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There was a link to this article in the M of A comments. Here is some of the important parts. The author has some doubts about what the actual plan is for this war. I am not a doomer but the article touches on some things that are at least worth a thought.
Russia Has No Strategy For Winning This War
If you look at and analyze the Not-War on the strategic level, well, you can’t help but come to the conclusions and talking points presented by the pessimists.
But the narrative has now shifted and the discussion is being framed on the tactical level. That is, the events around Bakhmut are what the Russian news and the commentators are talking about now. But the action around Bakhmut is a tactical one. There are three levels to military operations, at least in the Russian school.
The founder of Wagner PMC Yevgeny Prigozhin denied the information about the encirclement of 1.5 thousand Ukrainian soldiers near Bakhmut (Artemovsk). His comment is published by Prigozhin’s press service in the official telegram channel. He noted that the Ukrainians are putting up strong resistance and Bakhmut (Artemovsk) will not be taken in the near future. “In all directions, the enemy is becoming more active, pulling up more and more new reserves. Every day, from 300 to 500 new fighters approach Bakhmut in all directions. Artillery fire intensifies every day,” said Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Contrast this with the early days of the war where entire swaths of Ukraine were being colored in on maps and shared by Russia pundits and bloggers. Now, they’re coloring in fields and factories and little farms. And they’re trying to keep the same level of hype going as when they were talking about entire provinces being taken. Or, perhaps they will show videos of a tank getting blown up. Or a platoon of soldiers getting a grenade dropped on them from a drone. Very interesting footage, don’t get me wrong. We are seeing a different kind of war — a mix of WWI trench warfare and mini-Stalingrads.
But it is undeniable that a certain “zoom-in” has occurred. At best, we’re talking endlessly about towns that have been fought over for months now. Having a discussion about the tactical level of things is a worthy pursuit in its own right. But not when it is presented in the context of a bait and switch. That is, we were promised large scale offensives. However fierce the fighting is in Bakhmut, it doesn’t take away from the fact that everywhere else on the frontlines, we are at a standstill. Furthermore, people are drawing conclusions about the state of the war on the strategic level based on tactical level data.
I will give you a concrete example of what I mean. Bakhmut, even if taken, will not be exploited on an operational level. That is, there is no follow-up planned. I have been saying this for months now. There are no large concentrations of tanks and reserve troops to throw at the enemy once Bakhmut, a key point in the Ukrainian defensive line (or so we are told), finally falls to Ukraine.
In the early days, we saw a clear strategy reflected by large troop movements, rapid breakthroughs and consolidation of territory and so on. Since then, we have seen very little of the same kind of warfare. And after that, we well and truly saw nothing resembling a coherent strategy from Russia at all. Only feuding among its feudal commanders and an attempt to hold a defensive line. At the moment, there are no large concentrations of fresh Russian forces anywhere, except perhaps, in Belarus [or in the south, near Mariuple and Melitople ahead of the expected Ukrainian advance].
We have no idea what Russia’s plans are on the strategic level at this point. Putin’s speech did nothing to clarify this.
If the strategy is to engage in attrition warfare, then simply do the math yourselves. How many years of fighting will it take at this pace to destroy the Ukrainian army, which stands at 700k now, at least, and whose numbers continue to climb and which, in theory anyway, could easily draft another million men? And, of course, their ranks are being supplemented by Western mercenaries all the while. Poland openly admits to training tank crews and sending officers into Ukraine and so does NATO.
If, on the strategic level, the goal is to engage in attrition warfare, then it simply isn’t working fast enough.
Many pessimistic pro-Russian analysts have already come to this conclusion and point out that a new strategy is necessary. That Russia needs to fight this war like wars are normally fought. Russia needs to focus on seizing territory and strategic objectives, on breaking through enemy lines and then enveloping their positions. More men and equipment are needed to achieve decisive victories that can then be followed up on and the war concluded more rapidly, not strung out, with the number of dead steadily rising and progressively more and more of the Ukraine left in smoldering ruins.
