How Americans Control Missile Launches from Ukrainian Territory, by Igor Garnov for VZGLYAD. 11.18.2024.
The ATACMS missiles that Ukraine has cannot be used against targets deep inside Russian territory without the direct participation of NATO servicemen. This conclusion follows directly from both the procedure for Ukraine to obtain intelligence information and from the process of creating flight missions for these missiles.
It looks like the US is about to cross another red line – and this time one it would be better not to cross. Joe Biden is said to have given in to the requests of the head of the Kiev regime and allowed US missile strikes deep into Russian territory.
First of all, we are talking about the American ATACMS ballistic missiles (range 300 km), American JASSM cruise missiles (370 km), British Storm Shadow cruise missiles and their French version SCALP-EG (both up to 560 km). Although both the British and French leadership currently deny this possibility, it is still worth considering.
But the main thing is not the fact of using Western weapons systems, but that they cannot be used in any other way except with the participation of NATO servicemen. And such participation means direct involvement of NATO in the conflict with Russia. According to the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova, Russia's response in this case will be adequate and tangible. And any such strike will mean "direct participation of the US and its satellites in military actions against Russia, as well as a radical change in the essence and nature of the conflict."
" ...The Ukrainian army is not capable of carrying out strikes with modern high-precision long-range systems of Western manufacture... This is only possible with the use of intelligence data from satellites, which Ukraine does not have, this is data from satellites of the European Union or the United States, in general from NATO satellites. This is the first thing.
The second, and very important, perhaps key, is that flight assignments for these missile systems can, in fact, only be entered by NATO military personnel. Ukrainian military personnel cannot do this ,” Vladimir Putin said on this matter.
How does NATO military participation occur in this case purely technically? This participation begins, as already indicated, with satellite reconnaissance.
The US military satellite constellation has more than four hundred devices, including several dozen reconnaissance ones. The European Union and NATO have far fewer satellites. Ukraine has none, so the Ukrainian Armed Forces are completely dependent on intelligence information coming from the West.
It would seem that the transfer of intelligence information in itself is not yet full participation in the conflict. But it is not enough to receive satellite images. These images require decoding and interpretation in special data processing centers. There are only a few of these centers in the world, but not a single one in Ukraine.
In the US, this is the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), in France, the Centre d'Expertise de la Défense (CED), and in the UK, the Defence Intelligence Organisation. There are also NATO structures called the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), Allied Joint Force Command and Allied Command Operations (ACO), which process and analyse data to support military operations. All centres are linked by duplicated digital communication lines. All of them currently work for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
In all these centres, primarily satellite – but not only – intelligence information is processed in real time. The processed information becomes the basis for obtaining precise target coordinates. What in military language is called target designation, the point at which a strike is carried out with some type of weapon.
But isn't it possible to use openly available data from mapping services to obtain target designations? Yandex maps or other similar ones? After all, they also display objects tied to precise coordinates on the ground. Maybe the Ukrainian Armed Forces are capable of using, say, Google Map to attack Russian objects?
Yes, it is possible to obtain coordinates of a critical infrastructure, industrial or energy facility in this way. But these two types of data cannot be found in these geoservices.
Firstly, data on troop groups, the presence of aircraft at airfields, ships at bases, air defense facilities. Such data changes quickly and requires prompt processing. Secondly, data on the high-precision altitude profile of the terrain. In fact, this is a radar portrait of the terrain, which is critical for constructing the route of missiles. These data were collected by many generations of spacecraft and civilian airliners.
There is nothing like this in Ukraine or in publicly available services. And all these parameters are absolutely necessary for creating flight missions for high-precision long-range weapons.
For example, let's imagine the work of a Ukrainian crew of the HIMARS MLRS system, transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces by the United States. The commander of this crew presses the conventional "red button" to launch the ATACMS missile. However, before this, the missile must be loaded with a flight mission, otherwise after launch it will fly anywhere but to the target.
The flight missions themselves are usually not created in the cabin of a ground launcher or aircraft. This is done by the above-mentioned centers. This is a long way and a complex procedure that requires the participation of many specialists of various profiles.
First, NATO satellite data on reconnaissance targets is transmitted to Ukrainian headquarters. There, they decide which targets need to be fired upon. At the HIMARS control points, a specific installation is selected to carry out the mission. All information exchange is conducted via secure NATO digital communication lines, primarily Link-16.
Once HIMARS arrives at the launch site, the launcher's position is determined with centimeter accuracy using GPS, and orientation is performed with hundredths of a degree accuracy. These values are transmitted to NATO data processing centres. There, specialists use the data they receive to create a computer program that will control the missile's flight during its specific flight - what is called a flight mission. These specialists are military personnel from NATO countries, usually the United States.
The created programme is then transmitted back to the HIMARS crew. The commander enters the flight mission into the onboard computer and launches.
In some NATO missile systems, crew commanders can enter target coordinates themselves, right in the cockpit. The flight mission is then calculated by the onboard computer. However, the control programme simply will not allow parameters to be entered that, for example, direct the missile to the territory of a NATO country. To expand the missile's area of application, to remove the corresponding safety devices, again, requires the intervention of NATO servicemen in the corresponding control centres.
The flight mission entry for Storm Shadow cruise missiles on Su-24 bombers and F-16 fighter-bombers looks roughly the same. The only difference is that the launch point – the carrier side – is mobile. But cruise missiles have the ability to adjust their course based on the radar portrait of the terrain. They even have a photo of the object, which compensates for inaccuracies in reaching the launch point and the error in launch time. So here, too, the pilot/crew in no way determines where and how the missile will fly.
Thus, Ukrainian operators of launchers and carriers of American missiles are simply drivers and service personnel. Their task is to drive the vehicle to the position, take their own coordinates, transmit them to the control centre, and when the ready flight task arrives, press the "Enter" key. The actual control of the choice of target, preparation of the flight task remains with NATO - most often American - servicemen. This is NATO's direct participation in the Ukrainian conflict.
https://vz.ru/world/2024/11/18/1298627.html
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