics to punishing corrupt officers and ensuring soldiers get sufficient education in Marxist ideology. They’ll all report directly to the Central Military Commission, a Communist Party body led by Xi.

“It may be that this is a means for Xi to increase his support within the PLA, as all these new general officer billets will be filled with his people,” said Cheng, of the Heritage Foundation.

Success of the reform plan will depend heavily on Xi’s capacity to overcome entrenched interests in the PLA, which has long enjoyed a privileged status as the guarantor of Communist Party rule. In a sign of the army’s continued influence, all five of the commanders chosen for the new battle zones hail from the ground forces.

One thing Xi has made clear: he has no plans to transfer control over the PLA to the government from the party, something foreign military experts say is needed to professionalize the services.

China’s Growing Overseas Presence Aims to Protect Beijing’s Interests

China’s ascendance on the international arena comes out from the defense the country's interests abroad, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Tuesday.

BEIJING (Sputnik) – China’s growing overseas presence is aimed at protecting the country's interests abroad, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Tuesday.

"Like many large countries, China expands its presence abroad," Wang stated at a briefing.

Tens of thousands of Chinese companies are working abroad, while China's 2016 overseas investment exceeded $100 billion, that is why the protection of the country's interests "is a pressing issue for Chinese diplomacy" and the actions of Beijing "are focused on the protection of its interests," he stressed.

China will not follow the expansion path as the world’s powerful countries traditionally did, the minister noted.

The Asian nation provided the largest number of peacekeepers for worldwide programs, and the contribution to the UN budget for peacekeeping missions is also the highest, he stressed.

Wang also voiced China’s intent to strengthen cooperation with other countries, including the collaboration in the legal and security areas.

Read more: http://sputniknews.com/asia/20160308/1035949849/china-abroad-influence-cooperation.html#ixzz42JAq7GMf

China proposes 'Underwater Great Wall' that could erode US, Russian submarine advantages



Chinese version of amerikan SOSUS. Does Russia use such sonar network system ?

The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) has proposed the construction of a network of ship and subsurface sensors that could significantly erode the undersea warfare advantage held by US and Russian submarines and contribute greatly to future Chinese ability to control the South China Sea (SCS).

Details of the network of sensors, called the 'Underwater Great Wall Project', were revealed in a CSSC booth at a public exhibition in China in late 2015. A translated copy of the descriptions was obtained by IHS Jane's from a government official. The text was confirmed by a source from a second government on condition of anonymity.

While some elements of this network have been known for some time, CSSC is now in effect proposing an improved Chinese version of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) that for a time gave the US a significant advantage in countering Soviet submarines during the Cold War. The system proposed by CSSC is likely being obtained by China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) but may also be offered for export.

CSSC says that, among other things, its objective is to provide customers with "a package solution in terms of underwater environment monitoring and collection, real-time location, tracing of surface and underwater targets, warning of seaquakes, tsunamis, and other disasters as well as marine scientific research".

The corporation says in the document that its "R&D and production bases in Beijing and Wuxi [have] the ability to support the whole industry chain covering fundamental research, key technology development, solution design, overall system integration, core equipment development, production, and operation service support".

The shipbuilding conglomerate says it has 10 series of products on offer that include systems relating to marine observation, oceanographic instrumentation, underwater robotics, and ship support.

Specific components of CSSC's surveillance system include surface ships, sonar systems, underwater security equipment, marine oil and gas exploration equipment, underwater unmanned equipment, and marine instrument electronic equipment.[/b]

Chinese naval fleet call at Myanmar port to enhance strategic cooperative partnership

YANGON, Sept. 30 (Xinhua) -- A Chinese naval fleet comprising Xiangtan and Zhoushan of the 23rd Escort Task Group called at the Myanmar International Terminals Thilawa (MITT) in Yangon's Thanlyin township Friday, following the completion of its escort mission in the Gulf of Aden.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy fleet's five-day visit to Myanmar aims to implement the important consensus reached by military leaders of both sides, that is to strengthen strategic communication, promote practical cooperation and enrich the China-Myanmar comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.

The call also aims to enhance exchange and cooperation and increase mutual understanding and traditional friendly ties between navies of the two countries.

Welcoming the Chinese naval fleet at the Thilawa port terminal were Chinese Ambassador Hong Liang and Chief of Myanmar naval dockyard headquarters Admiral Myint Oo as well as other naval officials.

Ambassador Hong Liang said at the deck reception that the PLA naval fleet's Myanmar visit will promote understanding of Myanmar people on China and enhance the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries and deepen military cooperation between the two armed forces.

He added that during the four months' voyage of escorting Chinese and foreign vessels, the PLA navy fleet also protected those transporting humanitarian food aid, showing the PLA navy's contribution to a harmonious world and a harmonious ocean and playing a positive role in safeguarding world peace and stability.

During its call in Myanmar, commander of the Chinese navy fleet will meet Myanmar military leaders.

Besides carrying out cultural exchange and interaction with the Myanmar side such as visits, tours, football games with their counterparts, the Chinese naval vessels will be open to the public for show .

The Chinese naval fleet's call at Myanmar port, which represent another voyage after a training flotilla's visit in May 2014, will be significantly important to the exchange of the two navies.