By narrowing in our focus on the tactical level fighting over a barn in Bakhmut or Ugledar, we lose sight of the strategic goals of the war. Full article https://roloslavskiy.substack.com/p/russia-has-no-strategy-for-winning
Russia Has No Strategy For Winning This War
If you look at and analyze the Not-War on the strategic level, well, you can’t help but come to the conclusions and talking points presented by the pessimists.
But the narrative has now shifted and the discussion is being framed on the tactical level. That is, the events around Bakhmut are what the Russian news and the commentators are talking about now. But the action around Bakhmut is a tactical one. There are three levels to military operations, at least in the Russian school.
The founder of Wagner PMC Yevgeny Prigozhin denied the information about the encirclement of 1.5 thousand Ukrainian soldiers near Bakhmut (Artemovsk). His comment is published by Prigozhin’s press service in the official telegram channel. He noted that the Ukrainians are putting up strong resistance and Bakhmut (Artemovsk) will not be taken in the near future. “In all directions, the enemy is becoming more active, pulling up more and more new reserves. Every day, from 300 to 500 new fighters approach Bakhmut in all directions. Artillery fire intensifies every day,” said Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Contrast this with the early days of the war where entire swaths of Ukraine were being colored in on maps and shared by Russia pundits and bloggers. Now, they’re coloring in fields and factories and little farms. And they’re trying to keep the same level of hype going as when they were talking about entire provinces being taken. Or, perhaps they will show videos of a tank getting blown up. Or a platoon of soldiers getting a grenade dropped on them from a drone. Very interesting footage, don’t get me wrong. We are seeing a different kind of war — a mix of WWI trench warfare and mini-Stalingrads.
But it is undeniable that a certain “zoom-in” has occurred. At best, we’re talking endlessly about towns that have been fought over for months now. Having a discussion about the tactical level of things is a worthy pursuit in its own right. But not when it is presented in the context of a bait and switch. That is, we were promised large scale offensives. However fierce the fighting is in Bakhmut, it doesn’t take away from the fact that everywhere else on the frontlines, we are at a standstill. Furthermore, people are drawing conclusions about the state of the war on the strategic level based on tactical level data.
I will give you a concrete example of what I mean. Bakhmut, even if taken, will not be exploited on an operational level. That is, there is no follow-up planned. I have been saying this for months now. There are no large concentrations of tanks and reserve troops to throw at the enemy once Bakhmut, a key point in the Ukrainian defensive line (or so we are told), finally falls to Ukraine.
In the early days, we saw a clear strategy reflected by large troop movements, rapid breakthroughs and consolidation of territory and so on. Since then, we have seen very little of the same kind of warfare. And after that, we well and truly saw nothing resembling a coherent strategy from Russia at all. Only feuding among its feudal commanders and an attempt to hold a defensive line. At the moment, there are no large concentrations of fresh Russian forces anywhere, except perhaps, in Belarus [or in the south, near Mariuple and Melitople ahead of the expected Ukrainian advance].
We have no idea what Russia’s plans are on the strategic level at this point. Putin’s speech did nothing to clarify this.
If the strategy is to engage in attrition warfare, then simply do the math yourselves. How many years of fighting will it take at this pace to destroy the Ukrainian army, which stands at 700k now, at least, and whose numbers continue to climb and which, in theory anyway, could easily draft another million men? And, of course, their ranks are being supplemented by Western mercenaries all the while. Poland openly admits to training tank crews and sending officers into Ukraine and so does NATO.
If, on the strategic level, the goal is to engage in attrition warfare, then it simply isn’t working fast enough.
Many pessimistic pro-Russian analysts have already come to this conclusion and point out that a new strategy is necessary. That Russia needs to fight this war like wars are normally fought. Russia needs to focus on seizing territory and strategic objectives, on breaking through enemy lines and then enveloping their positions. More men and equipment are needed to achieve decisive victories that can then be followed up on and the war concluded more rapidly, not strung out, with the number of dead steadily rising and progressively more and more of the Ukraine left in smoldering ruins.
By narrowing in our focus on the tactical level fighting over a barn in Bakhmut or Ugledar, we lose sight of the strategic goals of the war. Full article https://roloslavskiy.substack.com/p/russia-has-no-strategy-for-winning
Hole