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/30/content_7285472.htm

Xi Jinping Heads to Latin America to 'Fill Vacuum Left By New US Politics'

Read more: https://sputniknews.com/latam/201611171047560918-china-latin-america-us/

China re-established diplomatic ties with Sao Tome and Principe, an island state located along the equator off the coast of Africa that has recently broken off relations with Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said Monday.

Read more: https://sputniknews.com/asia/201612261048995368-china-diplomatic-relations-sao/

A group of Navy ships of the PLA went to Djibouti to build a fleet support base

On July 11, 2017, the multipurpose assault group of the PLA Navy ships as part of the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) 868 Donghaidao and the universal landing ship 071 Jinggangshan departed from the port of Zhangjiang, located in Guangdong Province, to create the logistics base of the PLA Navy in Djibouti.

Before the departure, Commander of the Chinese Navy, Shen Jinlong, read out an order to establish a base in Djibouti. The decision to create a base of the Chinese Navy in Djibouti was adopted following friendly talks between the two sides in order to promote and protect the interests of the peoples of the two countries, Xinhua news agency reported.

The base will provide support to the Chinese Navy during various missions in Africa and Western Asia, including maintenance tasks, peacekeeping operations and delivery of humanitarian aid.

It is also alleged that the base will serve the interests of international cooperation, implementation of joint exercises, as well as ensuring the security of international strategic shipping lanes.


As previously reported by a colleague of bmpd, the Chinese mobile landing platform Donghaidao was solemnly accepted into the Southern Fleet of the PLA Navy in July 2015. Thus, China became the second country in the world, after the USA, which possesses ships of this class. The speed of the adoption by the Chinese of the American idea attracts attention. In the US, the first ships of the type MLP were laid only in 2011 (they were rebuilt from tankers of the Alaska type), and put into operation in 2013.

The construction of MLP quite clearly speaks about the goals that China sets itself by developing the naval forces. The American concept of MLP and Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) is based on another concept - Seabasing, conducting expeditionary operations in remote areas without reliance on coastal infrastructure. The idea is that supplies at sea are transferred to MLP and AFSB from transport ships and then delivered to unequipped shore by MLP-based amphibious assault boats and AFSB-based heavy transport helicopters. In addition, AFSB can support the deployment of various forces that support the operation, for example, minesweepers, special forces units, etc.

In 2015, the USA re-qualified MLP in Expeditionary Transfer Dock, Expeditionary Transfer Dock, and AFSB in Expeditionary Base Mobile Expeditionary Mobile Base. It is important to note that both types of ships are specially designed to provide large-scale amphibious operations operations in areas located at a great distance from the friendly coastal infrastructure. For operations of a small scale, for example, by special forces, there is enough transport capacity for landing ships, and for landing parties on the nearby islands, numerous and cheap landing craft and mobilized civilian small displacement vessels can be involved. Therefore, although the Chinese state media drew attention to the possible usefulness of MLP in ensuring the interests of the PRC in the South China Sea, in reality, these ships have more ambitious tasks. Especially if you consider that from 2013 China has successfully built artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago and will soon have the necessary infrastructure on the shore. It is no longer a matter of fighting for Taiwan or microscopic disputed islands, but about operations off the coasts of other continents.








http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2724259.html

Opening ceremony of the PLA military base in Djibouti

The flag-raising ceremony of the PRC at the base in Djibouti (East Africa) took place at 8:00 am local time (coincides with Moscow). After its termination, the ships of the Chinese Navy approached the piers.

More than 300 servicemen and sailors took part in the solemn event, including Tian Zhong, the commander-in-chief of the PLA Navy. The ceremony was timed to coincide with the 90th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army of China. As noted by the Xinhua News Agency, the base is built for Chinese military participation in peacekeeping operations in the region, as well as for humanitarian assistance in Africa and West Asia. In addition, military exercises will be held there. China announced the beginning of construction of a military base in 2016. The first military servicemen were sent to the base on July 11 this year. In total, over two thousand military will serve on it. Djibouti is a country in East Africa with a population of about 740,000 people. On the territory of the country there are already points of supply of the US Navy, France and Japan.







http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2763659.html

Chinese military base in Djibouti



https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2973093.html

No troops to Afghanistan: China
https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/no-troops-to-afghanistan-china/article24822840.ece

They may wear no insignia or be in Afghan Army uniforms. We r talking about special "mountain" forces. They may be even from among the Chinese Muslims, many of whom r not Han types.

Beijing goes on the offensive  
China continues to squeeze RF and India out of their traditional zones of influence.

Chinese Navy "blocked" the Taiwan Strait

They can do it again & again, w/o closing the strait "till further notice" & violating any maritime laws. The USN could've based warships on Taiwan's W. coast for access to it 24/7, but it's too late now.

China made a new move in rivalry over Southeast Asia: https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2675886.html

https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/07/article/cambodia-china-ink-secret-naval-port-deal-report/

The bases will also be handy in monitoring & defending the future Kra Canal across Thailand.

About military friendship with China
https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2698359.html

Sri Lanka is a problem.

But when they got Hong Kong and Taiwan to deal with...

Not ready but it's a good challenge to get their feet wet on what's to come.

Recently released report suggests People’s Liberation Army Air Force's Su-27s lost a majority of engagements in a November 2015 joint exercise with the 701 Fighter Squadron of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF)

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2020-02-08/plaaf-senior-pilot-reveals-poor-performance-joint-exercise-rtaf